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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The labor injunction played a prominent role in labor disputes
during the first three decades of the Twentieth Century. When the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932 restricted the use of the injunction to those labor
disputes where fraud and violence were present, the importance of the labor
injunction diminished. Employers resorted to the labor injunction less
and less as the United States Supreme Court in a series of landmark
decisions limited the area of injunctive action. 'With the Norris-LaGuardia
Act the Government came closer to the position of neutrality in the economic
conflict between capital and labor than at any time previous or since. The
Act was, as Gregory calls it, a "self-help"^ measure. Within the succeeding
years, however, the role of the Government has become less neutral as Congrej;
passed such pro-labor legislation as the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Reform that 7/as long overdue was bound to produce such a
reaction. Labor's favored position during the thirties, however, led to the
abuse of power and privilege in some cases. It soon became evident that the
Wagner Act needed revising. This reform finally found expression in the
Taft-Hartley Act of 19U7» Certain provisions of the Act deal with the
labor injunction, and the question arises as to whether the labor injunction;
will once again assume an important role in the American labor scene.
^ Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law (Ne7/ York: W. W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 19U6), p. 197^
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The potentialities of the labor injunction as an employer* s weapon
were first made manifest in the famous Debs Case of I89I1 . For the next two
decades every economic weapon that could be mustered by labor—strikes,
picketing, and boycotts—was of no effect when it was countered with the
labor injunction. At times the use of the injunction seemed to infringe
upon basic American freedoms, and its use almost exclusively in the interest
of management gave grounds to the charge that Americans were being treated
as two different classes of citizens. In practice the injunction would
swiftly paralyze a strike or a boycott, but injunctive procedure was such,
however, that it moved agonizingly slow in removing the entangling mass of
litigation in which the situation had become emeshed. The injunction
became the scourge of American labor, and labor leaders attacked the use of
the injunction in labor disputes. As the number of labor injunction cases
in the courts multiplied, the opposition to the use of the labor injunction
became more vociferous and vehement. Eventually Congress saw the need for
offering labor some relief from the injunction and from the anti-trust
laws which were often used in connection with the injunction. To accomplish
this purpose the Clayton Act of 191U contained some labor provisions which
many believed to restrict the use of the labor injunction. Labor leaders
prematurely called the Clayton Act the ’’Magna Carta'' of labor, but the
Supreme Court did not choose to interpret it that way. Apparently the
intent of Congress had been obscure, and more labor injunctions were issued
2
under the Clayton Act than ever before.
^
"Sections 17, 13, and 19 of the Clayton Act were intended to correct
/certain procedural abuses of the labor injunction/. They have now been
'the law of the land* for fourteen years. What have they accomplished?
More restraining orders without notice have been granted by federal courts
within that period of time than in any prior period of like duration."
Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1930), pp. 185-136.
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That the injunction not only survived that piece of legislation,
but even emerged stronger showed that here was an inherent and integral part
of our legal heritage that could not easily be changed. Our legal system
has been formed through evolution, not revolution. The change is rain-
fully slow, retarded as it is by precedent and tradition. What at times may
appear as a change may be merely an aberration. It is surprising then that
3
so much was expected of the Clayton Act.
When labor became convinced that it could expect no succor from
the injunction under the Clayton Act as it was interpreted by the Supreme
Court, it renewed its agitation for anti-injunction legislation. This
campaign finally came to fruition in 1932 with the passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. The Norris-LaGuardia Act afforded labor the first real
relief from the labor injunction. The intent of Congress in this case
was clear. The Act did not outlaw the injunction, but it restricted its
use to acts of fraud or violence. Thus limited in scope, the labor
injunction was gradually discarded by the employer. The Taft-Hartley Law,
has, however, brought the labor injunction back into the limelight by
widening its scope once more.
It is because the labor injunction is still a live factor and may
become as controversial as it once was that inspired the writing of this
thesis. This study hopes to achieve a greater understanding and to clear up
many misconceptions concerning the federal labor injunction.
3
"The Clayton Act was the product of twenty years of voluminous agita-
tion. It came as clay into the hands of the federal courts, and we have
attempted a portrayal of what thev made of it. The result justifies an
application of a familiar bit of French cynicism: the more things are
legislatively changed, the more they remain the same judicially." Ibid
.
,
p. 176.
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CHAPTER II
PURPOSE
Prior to the passage of the Horris-LaGuardia Act, the injunction
inspired fear and hatred among the ranks of labor* In the heated contro-
versy that surrounded the issue, many charges were hurled against the
injunctive process. In such an atmosphere, however, confusion inevitably
results. An attack upon what are believed to be a few bad features rapidly
degenerates into an attack upon the whole* A blindness incurred by hatred
removes all reason from the scene* Soon it was no longer the alleged
abuses of the injunction that inspired the wrath of its opponents; the
entire injunctive process was under fire. The very word injunction
^Incurred the anathema of its critics. The word became a rallying point for
hatred; the mere mention of it precluded logical evaluation of both its
good points and its bad.^ The word became a symbol. How dangerous that
can be*. A poet was unfortunate enough to have a name like a conspirator.
The mob shouted: " It is no matter, his name 1 s Cinna; pluck but his name
2
out of his heart, and turn him going.' 1
^ Labor began to distrust all law. "Organized labor views all law
with resentment because of the injunction ..." Frankfurter and Greene,
op. cit
. , p. 52; same page quotes Vice-President Katthew Woll (AFL) from The ;
Tie-,
7
York Times
,
February 3, 1928, p. 27, col. 8: "... Ho other country
in the world permits its laborers to be harassed and oppressed by the use
of the injunctions in labor disputes ... we must abolish and wipe out
this iniquitous menace which threatens to undermine our industrial supremacy 1
and establish class distinction and class hatred."
7/illiam Shakespeare, Julius Caesar (New York: Charles E. L'errill Co.,
1910, p. lOU* ) Act III, Scene iii.
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This study ’.7111 seek out those basic issues, shorn of all
emotionalism, which were the actual causes of the heated controversy that
finally culminated in the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It will be
the purpose of this thesis to analyze the alleged abuses of the injunctive
process and to examine the effect of federal legislation upon the labor
injunction*

CHAPTER III
SCOPS AND LIMITATIONS
In achieving certain specific objectives this thesis will at the
sane time give an overall picture of the federal labor injunction, viz.,
no attempt vriLll be nade to spotlight certain aspects of the injunctive
process. Continuity vriLll be sought with events falling in their proper
sequence. Thus those events which concern the thesis primarily will not
be lifted out of their context, but ’.Till be supported by an accumulation
of experiences which provide a climate of understanding and clarification.
There vriLll be no pretence, however, to exhaustive and extensive coverage.
Hie study will aim at conciseness but not at the sacrifice of comprehensive'
ness and coherence. It vriLll be a representative piece of the injunction
pie, so that upon sampling it, one will know how the rest of the pie tastes
and what its ingredients are; its dimensions will be such as to convey the
size and shape of the whole pie.
To achieve this it will not be necessary to follow all of the
legal aspects of the injunction with all of the ramifications involved.
That 'would be a study in itself. For the purpose at hand only those legal
aspects will be covered that must necessarily serve as tools or frames of
references in accomplishing the task. The study vriLll be limited to the
federal labor injunction, and the landmark cases that were considered by
the Supreme Court will receive chief attention. The federal labor
injunction will be treated as part of the overall story of the economic
struggle between capital and labor, and the vicissitudes of this struggle
.«
•
.
.
and all pertinent labor legislation will receive proper attention

CHAPTER IV
TERMINOLOGY
Since the injunction issues from a court of equity, greater under-
standing of the injunctive process may be achieved if an inquiry is made
into the principles of equity and other legal aspects surrounding the
injunction.
A distinction should be made first of all between substantive
law and remedial law. Substantive law is that body of law "which creates,
defines, and regulates rights."^ The common and statutory law is sub-
stantive law. c Remedial (or adjective law) "prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion."-^ It is
remedial law "which provides for legal protection through injunction or
damage suit"^ if the rights defined by substantive law have been violated,
or a violation of them has been threatened.^
Circumstances may prevail, however, when there is no adequate
remedy at law to protect property from irreparable damage. Remedial
^ Henry C. Black, Black* s Law Dictionary (2nd Edition; St. Paul, Iiinn.:
West Publishing Co., 19l0), p. TITS.
2 Richard A. Lester, Economics of Labor (Hew York: The Macmillan Co.,
19U6), p. 701.
^ Black, loc . cit.
^ Lester, loc . cit .
5 Loc. cit.
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relief may then be sought from a court of equity. Equity as used here
refers to "that portion of remedial justice which was formerly administered
in England by the high court of chancery." It differs from the common law
in that "it administers and adjusts common-law rights where the courts of
7
common law have no machinery," Thus resort may be had to equity, only
g
when there is no adequate remedy at law, ' Another stipulation is: "He who
o
comes into equity must come with clean hands." That is, the court will
not "aid a wrongdoer and enforce for his benefit an illegal or immoral
contract ."'*'0 Other principles of British equity which bear on the labor
injunction are: "Equity has no jurisdiction over crimes;"^ it must "never
be used to curtail personal rights, and it is "to be exercised for the
protection of property rights only."-^
Equity is peculiar as compared to common lav; in that it "supplies
a specific and preventive remedy for common-law wrongs where courts of
common law only give subsequent damages,
The advantages of equity law can be better understood by citing
° William hack and William B. Kale, editors, Corpus Juris (New York:
The American Law Book Company, 1920)
,
XXI, 22.
4
7 Black, o£. cit.
,
p. I1I4.3 .
O
Charles E. Chadman, editor, Cyclopedia of Law (Chicago: DeBower-
Elliott Company, 1905), VIII, 190 .
^ P* 195.
10 Ibid
., p. 197 .
Ibid., p. 190.
1 0c John P. Frey, The Labor Injunction (Cincinnati: Eauity Publishing
Company, 1922), p. 10 .
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an example of equity in operation. A nan may have a piece of property along
whose boundary stand a row of stately and imposing cypress trees. The man
takes great pride in these trees which enhance the beauty of his estate.
To him they have a great aesthetic value, and he is never prouder than
when visitors comment upon tneir beauty. Then one day the adjacent property
is purchased by an aviation enthusiast who wants it for a private air field.
The flat land is excellent for that purpose; the only thing standing in the
way are the tall trees which are hazardous to landing planes. A boundary
dispute develops. The new neighbor claims that the trees are actually on
his property, and proceeds to cut them down despite the owner's protest.
The owner could later sue in a common-law court. If it were then found
that the trees were on his property, he would be awarded money damages.
But that would not restore to him the aesthetic value that the trees had for
him. The trees themselves could not be restored—the damage had been
irreparable . A court of equity, however, could have prevented the
destruction of the trees. Upon the threatened destruction of the cypress
trees, their owner could have applied to a court of equity for an injunc-
tion. This would have prevented the neighbor from chopping them down until
the court had had an opportunity to study all of the facts in the case, and
the true boundary determined. In this case the rights of both parties would
have been protected. If it were found that the property belonged to the
first mentioned party, no irreparable damage to the trees would have ensued.
If, on the other hand, the owner of the air field had legitimate claims to
the property, he could have proceeded to cut them down. Equity would have
been done.
It has been shown that the injunction is an instrument of a court
of equity. Generally an injunction may be defined as ”a writ framed
,. ,
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according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the
court regards as essential to justice, or restraining an act which it
esteems contrary to equity and good conscience.""^ Thus an injunction can
be either mandatory or preventive in nature. Mandatory in that it commands
specific performance of some act. This does not mean that it commands
correction of some wrong already done—that is, redress. Its purpose
16
rather is to prevent further injury. Preventive in that it orders one
or more individuals to "refrain from doing certain acts." In this case
the acts have been "unperformed" or "unexecuted", and it is the purpose of
the injunction to "prevent a threatened but nonexistent injury."^
There are three general classes of injunctions : Temporary
restraining order; temporary injunction; and permanent injunction. A
temporary restraining order "is an order granted to maintain the subject of
controversy in statu quo /sic7 until the hearing of an application for a
temporary injunction. This restraining order was usually issued ex
20parte; that is, without notice or hearing. The defendant was then
notified that the complainant was petitioning the court for a temporary
injunction. He was required to appear in court on a certain day to show
Mack and Hale, op. cit., XXXII, 19 .
lb
Ibid., XXXII, 22.
17
Earl W. Mounce, editor, Prentice-Hall labor Course (New York:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1946 ), p. §23.
^ Mack and Kale, 0£. cit., XXXII, 21-22.
19
Ibid., XXXiI, 27.
20 _
Injunction procedure is being described here as it .existed prior to
passage of the Norris-LaOuardia Act. Changes and criticisms to.11 be
discussed in later sections.
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cause why a temporary injunction should not be issued against him to
restrain him temporarily ’’from comitting the unlawful acts alleged in the
complaint."
4 '3
’ This was not a final hearing. It was notice and opportunity
to be heard; the parties presented affidavits and sometimes witnesses were
22
examined. If the judge saw cause, he could then issue a temporary
injunction.
A temporary injunction "is a provisional remedy . . . its sole
object is to preserve the subject in controversy in its then existing
condition . . . until a full and deliberate investigation of the case is
afforded to the party. it does not determine any question of right;
it merely stops further wrong or irreparable injury until a full hearing.
When the judge granted it, the case was set down for trial. After a full
hearing, the court could either set aside the temporary injunction or grant
a permanent injunction. It is important to neb e that the trial was without
benefit of a jury "as the Constitution does not guarantee the right of
trial by jury in equity cases.
A permanent injunction "is one granted by the judgment which
finally disposes of the injunction suit.”^ It is the final judgment.
Its aim is beyond "provisional remedies;" it is in its essence "final
relief
21
22
>
23
2h
25
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Ilounce, o£. cit
., p. 526.
Loc . cit .
Mack and Hale, op. cit
., XXXII,
Mounce, loc . cit .
Hack and Hale, op . cit
. ,
XXXII,
Loc. cit.
20 .
21.
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One other type of injunction needs to be mentioned, and that is
the “blanket 1 ' or "omnibus" injunction. This foresees that the acts
enjoined may be attempted by other persons than those named in the
injunction suit. To overcome this, it brings "within the area of potential
contempt the conduct of all undefined persons vrho in the future might
27threaten or encourage or commit violation ... of forbidden acts." This
28
type of injunction was issued in the Debs Case enjoining the defendants
"and all persons combining and conspiring with them and all other persons
whomsoever. "29 And again in the Tri-City Central Trades Council Case-^°
which said in part:
. . . the said defendants . • . and each of
them, and all persons combining 7/ith, acting
in concert with, or under their direction,
control or advice, or under the direction,
control or advice of any-^of them, and all
persons whomsoever. . .
Disobedience to the injunction places the offender in contempt
of court. This puts teeth in the injunctive process—the procedure
through which violations of the injunction may be punished. The violator
may be punished either by a fine or jail sentence if he is found guilty of
contempt. Prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act the accused was tried by the
same judge who issued the injunction.
27 Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. ,
p. 88. Phrase actually reads
"ambiguous schedule of forbidden acts" hut it is not feasible at this
point to inject any criticism.
^
’ In re Debs
,
Petitioner, 168 U. 3. 5&k (1^95)*
^ Frankfurter and Greene, op
. cit
. ,
p. 87 .
American Steel Foundries V. Tri City Council, 257 U. 3. I8 I4. (1921).
31
" Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit., p. 38.
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING IS3UAi:CE
In discussing equity, it was seen that certain stipulations must
be present before equitable relief will be granted; and that certain
principles govern the courts of equity. A further elaboration of these in
connection with the issuance of the injunction will now be discussed.
Unless stipulated by statute, no one has an absolute right to
injunctive relief. This lies in the discretion of the court and upon the
circumstances of the case.^
The issuance of injunctions is not based upon precedent. That
is, no precedent is needed. "If this was not so, and courts were confined
to particular precedents, there would be no power to grant relief in new
cases constantly occurring.”^
"An injunction may be obtained to prevent an irreparable injury
even though no such injury has yet occurred. A threat to commit such
injury is sufficient to obtain an injunction. Nor need the threat be
actually made; if the conditions indicate that acts leading to irreparable
damage are present, that is sufficient evidence.^ 1 In the example on page 17
^ Mack and Hale, op. cit.
,
XXXII, 29.
2 Ibid
. ,
XXXII, 3b.
3 Ibid
., XXXII, b2.
h Ibid
., XXXII, b$
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an assembling of cutting tools near the trees is an indication of intent
which may call for the issuance of an injunction.
Other conditions attending the issuance of the injunction are that
the injury is continuing^ or that it is substantial .0
• Property is an important concept in connection 'with the issuance
of an injunction. It has already been mentioned that equity is to be
exercised solely for the protection of property rights.^ This is not a
new concept, but is as old as equity jurisprudence. The first injunctions
Q
were issued by British chancery to prevent irreparable injury to land. 1
The labor injunction has made use of this important concept. Frankfurter
and Greene point out that property "has been the lattice-work upon which
the labor injunction has climbed. "9 It is easy to understand the issuance
of labor injunctions to protect tangible property from destruction. At
first glance, however, it is hard to conceive of a labor injunction when
no injury to tangible property is evident or is threatened; the misunder-
standing is cleared away be defining what is meant by property. This is
made clear in the following paragraphs:
Destruction of Property and Business. Acts
that will cause the destruction of complain-
ant* s property, or acts committed without just
cause or excuse that interfere with the carrying
^ Ibid
., XXXII, 1|6.
6 Ibid
., XXXII, 51.
7 Supra
, p. 17.
O
Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. ,
p. hi .
^ Ibid., p. I48 .
..
.
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on of complainant’ s business, destroying his
custom, his credit, or his profits, do an
irreparable injury and authorize the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. It is elementary-
law that the right to conduct one* s business
without the wrongful and injurious interfer-
ence by others is a valuable property right
which a court of equity will not hesitate
to protect by injunction.
Since the right to carry on a lawful
business without obstruction is a property
right, acts committed without just cause or
excuse, which interfere with the carrying on
of complainant’ s business and destroy his custom,
his credit, or his profits, do an irreparable
injury and authorize the issuance of an injunc-
tion. It has accordingly been held that inter-
ference with complainant’ s employees and business
by striking workmen . . . will be restrained in
proper cases as causing irreparable injury.^1-1
The Supreme Court put it more succintly. In Truax v. Corrigan
it said: "Plaintiffs’ business is a property right, and free access for
employees, owner, and customers to his place of business is incident to
such right. "12
An injunction though wrongfully issued must be obeyed.H This
is an old concept. In a volume written in 1321, the writer says: "An
injunction, however erroneously granted is an order of court, and must be
obeyed; if, therefore, the defendant or his attorney are guilty of a breach
10 Hack and Hale, op. cit., XXXII, 5U-55.
11
Ibid** XXXII, 155-156.
JTruax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921); from opinion reprinted in
Hilton Randier, Labor Law (St. Paul, l£Lnn.: West Publishing Co., 19hli)*
p. 135.
Infra, p. 122.
"”T " .
.
.
' C‘
i
.
'
. . .
.
.
.
.
-
.
-
.
•
-
< .
,
tjl
(
25
of the injunction, it is a contempt which the court will punish. A
modern application of this concept in labor cas^p was made by the Supreme
Court in Howat v. Kansas . In that case the Supreme Court held that an
injunction wrongfully issued could not be disobeyed; the correct procedure
is to obey while awaiting appellate adjudication.
Robert Henley Eden, A Treatise On The Law Of Injunctions (London:
Butterworth, 1321), p. 75*
^ Howat v. Kansas 258 U. S. 181 (1922). Case dismissed by Thomas R.
Powell, ’’The Supreme Court’ s Control Over the Issue of Injunctions In Labor
LLsputes," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. Parker T. Moon,
editor, XIII (1923"), 70.
.*
.
*
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CHAPTER VI
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It appears that the institution of equity or rather the concept
of equity in its primordial state was intended to protect the weak and poor
from the mighty and rich. Early laws tended to favor the rich, viz., the
Code of Hammurabi. In that body of law it was written, for example:
If a man has made the tooth of a man that is
his equal to fall out, one shall make his tooth
fall out.
If he has made the tooth of a poor man to fall
out, he shall pay one-third of a mina of silver.
1
The rich and powerful, moreover, were oft beyond the pale of the
lav/’. The plebian did not dare to assert his rights against the patrician,
nor the serf against the lord living in the manor. And if he dared, he
did not have the price with which to purchase justice.^
The concept of equity was given expression in Rome in order to
offer some protection to the poor. In $CQ B. C. the plebeians combined to
elect two tribunes annually "with extraordinary power to curb the political
and economic oppression of the plebeians ... These tribunes had the
power of saying ’I forbid', if appealed to in judicial or legislative pro-
3
ceedings." The institution disappeared upon the birth of the Roman Empire
^ The Code of Hammurabi (V. F. Calverton, editor, The Ilaking of
Society
,
Kew TorkT T.bdern Library, 1937 ), p. 25.
2
P« 29.
3 Frey, op. cit., p. 1.
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The concept of modern equity had its origin in England. The
common law began to develop first. It had its roots in the custom of the
Saxons. ^ Through continual usage a body of unwritten law developed—the
common law. Decisions were rendered orally; these oral decisions formed a
precedent for other judges to follow. Thus the common law was based on
oral tradition handed down from judge to judge. ^ Under such circumstances
the lav: was not able to cope with novel situations for which there existed
no precedent. Such 7ras the legal system of England during the reign of
Edward the Confessor (I0li2-1066) . After the ITorman Conquest (1066)
,
William the Conqueror did not upset the legal structure. He did, however,
reaffirm the principle that the king is the "fountain of justice" by
establishing the Curia Regis
,
i.e., king1 s or royal court. Vftthin this
legal system a hazy notion of equity took root and later developed into
the Court of Chancery. 1^ One of the members of the Curia Regis was a person
close to the ld.ng—the Chancellor. At first the Chancellor was the king* s
spiritual adviser; in time his duties expanded to those of secretary to the
king. Since the early chancellors were ecclesiastics who advised the king
on matters of conscience, the concept of conscience became an important
factor in the development of equity jurisprudence. Archer in his History
of the Law says that the first Chancellor was probably Arfastus, a
chaplain to William the Conqueror. ? The Chancellor gradually assumed
^ Harold L. Perrin and Hugh W. Babb, Commercial Law Cases (third
edition; Boston: Blanchard Printing Company, 1932)', I," *2.
5 Gleason L. Archer, History of the Law (Boston: Suffolk Law School
Press, 1928), p. 156.
^ Ibid., p. 157.
7
Loc. cit.
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great powers; he was placed over the other officers of the realm; and he
was given custody of the king’ s great seal# Beyond his ministerial duties
,
his power also began to extend over judicial natters*
Meanwhile the common-law courts were proving entirely unsatis-
factory in meting out justice. limited by a rigid adherence to precedent
and mired by set procedure, they were not able to give (and in some
p
instances unwilling to give') relief in all cases brought before them. A
case in a law court began with a writ. The form of the writ became "fixed
and rigid" 9 with the result that:
. . • while ordinary actions had a correspond-
ing writ, causes of action arose for which there
was no writ, and the common-law courts refused
modification of old writs for these cases.-0
This state of affairs came to a head in the reign of Edward I.
(1272-1307) when Parliament by the statute of Westminster (13 Edw. I.,
Chapter 2l0^ offered relief in those cases where there was no adequate
remedy at law by allowing them to be referred to the Chancellor. It had
already been the custom of the land to appeal to the king in matters of
"grace", that is, "matters requiring special indulgence or provision. "12
Since the king was occupied with matters of state, the custom developed
of petitioning the Chancellor rather than the king. New official recogni-
tion had been given to this custom and the courts of chancery began to take
shape. This fitted in with the scheme of things. Here was an ecclesiastic
8 Hack and Hale, op. cit. XXI, 23.
5 Chadman, op. cit
. ,
VIII, 179.
10 Ibid
., VIII, 179-130.
11
Ibid-j VI11
> 130.
Edward Jeriks, A Short History of English Law (London: Methuen & Co.,
,.
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who was "spiritual advisor" to the king and had "confidential relations
with him. In these matters of "grace" where personal judgment rather than
set legal doctrines ruled, who but the Chancellor would know how the king
would have acted? Since equity pleadings were free from the technical
rules of common law,U* the Chancellor, or as he was called, "the keeper of
the king’s conscience, was guided in procedure and judgment solely by
his conscience.
There is an old Italian proverb which says, "I cone for grace and
you give me justice." Perhaps that expresses best what equity sought to do,
it gave the petitioner grace. Justice said that if a wrong had been done,
damages would be awarded. But it did not prevent this wrong . In some
cases it did not offer any remedy. Equity through an injunction could
restrain a threatened wrong. It afforded relief "more ample and complete
than the law courts could give." ° Thus the number of suits that were
presented before the Court of Chancery began to increase. Equity juris-
diction was firmly established by the end of the Fourteenth Century as
can be seen from a study of chancery cases.
Another reason for the popularity of the Courts of Chancery' was
the expense of instituting a suit at law. Fines or fees had to be paid
Ltd., 193U), p. 211.
^3 Chadman, op . cit
. ,
VIII, I78 .
Jenks, op . cit
. ,
p. 166.
18^ Chadman, op. cit
., VIII, 179.
16 VIII, 182.
^ Jenks, on. cit
.
,
p. 165.
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for (l) acquiring justice and right, (2) writs, (3) pleas, (U) trials,
(5») judgment, and, (6) expedition of pleas, trials, and judgment.
The Court of Chancery, however, was not free from faults. The
fact that the Chancellor decided a case upon "good conscience" made him a
rather arbitrary judge. The term was nebulous. TNhat may mean "good
conscience" to one man may be disapproved by another. This was especially
noticeable whenever a new chancellor took office. In his famous "Table
Talk" Selden described the situation thus:
Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have
a measure and know what we trust to. Equity is
according to the conscience of him that is
chancellor; and as that is larger or narrower,
so is equity. ' Tis all one if they should make his
foot the standard for the measure we call a
chancellor's foot. YThat an uncertain measure
would this be? One chancellor has a long foot,
another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot^ c
'Tis the same thing as a chancellor's conscience.
As the Court of Chancery developed, however, this criticism was
less applicable. "Under the succession of able chancellors the juris-
diction of equity became firmly established, and its method of procedure
uniform and complete."-*-?
In the reign of Edward III. (132?—1377) the Court of Chancery
began to sit regularly at 'Westminster, and, as was pointed out above, the
number of cases began to increase. With the coning of Richard II in 1377
^ Hack and Hale, op. cit
., XXI , 22
-*-? Chadman, on. cit
. ,
Till, lp Ii.
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the courts of chancery began to protect "the poor and weak against the rich
and powerful."^
By the time of Henry V. (l]fL3-ll;22) the Court of Chancery had
become well established and distinct from the common-law court. About the
year l£00, the main differences between the two courts can be seen in the
21following chart:
Common-Law Courts Chancery Courts
1. Right 1. Grace
2. Writ (i.e., special 2. Bill (no form of action)
form of action)
3. Pleadings (Oral?) to issue 3. ’Written pleadings (no issue
No examination of parties u. Defendant on oath
5. Precedent 5. Discretion
6. Jury 6. No juiy’-
7. In rem 7. In personam
8 . Open accusation 8. Open accusation
9. Reason given for judgment 9. Reason given for judgment
The growing power of the Court of Chancery was viewed with
apprehension by the common-law courts. A struggle for supremacy ensued.
Meanwhile the chancellors were no longer chosen from the ecclesiastics. In
_
Ibid., VIII, 133« See also Francis Bowes Sayre, Cases on Labor
Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1922), p. i'll 3 in which
Sayre quotes Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
,
"The Chancellor, therefore, at the very outset of RichardTs’ (i. e.,Richar
d
II-Ed.) reign, the king himself being of tender years, with the sanction
no doubt of the Council, exercised an authority, especially in favor of the
weak."
21
Jenks, 0£. cit . , p. 168.
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1616 when Lord Ellesmere was Chancellor, the law courts Tinder Sir Edward
Coke, Chief Justice of the king* s bench, resisted further encroachment
upon their jurisdiction. A case developed in the law court and the
defendants applied to chancery for an injunction to restrain the proceed-
ings. The matter was referred to the king who sided with the court of
equity.
^
This reaffirmed the power of the court of equity, and soon those
principles of jurisprudence which governed it 'became extended to nearly
its modern scope. Equity and law courts became two separate and
distinct systems of jurisprudence in England, and continued in juxta-
position until the passing of the Judicature Act of 1373. This Act
merged the two systems into one supreme court of which chancery became a
.. . . 25division.
The American Colonies which were settled by Anglo-Saxons
,
fell
heir to English tradition, customs, and institutions. Early colonization
took place at the time that equity jurisprudence received its major
victory in England; thus the concept of equity became appended to the
judicial system of the English Colonies. The administration of equity,
however, assumed different forms in the various colonies. In most of the
09
Chadman, o£. cit
.,
VIiI, 13 U.
2*5J Jenks, o£. cit
., p. I67 .
Hack and Hale, op. cit
. ,
XXI
,
2i|.
2 C>
^ Loc. cit.
26
Chadman, op. cit.
,
VIII, 135
1.
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Colonies equity powers were bestowed upon the royal governor who exercised
them conjunctionally with his council. In the rest of the colonies save
Pennsylvania, equity jurisdiction was vested in the legislative branch.
Pennsylvania was the only one in which equity was not administered by a
pQ
"tribunal distinct from the common-law courts."^
After the P-evolution, the Federal Government and the several
states gave official recognition to the concept of equity. The
Constitution conferred upon the Federal Courts both equity and common-law
23jurisdiction. In the Federal Courts law and equity are administered by
the same court, but the procedure in each case is distinct. Many of the
states follow this system. A second group of states have two distinct and
separate courts administering law and equity. A third and final group
have no distinction between actions in law and suits in equity. The same
court rules in both cases, governed by codes establishing a uniform
procedure. 3°
^ Lo£* cit.
2:; Mack and Hale, loc . cit .
^ The Constitution, Article III.
hack and Hale, loc. cit.

CHAPTER VII
THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL LABOR INJUNCTION
A judicial concept does not develop overnight, but evolves slowly
through the years. Even that which may seem like a revolutionary piece of
legislation is the result of years of experience, and is itself an area of
experience which forms the basis for future law. Although the law evolves
slowly, there are factors which are constantly exerting pressure on it to
influence its future course. These forces are of various sorts such as
economic or social. Baron De Montesquieu wrote that even the climate
exerted an influence on the law of a country. After years of relentless
perseverance some particular force may gather sufficient strength to mark
a change in the law which reflects its particular brand of philosophy.
Needless to say, this change can only be transitory because, first, the
ideas of men are always in a state of flux, and, second, opposing forces
are ever at work. It is against such a background that the federal labor
injunction developed; and such laws as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Taft-Hartley Act, which have affected the injunction, must be studied in
the light of this background if they are to be clearly understood. There-
fore, in order to get a proper insight into these two pieces of labor
legislation and into the economic struggle between capital and labor in so
far as it touches upon the labor injunction, it will be necessary to trace
Baron De Montesquieu, Of Laws In Relation To The Nature Of The
Climate (V. F. Calverton, editor, TFie~Eaking of Society
,
I-'ew ‘NorH: The
Modern Library, 1937), pp. 178 ff.
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the concepts around which the controversy first began to revolve—the
doctrines of conspiracy and of restraint of trade.
THE DOCTRINES OF CONSPIRACY AND OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The doctrines of conspiracy and of restraint of trade have played
an important role in the economic conflict and in the development of the
9
federal labor injunction." Developing through centuries the doctrine of
conspiracy was crystallized into the following definition in 181;2 by Chief
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts: ”... a conspiracy must be a combination
of two or more persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish some
criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself
•5
criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means.” A brief examination
of the history of this doctrine is necessary if later interpretation of it
are to be understood.
The drama began to unfold in England with the common-law con-
ception of criminal conspiracy which was applied by the law courts as early
as the fourteenth century. ^ A statute applying to conspiracy among journey-
men was framed into law in 15HS, aimed at incipient combinations of laborers
At this early date the idea that v/orkers would combine to seek a better
bargain with their employers was embryonic; still counteracting forces began
c
”
. . . the two judicial conceptions which have played the most
prolific roles in the evolution of the labor injunction /are7 the doctrine
of ’conspiracy’ ana of ’restraint of trade’.” Frankfurter and Greene, op .
cit
. ,
p. 126
3 Commonwealth v. Hunt, h Metcalf 111, 123 (131|2).
k Mounce, op. cit.
, pp. 105-106.
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to germinate as can be seen from this law of 15U8, Concerning Conspiracies
of Journeymen
,
which read in part:
Forasmuch as of late divers . . . labour-
ers have made confederacies and sown mutual
oaths not only that they should not meddle one
with another 1 s work, and finish that another
hath begun, but also to appoint how much work
they shall do in a day, and what hours they
shall work . . . therefore it is enacted that
if they shall not do their work but at a
certain price or rate, or shall not take upon
them to finish that another hath begun, or
shall do but a certain work in a day, or shall
not work but at certain hours and times, on
conviction every person so offending shall for-
feit ten pounds.
6
Why it was unlawful for a group of men to do what was lawful for
one man was explained in People v. Wilzig :° "A combination of men is a very
serious matter. Uo man can stand up against a combination; he may success-
fully defend himself against a single adversary but 'when his foes are
7
combined and numerous he must fall*
In 1720 an attempt by journeymen tailors of London and West-
minster to raise their wages and lower their hours of work was termed an
unlawful conspiracy by Parliament which promptly passed a law against such
actions:
hhereas great numbers of journeymen taylors
in the cities of London and Westminster have
departed from their services without just cause,
and have entered into combinations to advance
their wages
. • . and lessen their usual hours
^ 2 & 3 Edw. VI, c. 15, I5b8, Concerning Conspiracies of Journeymen,
from abridgment in Handler, op. cit
. , p. 3«
° People v. Wilzig, 5 Eliz., c. b, 1562.
7 Reprinted in Mounce, o£. cit
., p. 105*
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of work, which action tends to the prejudice
of trade, . . . therefore be it enacted that
all contracts . . . between any persons . •
• exercising the art of a taylor in the cities
of London or Westminster, for advancing their
wages, or for lessening their usual hours of
work, shall be illegal, null and void.-
Again in 1721 a court of law indicted as conspirators a group of
journeymen tailors who combined to raise their wages.
^
The Combination Acts of 1799 and 1300 finally brought together
all concepts of conspiracy as they were applied to labor. The Statute of
1799 sought to freeze the status of the workmen of England1^ by prohibiting
them from organizing to improve their working conditions. In brief the
Statute made collective action or collective bargaining unlawful. 1 -1- By the
Statute of 1300, "Societies for the collection of funds for the benefit of
12fellow-workmen were definitely forbidden." The implications of these
Acts were plain: to combine to raise wages and improve working conditions
was an unlawful means to accomplish a criminal purpose. Trade unions were
henceforth illegal, but apparently the Combination Acts did not destroy
Q
7 George I., Stat. 1, c. 13> 1720 from abridgement in Handler, op .
cit., p. 5*
9 Rex v. Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge (Jang1 s Bench, 1721. 8 Mod.
10), " . . . it is for a conspiracy to raise their wages, for which these
defendants are indicted. It is true, it does not appear by the record that
the wages demanded were excessive; but that is not material ..." From
Court's opinion; case reprinted ibid
., p. 2.
10
Every journeyman or workman or other person who shall enter into any
combination to obtain increased wages, or to lessen or alter the hours of
work . . • shall be committed to the common goal ..." From abridgement
of the Combination Act of 17 99> ibid ., p. 6.
11 Loc . cit .
Abbott F. Usher, The Industrial History of England (Boston: Houghton
Llifflin Co., 1920), p. 379.
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then for they continued to exist surreptitiously. The Acts of 1799 and 1800
v/ere repealed in 13 2U in an effort to dissolve this clandestine labor
movement. Francis Place, T/ho did more than anyone else to bring the Repeal
of 1821;, v/rote: "Combinations Yd.ll soon cease to exist. Hen have been kept
together for long periods only by oppression of the laws, these being
repealed, combinations will lose the matter Yrhich cements them into masses
and they will fall to pieces." The Act of 13 2U further provided that
prosecution of workmen under common and statutory law should cease.
1
^
The passage of the Act had an unexpected result. Rather than
disintegrating, the combinations of workmen became aggressive, and a series
of strikes and boycotts was touched off which spread throughout England.
Counteraction was instantaneous—the Act of 1325 which neutralized the Act
of 132U. The results, however, were not as bad as might be expected. The
Act allowed the principle of the open shop, and workmen could combine to
l5determine "rates of wages and hours of work." Workmen, however, were
subject to prosecution for conspiracy under the common law.~ J This permitted
the common-law judge much leeway in interpreting the doctrine of conspiracy
especially when the coctrine of restraint of trade was applied. Thus any
^ Ibid, p. 33U.
"Journeymen ... who shall enter into any combination to obtain
increased wages, or to lessen or alter the hours of work, . . . shall not
therefore be subject or liable • . . under the common or statute law." From
abridgment of the Combination Act of 13 2U, 5 George IV, c. 95 . > Handler, op .
cit
.
, p . 7
.
15 Usher, op. cit
., p. 335. Ihe open shop means no union recognition
—
a nonunion shop. Its”use here implies, however, that whi?e v/orkers were
free to join the union they could not refuse to work alongside non-union men,
nor could they compel the employer to recognize their union.
1° Loc. cit.
.
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combination which impeded the free flow of trade could be termed an illegal
conspiracy in restraint of trade. This, even though, the combination
’would have been legal under the Act of 1825.
Labor finally received real succor from the doctrines of con-
spiracy and restraint of trade ’with the passage of the Conspiracy and
Protection Act of 1875 which "removed the threat of criminal conspiracy to
labor unions By this time, however, one of the first labor injunctions
had already been issued in England'.
^
The doctrines of conspiracy and of restraint of trade dominated
the attitude of the American law courts towards labor. Drawing copiously
from English precedent, the courts condemned early attempts of labor to
organize as conspiracies. Between 1806 and 1815 there were six conspiracy
cases which are now grouped under the title of the Cordwainers ' Conspiracy
cases. In 1806 a group of Philadelphia journeymen shoemakers were convictec
of conspiracy for attempting to raise their wages. The attitude of the
Court in this case was: "A combination of workmen to raise their wages may
be considered in a two fold point of view: one is to benefit themselves •
. • the other is to injure those who do not join their society. The rule
/
-*-7 Ibid., p. 386.
18 Mounce, op. cit., p. 108.
19 Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. Sq. 551 (1868), see infra,
p.
1
; The labor injunction, however, did not take root in England. The
legal struggle took a different turn there; it centered around the ramafica-
tions of the Act of 1875 with labor suffering set backs in the decisions
rendered in Quinn v. Leathern and the Taff-Vale Case and gaining ground in the
Trades disputes Act of 1906 which nullified the effects of the Taff-Vale Case
Philadelphia Cordwainers Case (l306). See Mounce, op. cit., pp. 103-
109; also Frankfurter and Greene, on. cit., p. 2.
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of law condemns both." In this case the purpose for which the shoemakers
combined was held unlawful. The reaction against this decision was so
strong, however, that the remaining five cases were tried on the basis of
pO
unlawful means. In a New York case in which striking journeymen shoe-
makers were found guilty, the prosecution was more forceful. "A conspiracy
of any kind is illegal, although the matter about which they conspired might
have been lawful for them, or any of them to do, if they had not conspired
to do it.” J Thus a combination to better working conditions was held
unlawful on the a priori grounds that it was a conspiracy. The shoemakers
were convicted in four of these six conspiracy cases. In one the decision
was a compromise (Fittsburg, 181h), and the sole victory for the shoemakers
occurred in Baltimore in 1309.
In 1321 a combination of master shoemakers to lower wages was not
deemed a conspiracy by a Pennsylvania judge. The Court held that as long
as the masters did not push wages below their "natural level" no conspiracy
existed. But in three other cases in this second group of conspiracy cases,
journeymen were found guilty of conspiracy in seeking to better their work-
ing conditions. These included the New York hatters in 1323, the Buffalo
taylors in I82li, and the Philadelphia taylors in 1827 .
^
The next important 'wave of conspiracy cases occurred between 1329
c ^- Reprinted in part, loc
. cit .
22 People v. Kelvin, Select Cases, 11, 219, (N. Y., 1810).
Reprinted in part in Frankfurter and Greene, on. cit
. , pp. 2-3.
^ All of these conspiracy cases are discussed in Selig Perlman, A
History of Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: The Kacmillan
Company,"T923 )
,
Chapter 7.
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and I8h2. One of the most important of these cases vras that of People v.
Fisher * "5 In this case certain journeymen shoemakers of Geneva, New York,
struck to induce the discharge of a worker who persisted in working below
the union rate of wages. Justice Savage ruled that the journeymen were
guilty of a conspiracy to raise wages, and that this was injurious to trade
and in violation of a New York statute passed in 1829. In 1336 a group of
New York taylors struck when their wages were lowered, and they picketed
the shops of the masters. Twenty of the leaders were arrested and tried for
conspiracy. Judge Edwards, acting largely on the strength of People v.
Fisher
,
called the taylors' society an illegal combination and instructed
the jury7- to hand in a verdict of guilty. These two cases produced a violent
reaction. There were many demonstrations, and Judges Edwards and Savage
were burned in effiry. This reaction influenced the decisions in the
succeeding conspiracy trials, and in 1336 the shoemakers in Hudson, New York
26
and the plasterers in Philadelphia were acquited after jury trials.
Finally in lSlj.2 the doctrine of conspiracy was rendered innocuous to those
combinations which used legal means to achieve legal ends. This was the
famous case of Commonwealth v. Runt
.
COMMONWEALTH v. HUNT27
The case of Commonwealth v. Hunt
,
by establishing a new precedent
in the common-law doctrine of conspiracy, was one of the factors that
2> Hi Wendell, 9 New York, (1835).
Perlman, loc . cit .
27
h Metcalf 111 (13U2).
..
.
..
.
*
.
'
"•
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
U2
caused employers to turn to more effective legal means in an effort to curb
labor. The courts of equity could issue labor injunctions as had been
demonstrated in England, and after 1890 the Sherman Act codified the
doctrines of conspiracy and restraint of trade, so that here was a new
source of succor. But first it would be well to discuss the accomplishments
of the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt .
Briefly, the indictment alleged that the defendants, journeymen
bootmakers, "unlawfully'’ formed themselves into the Journeymen Bootmakers*
Society agreeing not to work for anyone employing a non-member, or a member
not in good standing; that they compelled master cordwainer Wait to fire
journeyman Home because he was not a member in good standing; that they
unlawfully conspired "to prevent Horne from following his trade and by
indirect means to impoverish him;" and that they unlawfully conspired to
impoverish Wait and hindered him and others from employing non-members and
members not in good standing.
The allegations were rejected. It was held "that there was no
sufficient averment of any unlawful purpose or means."
In his opinion Chief Justice Shaw found that the banding together
O
of persons in a like occupation was not an unlawful purpose. J Thus a new
ft
interpretation was put upon purpose, and purpose became a "vital considera-
29
tion." 7 The gist of it was that labor unions were not illegal.
Chief Justice Shaw then examined the means employed by the
"The manifest intent of the association is, to induce all those
engaged in the same occupation to become members of it. Such a purpose is
not unlawful.", Shaw, J. C., Ibid
. ,
p. 129.
Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. , p. U.
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bootmakers to achieve their objectives. He found that these amounted to a
withholding of their labor from anyone employing a non-member . He held that
this was not an illegal means but merely an exercise of the workers’ right to
work for whom they pleased.30 Chief Justice Shaw further pointed out that
as the bootmakers did not resort to "force or fraud" in inducing Wait to
fire Horne but merely withheld their labor, they were merely exercising
31
their rights.
This case in effect gave legal sanction to unions, the closed
shop, and the strike weapon. It did not stop at once the prosecution of
labor unions on the grounds that they were labor unions, but it aid open
the path for their recognition. Its greatest contribution in the field of
labor law was that thenceforth the law courts scrutinized more closely the
"ends" and "means" of labor organizations.-'' 1*
After Commonwealth v. Hunt, the doctrine of conspiracy diminished
"
• . . The means which they proposed to employ . • . were
,
that
they would not work for a person, who
,
after due notice, should employ a
journeyman not a member of their society. . . . we cannot perceive, that it
is criminal for men to agree together to exercise their own acknowledged
rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their own interest." Shaw,
J. C., Commonwealth v. Hunt, (U Met. Ill) p. 130.
J>± "
. . • But further; if this is to be considered as a substantive
charge, it would depend altogether upon the force of the word * compel'
,
which
may be used in the sense of coercion, or curess, by force or fraud ...
But whatever might be the force of the word ’compel', unexplained by its
connexion, it is disarmed and rendered harmless by the precise statement of
the means, by which such compulsion was to be effected. It was the agree-
ment not to work for him, by which they compelled Wait to decline employing
Horne longer.
. . . We think, therefore, that associations may be entered
into, the object of which is to adopt measures that nay have a tendency to
impoverish another . . . and yet so far from being criminal or unlawful, the
object nay be highly meritorious and public spirited." Ibid
. , pp. 133-13U.
3 2 Frankfurter and Ireene, op . cit .
, pp. U-,E?> •
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in importance, and the next big wave of court action against labor took the
form of the injunction used together with the doctrine of conspiracy and of
restraint of trade as set forth in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.-^
EARLY LABOR INJUNCTIONS
Springhead Spinning Co.
The labor injunction made its debut in England in the case of
Springhead Spinning Co . v. Riley in 1868. In this early case an organiza-
tion of cotton workers struck against their employer, the Springhead
Spinning Co., Ltd., when the latter put forth a "proposed readjustment of
wages." The cotton workers then "caused" signs to be put up on the walls
and public places of the towns of Springhead, Lees, and Oldham. Like
notices also appeared in the Manchester Guardian . They read as follows:
Wanted all well-wishers to the Operative
Cotton Spinners, etc.. Association not to
trouble or cause any annoyance to the Spring-
head Spinning Co., Lees, by knocking at the
door of their office until the dispute between
them and the self-actor minders is finally
terminated. By special order.
Hu..
It was alleged by the plaintiffs that this was part of a "scheme"
of "threats and intimidation" whereby prospective employees were prevented
from seeking employment with the plaintiffs. They pointed out that they
had a large business and an enormous goodwill, and in order to maintain
33 "After Commonwealth v. Hunt came a forty years' lull in the counts'
application of the coctrine of conspiracy to trade unions." Perlman, op .
cit
., p. 152.
L. R. 6 Equity, 551 Chancery, 1868 $ case reprinted in Sayre, op .
cit.
, pp. 719ff.
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this goodwill, the plant had to he in operation. The defendants by pre-
venting hiring were causing "irreparable damage to the corpus of their
property." The plaintiffs asked the court to restrain the defendants from
printing and publishing the aforementioned notice, and the Court so
granted.
In finding for the plaintiffs. Sir Malins, the Vice Chancellor,
called the signs illegal because of their intimidating nature. He said:
"It is clear, therefore, that the printing and publishing of these placards
... admittedly for the purpose of intimidating workmen from entering into
the service of the plaintiffs are unlawful acts, punishable by imprisonment
. . .
and a crime at common law." The Court recognized that if the actions
of the defendants were criminal, it had no jurisdiction.^ But it did have
jurisdiction to protect property, and though alleged criminal actions were
involved, an injunction was issued. The Court put forth the rhetorical
question: Why shouldn't the defendants be restrained if they proceed to
destroy the plaintiffs' property "by their threats and intimidation render-
ing it impossible for the plaintiffs to obtain workmen, without whose
assistance the property becomes utterly valueless for the purpose of their
trade?" The injunction was issued to prevent such destruction of property.
This case raised many of the questions that became the subject
of the labor-injunction controversy in the United States. What is meant
by intimidation and threats? Could such a sign as was displayed by the
defendants be called an intimidation? Would it be destructive to property?
What is property? Is it the right to hire? Can a court of equity infringe
35 Supra
, p. 17 , a court of equity has no jurisdiction over crimes
..
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upon basic freedoms in protecting property? Can a court of equity infringe
upon the police powers of the State in protecting property? These are some
of the questions that will be discussed in connection with the Federal
labor injunction.
After this early case the labor injunction was not used extensively
in England,^ and the opinion of Vice Chancellor Malins was criticized in a
later English case,37 ln the United States the story was different. After
the Springhead Spinning Co. Case, the labor injunction began to crop up rath
increasing frequency in the state courts. An early attempt in New York
failed because the judge "did not believe that the facts as found were
tortious . . . ' Other attempts, however, met with success. 3- And in
1838, a classic decision was rendered in Massachusetts restraining picketing,
The labor injunction had arrived. It needed but to be tested in the Federal
Courts
.
Sherry v. Perkins^
This Massachusetts case was similar in many respects to its
3°
"An injunction was granted in a labor dispute /±n England/ as early
as 1868. But in England resort to the injunction has not been frequent and
it has played no appreciable part there in the conflict between capital and
labor.", Mr. Justice Brandeis in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, case
reprinted in Handler, ojd. cit.
,
p.133.
37 "The opinion in support of this decision (i. e.. Springhead Spinning
Co. v. Riley) was strongly disapproved by the court of appeal in Prudential
Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. lU2.", Sayre, op. cit., p. 723; "and
Chief Justice "Gray of the Supreme Judicial Court ofTiassachusetts . . .
declared that it appeared to be so ’inconsistent with’ the authorities ’and
with well settled principles, that it would be superfluous to consider whetb
upon the facts before him (Malins), his decisions could be supported.’"
(Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., lU Mass. 69, 70), ibid., pp. 723-U
33 Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 60 How. Pr. 163 (N. Y. 1380),
3? Ohio, Baltimore, and Iowa. Frankfurter and Greene, on. cit., p. 21.
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English predecessor. Sherry, a shoe manufacturer in Lynn, alleged that some
of his workers belonging to the Lashers’ Protective Union struck and "caused
to be carried in front of Sherry’ s factory, by a boy hired for that purpose,
a banner bearing the following inscription:
Lasters are requested to keep away from P. P.
Sherry's. Per order L. P. U.
The allegation further said that the banners were a scheme to
prevent egress to the plaintiff' s property and that the goodwill of the
company was being destroyed. The prayer that " . . . the defendants might
be restrained from making such banners and from causing them to be
similarly carried ..." was granted by Justice Allen. As in the
Springhead Spinning Go
. Case
,
the Court called the banners illegal because
of their intimidating nature . The signs tended to injure Sherry' s property,
but no adequate relief could be secured from a suit at law. In granting the
injunction Justice Allen said:
The scheme in pursuance of which the banners
were displayed and maintained was to injure
the plaintiffs’ business, not by defaming it
to the public, but by intimidating workmen,
so as to deter them from keeping or making
engagements with the plaintiffs. The banner
was a standing menace to all who were or
wished to be in the employment of the plain-
tiffs, to deter them from entering the
plaintiffs’ premises. Maintaining it was a
continuous unlawful act, injurious to the
plaintiffs' business and property, and was a
nuisance such as a court of equity will grant
relief against.
To support its opinion the court cited the decision in Springhead
Spinning Co . v. Riley . Not unaware that the latter decision was in ill
repute in England, it grudgingly added: "Some of the language in Spring-
head Spinning Co. v. Riley has been criticised but the decision lias not

'seen overruled.”
The similarity between these two cases is interesting in view of
the procedure and findings of later federal cases. In both cases two basic
rights came into conflict—a personal right and a property right—with the
outcome hanging on the thin thread of the court* s interpretation. It
depended upon the court to rule whether the language used was intimidating,
and, if so, whether it was destructive to property. This involved a keen
definitive analysis of terns on the part of the judge who had to rely on
discretion.^" It really became a problem in semantics. On his part the
claimant, as can be seen from comparing these two cases, by using such
stereotyped words as intimidation
,
loss of goodwill
,
and destruction to
property
,
which had already proved a successful formula, was virtually
assured injunctive relief. It remains to be seen if such was the course
followed in federal cases.
THE SHERMAN ACT OF 1890
While the labor injunction was developing in the state courts,
Congress passed the Sherman Act which was to form the basis for the use of
j^he injunction in the federal courts. The argument has long raged as to
whether Congress intended the Act to apply to labor, but to reargue to issue
mere would be superfluous and fruitless.^ It would not be amiss, however
,
to discuss some of the background of the Act to better understand the
"... judges who granted injunctions almost necessarily exercised
considerable discretion." John R. Commons and John B. Andrews, Principles
of Labor Legislation (fourth revised edition; New York: Harper, 1936)", p. UU
^2 As Gregory puts it: "this issue still presents a most fascinating
’ield of speculation; but extended argument on this question is a little like
fighting the Civil War in retrospect—and about as profitable." Gregory,
>£ • cit . , p . 206
.
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position of the courts and why labor took exception to the courts’ rulings
In the latter part of the nineteenth century the United States
was rapidly becoming industrialized. Immigration swelled the population;
new resources were discovered and exploited; innovations followed in rapid
succession; and there was plenty of land to catch the overflow of all this
expansion. The railroads, pushing ever westward, widened the market,
and industry grew to enormous proportions to meet the demand. Bigness,
however, soon gave way to monopoly as the industrialists vied with one
another to capture the market in order to get larger profits. In some
cases competitors were driven out of business in murderous price wars.
The larger industrial magnates would either buy up their smaller coimeti-
tors or drive them out of business by underselling themy 3 a more refined
method was that of merger and consolidation. Combinations were formed
which made it possible for "Prices" to be "fixed without benefit of
competition, and sometimes at higher levels than before the trust was
formed. Raw producers were compelled to take what the trust chose to pay,
for there was no one else to whom to sell'.’" ' Such was the situation about
1890 with the consumer and small business at the mercy of whiskey, sugar,
Rockefeller of Standard Oil was such a giant. "... he bought up
vrhatever refineries would sell, induced others to join forces with him, and
drove still others out of business." John D. Hicks, The American Nation
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19U3), p. 176; "Price-cutting was carried
to any extreme necessary to put a competitor out of business ..." loc.
cit. As for railroads r they found "it was easier to steal existing trafTic
than to create new business.", Ernest L. Bogart and Donald L. Kemmerer,
Economic History of the American People, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.
19112)
,
'p.
—
603 ; and " . ~. . a series of
-
ruinous rate wars was initiated by
the efforts of the competing roads to divert as much of their rivals
’
business to themselves as possible." Ibid
. ,
p. 603.
^ Hicks, 0£. cit., p. 177.
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match, lead, and a myriad other trusts. The situation came to a head vrhen
"American trusts had become sufficiently threatening for the independent
producers, who were still politically dominant, to attempt to stop their
growth once and for all. They succeeded in passing the Inter-State Commerce
Law of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890. "^5
It will be noted that it was combinations of capital and not of
labor that led to the Sherman Act. The animosity of Congress in debating
the measure was clearly directed against the former type of combinations.^
In the Congressional debates preceding its passage, it occured to some of
the senators that the Act could conceivably be applied against labor. Some
felt that this point should be cleared up. Senator Teller, speaking on the
floor of the Senate, said:
I know that nobody proposes to interfere
with the class of men (laborers) I have
mentioned. Nobody here intends that by any
of these provisions either in the original
bill or in any amendment. . .^7
Senator Stewart also expressed the same sentiments . No one
^ John Strachey, The Coming Struggle For Power
,
(New York: The Modern
Library, 1935), p. 71.
~
Both Berman and Gregory argue strongly that the Act did not apply to
labor, and one is struck by the similarity of their views: "Everyone who
knows the history of that act is aware that the sole intent of its framers,
and of practically every member of Congress who gave the matter thought, was
to find some means of restricting the pernicious activities of the trusts."
Edward Berman, Labor Disputes and the President of the United States (New
York, Longman's
,
Green & Co.
,
192U), pp. 31-32.
"
'"Everyone knew why"the act
was passed in 1Q 90. It was in response to popular demand aroused by the fear
of gigantic industrial and commercial enterprises which threatened to seize
control of the manufacturing and marketing of consumer goods of all kinds."
Gregory, op. cit
.
,
p. 202.
^ 21 Cong. Rec. 2562 (IS90).
^ Ibid., 2606.
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argued against this . This was on March 25, 1890. On that same day Senator
,
Sherman offered a proviso excluding labor and farm organizations from the
terms of the Act. The amendment was approved by the Senate. The entire
bill was reported back to the Committee on the Judiciary on March 27. On
that day only one senator spoke against the Amendment excluding labor. That
was Senator Edmunds of Vermont. He was answered by Senator Hoar of
Massachusetts who distinguished between combinations of capital and of
labor. The former he found undesirable; of the latter, he said:
I hold therefore, that as legislators we
may constitutionally, properly, and wisely allow
laborers to make associations, combinations,
contracts, agreements for advancing their
wages . .
And again, later, he added that there was a distinction "between
the association of laborers and this class of cases at which this bill
aims. 11^ The opinion of Senator Hoar is important because he was a member
of the Judiciary Committee which recast the bill. At any rate when the
bill came back to the Senate from the Committee, the amendment was missing.
It may have been that the Committee thought that the amendment was super-
fluous, that is, it was to be understood that the Act did not apply to
The proviso read: "That this act shall not be construed to apply
to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations between laborers made with
the view of lessening the number of hours of their labor or of increasing
their wages nor to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations among
persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture made with the view of
enhancing the price of their agricultural or horticultural products."
Ibid
. ,
2o6l.
5° Ibid
., 2728.
51 Ibid
., 2729.
..
.
'
.
r
.
.
.
•
-
—
. • .
.
.
.
r
,
.
.
labor. But in leaving it out Congress left the matter to speculation.
The crux of the brief Act lay in Section 1:
Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal.
There ivere to be three methods of enforcement: (l) Criminal
prosecution by the Government, (2) suits brought by injured private narties
who could collect treble damages and costs, and (3) injunction proceedings
initiated by the Government.
To all intents it appeared that Congress had passed a law aimed at
curtailing the big business trusts. The courts decided that when one
builds an umbrella to ward off the rain, there is nothing to prevent one
from using it to ward off the rays of the sun as well. That epitomized the
attitude of the courts towards the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE FIRST LABOR INJUNCTION TO REACH THE SUPREME COURT
In i860 George M. Pullman of sleeping-car fame established a
company town on the outskirts of Chicago for his employees. Homes, stores,
a theatre, a park, and even a church were "owned and operated by the
Pullman Palace Car Company as a business investment."-1- During the
depression in 18 9h the company dismissed one third of its employees, and
lowered the wages of the remainder from thirty to forty per cent. Rents
and retail prices at the company houses and stores, however, were not
reduced. This precipitated a strike. Some of the employees belonged to
the American Railway Union which came to the aid of the strikers, and
Eugene V. Dfebs, the head of the union, ordered its members to boycott all
trains that included Pullman cars. The strike became widespread, and all
2
rail traffic between Chicago and the west was practically halted.
The situation got out of hand when hoodlums^ began to
participate in the strike^ rioting, looting, and destruction of railway
equipment ensued in and around Chicago. Over the protest of Governor
Altgeld of Illinois, President Cleveland ordered federal troops into the
^ Hicks, op. cit
. ,
p. 262.
2 Ibid.
, pp. 262-263.
^
"Chicago saw rioting, much of it by hoodlums who stayed in Chicago
after the 1893 Exposition." Carl Raushenbush and Emanuel Stein, Labor
Cases and Materials, (New York: F. S. Crofts & Company, 19Ul),
pTSIi.
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area to protect free passage of the United States mail.'
1
In addition, the Government applied to the Federal District
Court in Illinois and received the -writ of injunction restraining "the
said defendants, E. V. Debs, G. W. Howard, L. W. Rogers, Sylvester
Keliher . . . and all persons combining and conspiring "with them, and
all other persons whomsoever absolutely to desist . . . from ... in
any manner interfering vdth the business of any of the following named
railroads . . . The court relied on the Sherman Act to sustain the
injunction.
Debs defied this order, and, in fact, on July 12, 189U, he
urged a general strike.' He was charged with contempt because "the
service of the injunction did not affect or change the policy or conduct
of the defendants relative to said strikes, but that, on the contrary,
the defendants continued ... to direct the employe’s of the railway
As Governor Altgeld did not request the troops (the legislature
was not in session) and as he did not want them, there was a question of
constitutionality involved. Article IV, Section h of the Constitution
reads: "The United States . . . shall protect each of them /the States/
. . . on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the
legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." However,
Section £298 of the Act of 1861 gave the President power to use troops
when legal processes fell short, and later statutes gave him this right
to enforce the decrees of federal courts. Berman, op. cit
.
,
p. 22.
And the President certainly had a right to protect the mails if such was
his intent in sending the troops. They carried out his intent in a
strange way, hoiYever. "Having arrived there, they exerted themselves
not merely to see that the mails were carried, but also to break the
strike." Hicks, op . cit .
,
p. 263.
^ Excerpt from Debs Injunction reprinted in Frankfurter and Greene,
op . cit.
, pp. 18-19.
° Hicks, op. cit., p. 26U.
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corapard.es ... to leave . . . in a body . . . Debs and his associates
were convicted on December lb, 18 9b, and sentenced to six months imprison-
ment. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court which unanimously
sustained the injunction and the conviction in 1895.
The results of this case were as follows
:
1. The labor injunction was possible under the Sherman Act.
The lower courts relied upon this Act to sustain their decision. The Supreme
Court relied on other grounds, but it did not repudiate the action of
3
the lower courts.
2. The labor injunction could be issued where a strike
Q
endangered government property—in this case the mails.
3. The labor injunction could be used where a strike
threatened the general welfare of the nation.'*'
0
7 U. S. v. Debs, 6b Fed. 72b (N. D. 111., 189b). Excerpt cited in
Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
.
,
p. 19.
O
J
"Y/e enter into no examination of the Act of July 2, 1^90 upon which
the Circuit Court relied mainly to sustain its jurisdiction. It must not
be understood from this that we dissent from the conclusions of that court
in reference to the scope of the Act, but simply that we prefer to rest
our judgment on . . . broader grounds ..." for. Justice Brewer, In re
Debs, Petitioner (158 U. 3. 56b, 1395), opinion reprinted in Raushenbush
and Stein, op. cit., pp. 6b-65.
9
the United States have a property in the mails, the protection
of which is one of the purposes of this bill." Excerpt from opinion cited
in Powell, op. cit., p. bO.
"The obligations which it /the government/ is under to promote the
i
interest of all and to prevent the wrong-doing of one resulting in injury
to the general welfare is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing
in court. * * * Yet, whenever the wrongs complained of are ... in
respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of
the Nation, and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the
citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that
the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient
to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein
to fully discharge those constitutional duties." Mr. Justice Brewer, In re
.
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h» The labor injunction could be exercised where a strike
interfered with interstate commerce.^"
5>. It was the first important labor injunction containing
the "blanket" clause.
6. It resulted in a conviction for contempt without the
right of trial by jury.
The case was important because it promised to be a harbinger of
future events. Certain rights seemed to be so inextricably confounded
that in loosening one right another may have been bruised. In such a
situation those rights must be salvaged which are paramount. A doctor
will not hesitate to amputate the leg of a patient if it will save his
life. And so in this easel The general welfare was at stake; there was
interference with interstate commerce; and the mails were being
obstructed. This state of affairs was harmful to the entire nation. If
allowed to continue, anarchy and chaos could have ensued. The injunction
averted that, but it also brought the strike to an end although it was
not the avowed intention of the Supreme Court to accomplish the latter.
"The right of any laborer, or any number of laborers, to quit work was
not challenged. The scope and purpose of this bill was only to restrain
forcible obstructions of the highways along which interstate commerce
12travels and the mails are carried." Thus to aid the whole, a small
part suffered. This could not have been prevented any more than the
"The scope and purpose of this bill was only to restrain
forcible obstructions of the highways along which interstate commerce
travels and the mails are carried." Mr. Justice Brewer, opinion
reprinted in Rausheribush and Stein, on. cit
.
,
pp. 6h-6S»
12
Mr. Justice Brewer, opinion reprinted in Rausheribush and Stein,
op . cit., pp. 61i-65.
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first leg amputation could have been prevented. But as medical science
eventually advanced to a point where in many cases both the patient and
his limb were saved, so too was there the need to perfect the injunction
to the point whereby it would protect the interests of the whole without
harming the interests of the few. The Debs Case presented this poignant
problem to the judiciary and legislative bodies to solve. This
particular aspect of the case has not and is not currently easy of
solution as evidenced in a similar case involving the general welfare
in 19b6-19h7 in which the Supreme Court could not in "good conscience"
place the workers' right to strike above the general welfare. The
peculiarity of such cases lies in the fact that they concern an entire
industry and a strike or lockout may endanger the national health and
safety. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 neglected this feature, but
Sections 206 to 210 of the Taft-Kartley Act of 19U7 prescribe a set
procedure to be followed in such cases. This will be discussed in a
later chapter.
The intricacy of the above problem met with little appreciation
or sympathy on the part of Labor and its friends. To Labor the injunction
and the action of the court appeared arbitrary. It began to fight what it
called "government by injunction."^ Had not the court acted as legis-
lator, prosecutor, judge, and executioner'. Had not labor leaders been
13
The United Mine Workers Case
"The Democratic national platform for the presidential campaign of
1896 read as follows: 'Yfe denounce arbitrary interference by Federal
authorities in local affairs as a violation of the Constitution cf the
United States and a crime against free insitutions, and we especially
object to government by injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of
oppression by which Federal Judges, in contempt of the laws of the States
and rights of citizens, become at once legislators, -radges and
..
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silenced1. The Court had justified these actions because of the afore-
mentioned peculiarity of the Debs Case . Extraordinary measures were
needed to curb the drastic activities of a few who were endangering the
welfare of many. In view of these facts, it may have appeared at the time
that labor’ s apprehension of the labor injunction was a bit unwarranted.
All labor had to do was to eschew those practices that created a situation
inimical to the general welfare. As far as obstruction of the mails or
destruction of any government property was concerned, labor could easily
govern its actions wisely by refraining from these acts. Endangering
the public welfare and interfering with interstate commerce constituted
a different matter. Here labor could endeavor to act wisely but
ultimately it would lie with the discretion of the court as to what
constituted endangering the public welfare. and, especially, as when to
executioners; . . ” From Proceedings of the Democratic National
Convention (1896) , reprinted in Frankfurter arid Greene , on. eft.', pp.
19-20 .
19
Debs described this curtailment of speech and action before the
United States Strike Commission while awaiting appellate jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court. 11
. . . Once we were taken from the scene of
action, and restrained from sending telegrams or issuing orders or
answering questions, * * * and we could not answer any messages. The
men went back to work ..." While the Supreme Court agreed with these
facts (it ’.vent so far as to quote them: see opinion reprinted in
Haushenbush and Stein, op. cit
. ,
p. 6U.), its purpose was different
from Debs' . Debs intimated ~tEat the strike had been crushed only by
crushing certain constitutional freedoms; the Supreme Court, on the other
hand, saw Debs abusing his rights rather than exercising them. It was
this abuse that the Court sought to curtail. They saw Debs standing
against law and order—against the majority 'with the public welfare in
jeopardy. With Debs restrained, the danger passed. "The outcome/the end
of the strike^, by the very testimony of the defendants, attests the
wisdom of une course pursued by the government, and that it was well not
to oppose force simply by force, but to invoke the jurisdiction and
judgment of those tribunals to whom by the Constitution and. in accordance
with the settled conviction of all citizens is committed the determination
of questions of right and wrong between individuals, masses, and states."
Ibid
., p. 65.
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apply the Sherman Act, It appears not to have been the intent of
17
Congress to extend the application of the Act to labor controversies, 1
That this was not actually written into the Act made it possible for a lit i
ally minded court to interpret the Act as applying to labor disputes.
The lower courts in the Debs Case had so interpreted it. The precedent
had been set. Should the procedure and methods ercplo3red in the Debs
Case be amplified and extended to cover all labor disputes, labor
indeed had something to fear.
r-
59
^ Acting wisely may be to no avail when the cards are stacked
against labor as in the Pullman Strike. Labor certainly had no control
over the lawless mobs; see surra
, p.53 , footnote 3 ; also Berman,
op . cit
. ,
p. 18: "... a comparatively small number of those on strike
were involved in lawless acts. The mobs were composed generally of
hoodlums and recruits from the criminal classes." Moreover, the
Government made an unwise decision in appointing Edwin Walker to
prosecute its campaign against the strikers. In view of the fact that
he was a railroad attorney ( Ibid . , pp. 29-30 ), his impartiality was
open to question. In addition about 3,600 United States deputy marshals
were selected and paid by the railroads. These acted as officers of the
United States when actually they were employees of the railroads. "Many
of them were worthless, men who were frequently reported drunk, who often
exercised very poor judgment, and who were often arrested while on duty
by the Chicago police for indiscriminate shooting and in several cases
for highway robbery." Ibid
.
, p. 31 . Such was part of the story concern-
ing the threat to the general welfare. And finally if the workers
wanted to arbitrate rather than strike, they had no one to arbitrate
with. The General Managers Association, representing the railroads,
refused even to receive proposals ( Ibid . , p. 25 ); and President
Cleveland did nothing to prevent the strike nor to settle it peacefully.
Since he felt called \ipon to intervene, it is strange that "he delayed
action until the strike and all its regrettable effects were upon the
nation, and then he proceeded to end it in such a way that not only
the wage earners of the country but many other citizens felt that the
government had resigned a large share of its authority to the railroads
for their unrestricted and arbitrary use in defeating the strikers."
Ibid
.
, p. 35.
^ Supra, p 51 .
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In the next three decades the labor injunction began to be
applied with increasing regularity. As it grew and expanded, it also
unleashed those forces that sought to limit its powers and to purge
it of abuses. It is in the study of these subsequent cases the mil be
found some of the seeds that led to corrective legislation.
i-
i
CHAPTER IX
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE LABOR INJUNCTION
PRIOR TO PASSAGE OF THE CLAYTON ACT
THE DANBURY HATTERS CASEJ
In 1908 the application of the Sherman Act to labor disputes
received its first big test. In Danbury, Connecticut, the Brotherhood of
United Hatters of America struck against the firm of Loewe and Company,
hat manufacturers, because the latter refused to accede to the demand for a
closed shop. In addition, the union conducted a secondary boycott
against the company’s products.' The company claimed that it suffered a
loss of about $88,000 as a result of this boycott and in 1903 sued for
triple damages under Section 7 of the Sherman Act, alleging that the
boycott was a conspiracy in restraint of its interstate commerce. The
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint in 1906, but when
"3
reviewed by the Supreme Court two years later, the decision was reversed."
The union was assessed $232,00—triple damages and costs. After several
unsuccessful attempts to have the decision reversed, the defendants finally
paid the sum of $23li,000.~
1 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 27h (1908).
p A general description of a secondary boycott is the refusal of A to
deal with B if B deals with C.
The Court unanimously decided that "the combination described in the
declaration was a combination in restraint of trade and commerce among the
several states, in the sense in which those words are used in the /Gherman/
Act, and the action must be maintained accordingly." Reprinted in I 'ounce,
op . cit
.
,
p. 113.
k Ibid
.
, pp . 112-113
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Although this case did not involve the labor injunction, it is
pertinent because the Supreme Court definitely stated that the Sherman
Act applied to labor and that secondary boycotts were rendered illegal
by the Act in so far as they interfered with interstate commerce. In the
future, then, infringements of the Act such as secondary boycotts could
conceivably be restrained by injunction.-^ Within a few years this came
c
about in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Company.'
GOMPERS v. BUCKS STOVE AND RANGE COMPANY?
This was the next labor injunction case to come before the
Supreme Court. Although the Court reversed a conviction for contempt
because of certain technicalities and because the rarties had already
settled their differences out of court, its opinion bears discussion be-
cause it throws light on the attitude the Court had taken in regard to the
labor injunction. The Court, in effect, crystallized certain judicial
conceptions, and future litigants were implicitly forewarned to conduct
themselves accordingly.
A dispute over hours of work precipitated a boycott by the
union against the products of the Bucks Stove & Range Company. The company
was declared ’’Unfair" and placed on the "Unfair" and "We don’t patronize"
5
It is interesting and important to note that the Court also held
that individual union members could be held liable for the acts of other
members and could be sued for damages individually.
"The most definite exposition of the Sherman Law was made in the
Gompers Case
. . .
’’ Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. , p. 9.
7 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Company, 221 U. S. UlS (1911 ).
..
...
lists of the American Federationist, an organ of the American Federation of
Labor. The company filed a complaint with the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia, alleging that the union had entered into a conspiracy to
interfere with its interstate commerce and had used the boycott to
accomplish this purpose. Through unfair lists and threats, merchants had
been prevented from dealing with the Bucks Company lest they themselves be
boycotted. This resulted in persons severing their relations vdth the
company and, consequently, a loss of business and irreparable damage.
3
After a hearing, the court granted a temporary injunction, effective
December 23, 1907. On March 23, 1903, a permanent injunction replaced the
temporary one. A few months later the complainants filed contempt proceed-
ings against the defendants, alleging that the injunction had not been
obeyed and that through speeches and printed matter the boycott was, in
effect, still being continued. The defendants denied that they were in
contempt and that their statements violated the injunction; and they
asserted that if their statements violated the injunction, then the
O
° The temporary injunction read in part: "Ordered that the American
Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, Frank Morrison, . . . John Mitchell
. . . and all persons acting in aid of or in conjunction with them be
. . . restrained and enjoined . . . from conspiring, agreeing, or combining
in any manner to restrain, obstruct or destroy the business of the
complainant * * * and from declaring or threatening any boycott against the
complainant ... or the product of its factory, or against any person
. . . engaged in handling or selling the said product . . . and from
printing, issuing, publishing, or distributing through the mails, or in
any other manner, any copies or copy of the American Federationist, or any
other printed or written newspaper ... or instrument whatsoever, which
shall contain or in any manner refer to the name of the complainant . . .
in the 'We don’t patronize’, or the 'Unfair' list of the defendants * * *
or words of similar import, and from publishing . . . whether in writing
or orally, any statement . . . calling attention ... to any boycott
against the complainant, its business or its product, or that the same are,
or vrere, or have been declared to be 'unfair’ . . . from the order,
reproduced in the report covering Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Company,
221 u. s. Ills at pp. 14.20—14.22 .
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injunction was a nullity for it sought to abridge freedom of speech and of
the press. In that case they could not be held in contempt for having
assorted jail sentences. Gorapers received the maximum one, being
sentenced to one year in prison. The defendants immediately appealed as
they had when the injunction was first issued. Meanwhile the parties had
settled their differences, so that the original appeal by the union and a
cross appeal by the Company were dismissed by the Court. The matter of the
conviction remained, however, and this came to the Supreme Court on appeal
from the defendants in 1911. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the
Court. The conviction for contempt was reversed on technical grounds. The
Court pointed out the difference between criminal contempt and civil contempt!.
The character and purpose of a case distinguishes between the tvro. In
civil contempt ’’the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the
complainant," whereas in criminal contempt "the sentence is punitive, to
vindicate the authority of the Court. It can happen in a civil contempt
9 This was for sake of argument, for the defendants claimed that they
did not disobey the order. Later, when appealing to the Supreme Court, the
defense (now the petitioner), in seeking to set aside the contempt convic-
tion, argued: "... these defendants did not offend against either the
letter or spirit of the decree. It is true that the name of Bucks Stove &
Range Company did appear in the 'Yfe don't patronize' list of the American
Federationist after the order was made forbidding it. But it also appears
that this was before the date when the order became effective by its very
terms. Certainly the defendants cannot be held to have violated the order
before it became operative." Argument for the Petitioner, Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Company, 221 U. S. [0.8 at p. h30.
9disobeyed it.
On December 23, 1908, the defendants were found guilty and given
^
i at p.
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case that the defendant is imprisoned; but the incarceration is not intended
to punish the defendant but rather to coerce him to perform a certain
remedial action. He will be freed as soon as he does what he was ordered to
do. (For example, if the defendant refuses to comply with a mandatory
injunction,^- he can be imprisoned until he acquiesces to the court’s order.
12
If the defendant is ordered not to do a certain act, and he disobeys,
imprisonment in a civil case would not be of remedial benefit to the
complainant but would be solely to punish the defendant. This would defeat
the purpose of civil contempt. In the case under discussion, the defendants
had been found guilty of disobeying a preventive injunction. The punish-
ment, however, had been punative rather than remedial. The complainant
did not receive material benefit from that decree. If that had been the
intent of the lower court, then this should have been a criminal contempt
case. But the proceedings were not conducted in the prescribed manner but
according to the rules of equity. "Proceedings for civil contempt are
between the original parties and are instituted and tried as a part of the
same cause. But on the other hand, proceedings at law for ciminal contempt
are between the public and the defendant, and are not a part of the
original case'.'^ The Court pointed out that it was not the Government that
had instituted proceedings against the defendants, but a private party, the
111
Bucks Stove & Range Company, The Court concluded that this was clearly
a case of civil contempt calling forth for only remedial relief and it set
aside the conviction of the defendants. Furthermore, as the parties had
Supra, p. 19.
12
Preventive Injunction, see supra, p. 19.
^ Ibid., p. UU5.
"In the first place the petition was not entitled "United States v.
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already settled their differences out of court, thus terminating the main
cause, the complainants were no longer entitled to remedial relief.-1-^
The implications of this part of the opinion are clear. To begin
with, the employers were indirectly advised as to the procedure to follow
in contempt cases. In the future, they would be careful to specifically
pray for remedial relief in contempt cases. In view of the fact that this
right to remedial relief would be prejudiced by a private agreement, it
would behoove the employer not to reach such an agreement with its employees
in a labor dispute where injunction proceedings had already been instituted.
This aspect of the injunction procedure could very well arrest future
negotiations between employees and employers and place greater reliance
upon the courts to decide the whys and wherefores of a labor dispute.
In discussing punishment for contempt, the Court revealed how
efficacious an injunction could be. Once issued there remained nothing to
do but to obey it. Criminal contempt could bring a punitive sentence;
civil contempt would mean remedial reparations which could make serious
inroads into a union’ s treasury. In addition, civil contempt of a mandatory
injunction would mean imprisonment until the guilty party was ready to do as
the court directed. A permanent blanket injunction could really paralyse
the actions of labor in an industrial disjmte. The only alternative would
be to appeal the injunction and await the results of lengthy and costly
litigation.
i
Samuel Gompers, et al. . . .as would have been proper ... if the pro-
ceedings had been at law for criminal contempt." Ibid
. ,
p. 14*6.
If this had been a case of criminal contempt, the fact that the
parties concerned settled their differences out of court would not have
prevented the court from vindicating its authority. Ibid
.
,
p. 1*51.
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What the Court had to say about the injunction made it clear to
labor that it would have to revise its notions concerning freedom of
speech, the boycott and the Sherman Act, and to govern itself accordingly
in the future. This, the more important part cf the opinion, was pregnant
with these results:
1. Free speech was not abridged by a court order restraining
a boycott against the complainant when the boycott was carried on by
publishing that the complainant was unfair. Such an injunction did not
abridge free speech; freedom of speech wasn’t even involved. It was the
objective of the Court to stop a boycott which "caused or threatened
irreparable damage."^
2. While the courts may differ as to the type of boycott
enjoined, all agree "that there must be a conspiracy causing
17damage to the business or property of the complainant."
3. Again referring to the question of freedom of expression,
the Court pointed out that once a court adjudged a boycott illegal, the
means by which the boycott was unlawfully continued would also per se
be in violation of the injunction enjoining the boycott. Among others.
that may be
irreparable
^ The Court was alluding to the fact that there is no abridgment of
free speech involved where "free speech" is being abused to the extend that
it is detrimental to others. This idea was expressed succintly by Hr. Justi
Holmes in his opinion in Aikens y. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 19U (I90 I4J: "No
conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of
which it may be a part. The most innocent an constitutionally protected of
acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step
in a plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to
prevent the punishment of the plot by law."
ce
17
Italics supplied; what the court meant was that the employer's right
to do business is a property right to be protected as property. Frankfurter
and Greene refer to the case as an example of this point of law., op. cit
.
,
p. h7
•
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XQ By means the Court meant "the nublication and,,use of letters^
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the Court cited Sherry v. Perkins as an authority.
li. The Sherman Act applies wherever interstate commerce is
restrained; even if this is accomplished by combinations of labor. If
interstate commerce is being restrained by a boycott involving speech and
publications, it would render the law a nullity to say that the law must
be enforced but that the means by which it was being broken could not be
20
enjoined. The Court cited Loewe v. Lawlor .
5. Although labor unions are legal, they are in a position
to exercise extraordinary power, and it is the duty of the Government to
see that this power is not abused. It must protect the one against the
many as well as the many against the one.
6. And finally the Court felt that it could not leave this
question of free speech without making a further comment, where there is
an unlawful conspiracy'-, words that are a signal for concerted action
exceed "any possible right of speech which a single individual might have."
The Court called these "verbal acts" which are as lethal as force in
causing unlawful damage to property. As such, they could be enjoined.
In Chapter VII, following the case of Springhead Spinning Co . v.
21
Riley
,
some pertinent questions were poised, the answers to which are
circular0 and printed matter . . . whereby a boycott is unlawfully
continued..
.
." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. Ul^.
Thus the importance of this early case; see supra
,
p. U6.
"... v/hether these /means/ be made effective, in whole or in part,
by acts, words or printed matter. . . To hold' that the restraint of trade
under the Sherman Anti-trust Act . . . could be enjoined., but that the means
through which the restraint was acomplished could not be enjoined would be
to render the law impotent." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. ii
21 Supra, p . k5 « == ===========
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now becoming discernable at this point. Property is the right to do
business, and all that that involves including selling and hiring. To
interfere with this right is coercion and intimidation leading to
irreparable damage to property. Such actions can be enjoined even if
they involve speech and printed matter, if the purpose be unlawful. In
2 ?
addition something new was added—the Sherman Act."
PAINE LUMBER CO. v. NEAI
23
s
The Paine Lumber Company Case began its tortuous journey through
the courts in February 1911. The defendant unions, who were not employees
of the plaintiff, refused to work on his material because the plaintiff
employed non-union labor. To enjoin this action, the Paine Lumber Company
obtained a temporary restraining order on the aforementioned date, and,
later, a temporary injunction. The bill was dismissed, however, in
November 1913, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals in April 19lU. On June 11, 1917 > the Supreme Court handed dovm
its decision with three Justices dissenting. The question before the
Court was whether the Sherman Act authorized an injured private party to
enjoin a boycott in restraint of its interstate commerce. The majority
opinion held that the Paine Lumber Company was not entitled to equitable
22 Such was the opinion of the Court in the Gonpers Case. But public
opinion is also important, for presumably it will sooner or later be
reflected in the courts. A segment of the public expressed an opinion in
the Gompers Case and it was different from that of the courts. "The
publicity in this case was so unfavorable to the company, that its sales
continued to decline after the injunction. Within three years the company,
under new management, made its peace with the union." Lester, on. cit
. , p.
709.
23*
2U1|. U. S. U59 (1917). Material and excerpts from this case were
obtained from Frankfurter and Greene, or. cit
.
,
pp. Hi5, 166, and 2lfL,
and from Powell, or. cit., pp. U2—UU
.
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relief because private persons could not institute injunction proceedings
under the Sherman Law which gave this right only to the government.
Furthermore, as litigation had commenced prior to passage of the Clayton
Act of 1911+, which did grant the right of injunction to private parties,
that Act did not apply. That is, the law in force at the time the case
arose, should rule. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing the majority opinion,
injected a personal view when he said that the Clayton Act "established a
policy inconsistent with the granting" of an injunction "here." In
other words, he felt that in any case the Clayton Act would not apply.
He admitted that on this point he was in the minority.
The minority opinion written by Justice Pitney contented that
the Sherman Act did not prevent the complainant from seeking an injunction.
He wrote that:
... in the absence of some provision to the
contrary, the right to relief by injunction,
where irreparable injury is threatened through
a violation of property rights, and the~e is
no adequate remedy at law, rests upon settled
principles of equity that were recognized in
the consitutional grant of jurisdiction to
the courts of the United States.
The minority also held that it coiild find nothing in Section 20
of the Clayton Act which interfered "with the right of the complainants
to an injunction." That part of the minority opinion was important, for
it was a precursor of the interpretation the Court was to put upon the
Clayton Act in subsequent cases. Even the majority, excluding Mr. Justice
Holmes, intimated that the Act would have authorized an injunction if the
case in question had post-dated the Clayton Act. It would appear from
21+ Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 21+1+ U. S. 1+59 (1917)
'c
c
. .
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this case that boycotts could be enjoined under the Clayton Act, and this
construction definitely came to fruition in 1921 in Duplex Co. v. Peering .
In the meanwhile one more significant case, which bears discussion, came
before the Court—the Hitchman Coal Company Case .
25
HITCHMAN COAL & COKE COMPANY v. MITCHELL
The Hitchman Company incorporated in the state of West Virginia
and operated a mine in the Panhandle district of that state. After many
disputes with the United Mine Workers of America, who represented the
Hitchman miners, the company began to operate on a non-union basis.
Before taking back men who had been on strike, the company stipulated that
each employee agree not to join the United Mine Workers and that the
employees recognize that the mine 7/as to be operated on a non-union basis
as a condition of employment. That is, each man was given to understand
that v/hile he was an employee of the company, he would not join the union.
To this verbal "iron clad" contract, the men agreed and later signed a
written one which read:
I am employed by and work for the Hitchman
Coal & Coke Company with the express understanding
that I am not a member of the United Mine Workers
of America, and Trill not become so while an
employe' of the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company;
that the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company is run
non-union and agrees with me that it vri.ll run non-union
v/hile I am in its employ. If at any time I
' ^ Case reported and reprinted in Handler, op. cit
. ,
pp. 219-230,
sans minority opinion, however; dissenting opinion of Brandeis is
reported in Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
. , pp. 105-103.
26 Also called a "yellow-dog" contract which Handler defines as:
"A contract of employment providing that the employee will not become or
remain a member of any labor organization during the period of his
employment, or that he will quit his employment if he becomes a member of
a labor organization." Handler, op. pit., p. 28.
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am employed by the Hitchman Coal and Coke
Company I want to become connected with
the United Mine Workers of America or any
affiliated organization, I agree to withdraw
from the employment of said company, and
agree that while I am in the employ of that
company I will not make any efforts amongst
its employes to bring about the unionizing
of that mine against the company's wish. I
have either read the above or heard the same
read. '
Almost all of the mines in the Panhandle district were operated
on this non-union basis, and they competed with mines in Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, and part of Pennsylvania which were organized by the United
Mine Workers. This condition in West Virginia constituted a direct threat
op
to the union in the organized areas." The court itself later phrased
the situation thus:
The unorganized condition of the mines in the
Panhandle and some other districts was recognized
as a serious interference with the purposes of the
union in the Central Competitive Field, particularly
as it tended to keep the cost of production low,
and, through competition with coal produced in the
organized field, rendered it more difficult for
the operators there to maintain prices high enough
to induce them to grant certain concessions
demanded by the union.
To remove this threat to union security in which unorganized
mines competed with union mines, the United Fine Workers launched a
vigorous organizing campaign 'in the West Virginia coal fields paying
particular attention to the Pitchman Company. At the Hitchman nine,
27
28
Ibid.
,
p. 222.
This "was a fatal thrust at the continuance of union conditions
in the organized areas." Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. ,
p. 38.
^ Handler, op. cit.
,
p. 223.
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organizers got pledges from about sixty men agreeing to join the union
and to strike when called upon.
On October 2ii, 1907, the Hitchman Company prayed for and
received injunctive relief against the union. In the bill, the complain-
ant asserted that the defendants were aware of the agreement between the
company and its employees that the mine should be run on a non-union basis
but in spite of this, the defendants conspired to induce the miners to
break the contract by joining the union and by striking at the appropriate
time for a "closed shop." The Supreme Court later summarized the object
and the cause of the injunction thus
:
In short, at the time the bill was
filed, defendants, although having full
notice of the terms of employment existing
between plaintiff and its miners, were
engaged in an earnest effort to subvert
those relations without plaintiff’s consent,
and to alienate a sufficient number of the
men to shut down the mine, to the end that
the fear of losses through stoppage of
operations might coerce plaintiff into
1 recognizing the union 1 at the cost of its
own independence. The methods resorted to
by their ' organizer* were such as have been
for discussion. . .
The ex parte restraining order issued on October 2U, 1907,
The general object of the bill was to
obtain an injunction to restrain defendants
from interfering with the relations existing
between plaintiff and its employe's in order
the mine
described
3° P. 220.
Ibid., p. 225.
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became a temporary injunction on May 26, 1908, and a permanent injunction
was granted on December 23 , 1912. In 19lU the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the decree of the lower courts and dismissed the bill but stayed
action pending resort to the Supreme Court, In 1917 > ten years after the
case had first appeared in the courts
,
the Supreme Court handed down its
32 ...
de 2ision with three Justices dissenting. The majority opinion written
by Justice Pitney arrived at these conclusions:
Was the plaintiff within its lawful rights in imposing an anti-
union contract upon his employees as a condition of employment? The
Court held that it was. "This court repeatedly has held that the employer
is as free to make non-membership in a union a condition of employment,
as the working man is free to join the union . . ."^ The Court pointed
out that as the right to join a union must be protected so must the right
not to deal with a union be protected. Men cannot be coerced into
collective bargaining. "Whatever may be the advantage of 'collective
bargaining', it is not bargaining at all, in any just sense, unless it is
w
J
voluntary on both sides."
May an employer look upon the continuing employment of his
workers as a property right? The Court- held that he could. This did not
mean that the employees were not free to leave their jobs if they wished,
but a third person had no lawful right to persuade them to do so. The
court phrased it thus: "... plaintiff was and is entitled to the good
-2 Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Clark.
Handler, loc. cit
.
Loc. cit.
; ' j
,
. :
•'
.
•
,
.
,
•
, : J
'
r-
.
.
.
V
.
.. . . :
v
1
. C£ . i
... H/ .
'
' V .-•'I
.
4
,
T " ' Ji ' ' f ' , " ;
<
75
will of its employes . . . although they are under no obligation to deal
with him. * * * it will be able to retain them in its employ. * * * The
right of action for persuading an employe to leave his employer is
.35
universally recognized."'' '
The defendants contended that since the measures they adopted to
unionize the Hitchman mine were peaceable, they were also lawful. The
Court replied that any measures that violated the plaintiff’ s legal rights
were as illegal as if they had involved a breach of the peace. "A com-
bination to procure concerted breaches of contract by plaintiff’ s employes
36
constitutes such a violation."
The Court made it clear that it was not abridging the union’
s
right to proselytize among unorganized workers. The union could have
accepted members from the Hitchman mine, provided they terminated their
employment as provided in the contract made with the plaintiff. The
union knowing of this contract, moreover, permitted the new members to
remain at the mine with the intention of striking when the number should
be large enough to injure the plaintiff. The decision was based mainly
upon this point, for injury to the plaintiff could not result if the
miners, acting in line vith the contract, had resigned their jobs as
they joined the union. It would have been easy for the plaintiff to
replace his workers a few at the time as they left, but very difficult
if the major part of his labor was withdrawn all at the same time as the
union intended.
»
35 3>id** PP. 225-226.
36 Ibid
., P* 228
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To summarize: The Court held that the anti-union contract was
lawful and that ’’the damage resulting from a strike would be irremediable.
Hence the injunction was granted.
The dissenting opinion is important because it views some of
the facts differently and because much of it vras later to be incorporated
into legislation. Justice Brandeis pointed out that no evidence had been
introduced to prove a conspiracy to either shut down or injure the mine;
furthermore, there was no evidence of "threats, violence, or intimidation.
Then he discussed the overall issues involved. Was the mine organized
without the plaintiff' s consent? To unionize a shop means more than
persuading the workers to join the union; it also means inducing the
employer to recognize the union for collective bargaining purnoses.
n
£
"Unionizing implies, therefore, at least formal consent of the employer.""
In this case the plaintiff sought to operate a "closed non-union shoo,"
while the defendants wanted a "closed union shop ." The latter objective
could be secured only through collective bargaining which is legal. "The
end being lawful
,
defendant's efforts to unionize the mine can be illegal
only if the methods or means pursued were unlawful."""
3
Justice Brandeis enumerated the chief features of unionizing as
follows: (l) The closed shop, (2) collective bargaining with the union
officers to negotiate wage scales and hours of work, and (3) taking up
grievances with representatives of the union. He called these legal ends
which workers could lawfully obtain and, if need be, secure through strikes
In that event, why could not the union strike "or use equivalent economic
Ibid
.
, p. 229.
3R Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
. , p. 105.
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pressure to secure an agreement to provide them? nUO
But is not this plan to induce the employees to join the
union and then to strike to secure the employer’ s consent coercion?
Justice Brandeis held that it was not. The employer was free to accept
or reject the unionization of his shop including the disadvantage of
a strike if he refused. In fact, the employer’s proposal to the
employees was based on similar grounds. That is, the employees were free
to accept or reject the employer’ s agreement not to join the union
along with the disadvantage of unemployment if they refused. "The
employer may sign the union agreement for fear that labor may not be
otherwise obtainable; the workman may sign the individual agreement for
fear that employment may not be otherwise obtainable. But such fear does
ia
not imply coercion in a legal sense." Justice Brandeis contended that
a non-union closed shop obtained via a yellow dog contract and a closed
shop secured through a strike were both legal. "In a legal sense an
agreement entered into, under such circumstances, is voluntarily entered
into; and as the agreement is in itself legal, no reason appears why the
general rule that a legal end may be pursued by legal means should not
be applied."^
^ k°c « cit .
Ibid
.
, p . 106
.
Ii2
Loc . cit . This seems to be in answer to the majority's assertion
that "Vifhatever may be the advantages of ’ collective bargaining'
,
it is not
bargaining at all, in any just sense unless it is voluntary on both sides.
This implied of course that collective bargaining could not be secured by
striking. Yet the majority opinion sanctioned the anti-union contract
which was secured by withholding employment. This was inconsistent.
Justice Brandeis, at least, was consistent; he held that a closed shop
secured by a strike was a legal end secured by legal means; and he like-
wise upheld the legality of a non-union closed shop secured by withholding
employment
.
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Justice Brandeis did not think the anti-union contract had been
violated. The contract did not prevent the miners from joining the union;
it merely stipulated that they could not join the union and continue
•working for the Hitchman Company. The union had not signed up the miners
as members, but had merely received pledges from some of them that they
would join the union. The contract would have been violated only when
the miners joined the union and continued on their jobs. There was no
evidence that this had happened or was contemplated. If the intention
of the union was to secure a large number of pledges who would join and
strike at the propitious moment, this would have been permissible under
the contract.
Finally Justice Brandeis, in answer to the majority opinion's
assertion that ’’the right of action for persuading an employe' to leave
his employer is universally recognized,” ^ replied that this is so only
if it be done "maliciously and without justifiable cause. To
strengthen the union and the bargaining power of the individual through
collective bargaining was in the opinion of the minority a justifiable
purpose.
The legal interpretation of the facts as expounded by the
opposing opinions need no further comment for they have been eloquently
argued by Justice Pitney and Brandeis respectively for the majority and
the minority. It would be well, however, to recapitulate briefly the
results of this case. The yellow dog contract was held to be legal; even
^ Supra
, p. 75.
^ Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
. ,
107.
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the minority did not contest this point. The minority insisted, however,
that unionization and all that it implied was a legal end that could be
pursued by legal means, viz., economic pressure such as a strike, provided
"threats, violence, or intimidation" were not used. This philosophy was
important because traces of it were later incorporated in the Norris-
LaGuardia and National Labor Relations ActsJ'^ It seems strange, however,
that the minority did not find this right to join the union incompatable
with the yellow-dog contract.
If the Hitchman decision were to be strictly interpreted, an
employer by refusing to bargain collectively would be immune from unioniza-
tion. Yet within the next few years union membership experienced a
phenomenal growth. Part of the answer to this lay in World War I and
the policy of the National War Labor Board. To achieve national solidarity
and uninterrupted production, the Board ruled that men were not to be
fired for union membership. This practically abrogated the Hitchman
decision for the duration of the war. The end of the war and the
disappearance of the Board saw the launching of an anti-union campaign
and a multiplication of yellow-dog contracts especially in the coal
fields.
‘
:c National solidarity and uninterrupted production apparently
^ Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which deals with the public
policy of the United States, infra. Appendix Ij Section 1 of the National
Labor Relations Act encourages' collective bargaining by "protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of ar iociation, self-organ: zation,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose
of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual
aid or protection."
^ After the war the United Mine Workers began to organize the non-
union area of West Virginia in the face of the many yellow-dog contracts
that abounded in that area. The operators sought to restrain this
invasion of unionism, and the many injunction suits that resulted were
consolidated under the title, International Organization, United Mine
Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Company, IS F.
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were not desirable during years of peace’.
,
2d 839 (C. C. A. U 1927), certiorari denied 275 U. 5, 536, (1927). A
temporary injunction was granted in 1920, and it was made permanent in
1925. The appeal of the defendant union was turned down in 1927 by Judge
Parker of the Circuit Court of Appeals. In his opinion Judge Parker cited
the Kitchman Case in support of the decision, and he said in part: "To
approach a company’s employees, working under a contract not to join the
union while remaining in the company’s service, and induce them, in
violation of their contracts, to join the union and go on a strike for the
purpose of forcing the company to recognize the union or of impairing its
power of production, is another and very different thing. 'That the decree
forbids is this ’inciting, inducing, cr persuading the employees of
plaintiff to break their contracts of employment’ ; and what was said in the
Pitchman Case with respect to this natter is conclusive of the point
involved here." It is interesting to note that Judge Parker’s nomination
to the Supreme Court in 1930 was rejected by the Senate largely because of
his enforcement of the yellow-dog contract. An examination of the
Congressional Ptecord for May 7> 1930, Volume 72, 81*75 to 81*88, reveals a
Senatorial reaction against the injunction and the yellow-dog contract. It
must be added, however, that Judge Parker’ s alleged anti-negro views also
contributed to his rejection.
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CHAPTER X
THE CLAYTON ACT
Under pressure from labor organizations many attempts had been
made in Congress to remove labor from the jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act and to offer labor some relief from the injunction. There was no
great opposition against legislative proposals to curb equity juris-
diction. The Littlefield anti-trust bill of 1900, which contained an
amendment excluding labor from the anti-trust provisions, was passed by
the House but became buried in the Senate Judiciary Committee.^ The
Pearre Bill of 1907 and the Wilson Bill of 1911, both affording equity
reform, were never enacted. The procedure was not to reject but to refer
back to committee, to amend and emasculate, and to delay. Though these
direct attempts at reform did not come to fruition, an indirect approach
2
finally met with approval. After 1913, appropriation bills carried a
provision which stipulated that none of the funds were to be employed in
prosecuting labor organizations under the anti-trust acts.^ This
devious and questionable attempt^ at reform best exemplifies the attitude
of Congress which was to remain non-committal. Thus the appearance was
x Frankfurter and Greene, op . cit
., p. lUO.
2 Frankfurter and Greene called this a "flank movement." Loc . cit .
3 Ibid
.
,
p. liil.
President Wilson, in signing the measure, remarked: ’I can assure
the country that this item will neither limit nor in any way embarrass
the actions of the Department of Justice. Other appropriations supply
the department with abundant funds to enforce the law.’ Loc. cit.
*.
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kept up that something was being attempted; at the same time nothing
definite was accomplished which would be offensive to capital. The
political psychology involved was not as simple as that. Congress is
made up of varied individuals and the motives of each run the gamut all
the way from political chicanery and log rolling to sincerity. One
thing is certain, when Congress as a body thinks that the time is right,
it does something definite. Whether individual motives be ulterior or
altruistic. Congress has a nose for sniffing which way the wind is
blowing, and it likes to go along. The election of Wilson, who promised
the country a "new freedom," in 1912 was a shift in the wind that could
not be ignored.^ Some definite reform had to be passed, and this came
in the form of the Clayton Act^ which became law on October 15, 191b •
But how specific could the Act be when, on one hand, Samuel Gompers
could declare that the labor provisions "are the sledge hammer blows to
the wrongs and injustices so long inflicted upon the workers. This
declaration is the industrial magna carta upon which the working people
n
vrill rear their construction of industrial freedom." Yet, on the
2 The shift in the wind actually started in 1910 with the election
of a Democratic majority in the House; there were also fifteen men hold-
ing union cards elected to Congress; and William B, Wilson, former
officer in the United Mine 'Workers, was appointed chairman of the House
Committee on Labor. "The corner stone of the Federations legislative
program, the legal exemption of trade unions from the operation of anti-
trust legislation and from ... injunctions, was yet to be laid . . •
the election of a Democratic administration was the logical means to that
end , . . with the election of Woodrow Wilson . . . and a Democratic
Congress in 1912, the political friends of the Federation controlled all
branches of government." Perlman, Selig, A History of Trg.de Unionism in
the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company,~T937
)
5’~PP* 206-7077
°
"The election of Woodrow Wilson made some action inevitable."
Frankfurter and Greene, loc . cit.
7 Ibid
.
,
p. llj.3
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other hand, the Act led the President of the American Bar Association to
»
say:
All these provisions have been called
the charter of liberty of labor. We have
seen that the changes from existing law
they make are not broadly radical and that
most of them are declaratory merely of what
would be law without the statute. This is
a useful statute in definitely regulating
procedure in injunctions and in express
definition of what may be done in labor
disputes. But what I fear is that when
the statute is construed by the courts it
will keep the promise of the labor leaders
to the ear and ]}reak it to the hope of the
ranks of labor.
Kow could these diametrically opposed interpretations be
explained? To seek the intent of Congress would be futile for the
"debates in Congress looked both ways." 9 Why had not Congress been
more explicit? The election of a liberal president had no doubt
facilitated passage of the Act: but Wilson was a minority president. 10
In view of that fact Congress may not have deemed it feasible to be too
8 Ibid
.
,
p. 16U.
' Fpjld
. t p # li|3. Some of the members of the Judiciary Committee felt
that Section 6 of the Act removed labor from the provisions of the Sherman
Law; others "suggested that the act would merely prevent suits for the
dissolution of labor organizations, but would continue to permit the issue
of injunctions under the Sherman Law to restrain them from carrying out
their purpose." Ibid
.
,
p. lliU. It is amazing to note that some of those
who supported the Act (Senator Pittman for one) assured Congress that it
was not a radical departure from what was already law; while those who
opposed it, feared that the Act would immunize labor from the anti-trust
laws. Many of the Congressmen were at least candid; they "attacked the
legislation as futile if it aimed only at legislation of what was already
legal, and vicious if it accomplished the immunization of labor from the
anti-trust laws." Loc . cit.
10 Theodore Roosevelt contributed to the defeat of Taft by running on
a third party ticket. The combined popular vote of Roosevelt and Taft,
however, amounted to 7*609, 9h2 f as against 6,286,216 votes for Wilson.
Debs running on the socialist ticket received 897,000 votes. Thus Wilson
»'
.
• i V
-
.
'
, ...
.
• /
.
zealous in its reform—and thus it presented labor "with a half-way
measure leaving it up to the "Supreme Court ... to find meaning where
Congress had done its best to conceal meaning."^ In several landmark
decisions the Supreme Court found nothing in the Act that changed the
status of labor under equity jurisprudence, but that on the contrary, the
Act merely crystallized into statute the law that had already developed in
the courts of equity. One may well ask what was the point of passing the
labor sections of the Act if such was the case.- Could this statute
which "was the fruit of unceasing agitation, which extended over more
than twenty years . . . "-3 offer no injunctive relief to labor? The
Supreme Court decided that it did not. The argument as to which of the
two—Congress or the Supreme Court—failed labor has long since raged.
^
was certainly not the choice of the najority of the voters, but in the
electoral college he received U35 votes as against 88 for Roosevelt and
8 for Taft.
Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
.
,
p. 1h5
12 Mr. Justice Brandeis raised this point in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 25U U. S. 14i3 (1921). Case reprinted in Handler, op. cit .
,
pp. 259-270.
13 Kr. Justice Brandeis, ibid
.
,
p. 268. Frankfurter and Greene also
point out that the "... Clayton Act was the product of twenty years of
voluminous agitation." Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
.
,
p. 17o.
Ik "It is hard to read this important chapter in the development of
American labor policy without becoming disillusioned about two of our most
important branches of government—Congress and the Supreme Court. Ever
since /the/ first interpretation of Section 20 of the Clayton Act, almost
all educated opinion in this country has been that the Supreme Court sold
organized labor down the river when it construed this section. But there
is another angle to this. Several astute lawyers thought that Congress was
the body which had betrayed the labor unions when it enacted Section 20.
They believed that Congress deliberately made this section ambiguous * *
*
.
These same lawyers thought that Congress had all the time actually
hoped and believed that the Supreme Court would nullify by construction
the liberal implications of the section." Gregory, op. cit., p. 170.
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This brief sketch of the background of the Clayton Act shows
the futility of attempting to ascribe any intent to the labor provisions
of the Act. An examination of the face of the Act, however, may prove
helpful in understanding the cases that came under it.
THE LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Sections 6 and 20 were the more important labor sections of
the Act. Section 6 reads as follows:
Section 6. That the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-
trust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricul-
tural, or horticultural organizations,
instituted for the purposes of mutual help,
and not having capital stock or conducted
for profit, or to forbid or restrain in-
dividual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or
the members thereof, be held or construed
to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the anti-
trust laws.l-
Insisting that the labor of a human being was not a commodity
or an article of commerce was not done to repudiate Karl luarx' famous
charge as to the status of labor under capitalism. The point was that
if labor was not an article of commerce, it would not be subject to the
restrictions and laws covering the movement of commodities in interstate
commerce. That part of the section upholding the legality of labor
organizations is strange since this right to organize had long since
been recognized. The concluding part of the section definitely removes
15 Compare this section with the proviso (the one that was buried in
the Judiciary Committee) excluding labor from the Sherman Act. Cf. ante
P- 51
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labor from the provisions of the anti-trust laws. This is in keeping with
the opening sentence. There is one joker in the section, however. Labor
cannot be forbidden or restrained when it is "lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof." This would clearly throw into the lap of
the Supreme Court the burden of interpreting lawfully and legitimate .
If the Court decided that all that hadtheretofore been considered unlawful
and illegitimate was still the law, labor had gained nothing by Section 6.
And this proved to be so, for in the first case to arise under the Clay-
ton Act,^ Justice Pitney writing the majority opinion declared: "As
to section 6, it seems to us its principal importance in this discussion
is for what it does not authorize, and for the limit it sets to the
immunity conferred. * * * But there is nothing in the section to exempt
such an organization or its members from accountability where it or they
depart from its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade." The Paine Lumber
Company Case^-7 had already foreshadowed this decision in the Duplex Case .
It now appeared that labor* s hope for relief were doomed to disappointment
as far as the Clayton Act was concerned.
Section 20 of the Law seemed to promise labor definite
injunctive relief. Close analysis of the section, however, reveals
18
the following ambiguities:
16 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 25U U. S. 14i3 (l92l).
Supra p. 69 .
1‘ Of course, it is easy to pick the ambiguities now in view of the
experience that has followed the Act. Any study in retrospection reveals
that which was not evident when viewed at close range.
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Sec. 20. That no re-
straining order or injunc-
tion shall be granted by
any court of the United
States, or a judge or the
judges thereof, in any
case between an employer
and employees,
Does this mean between an employer and
his employees? The word his is not used; it
could very well mean that persons not in the
employ of the employer in question would be
immune under this section. The union for
example! Or employees of another employer!
19
The Supreme Court did not think so. The
meaning is obscure and amenable to any
interpretation. This mistake was not
repeated in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Do
employees on strike still retain their status
as employees? The "area of economic con-
flict" must include the right to strike if
labor is not to be hamstrung. It would be
mockery then to take away the striker’
s
status as an employee. Surely Congress
could not have meant this since later in the
section it gives labor the right to strike.
It is strange that this point was not
cleared up in the Act since Congress was
21
not unaware of the problem.
19 In the Duplex Case the Supreme Court held that this phrase meant
the relationship existing between "those who are proximately and substanti-
ally concerned as parties to an actual dispute...", (i. £., an employer and
his employees), 254 U. S. 14*3 (1921).
20 Section 13 (c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, infra p. 130.
21 The question was discussed in Congress. 51 Cong. Rec. 965U-55 •
See Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. p. 161 . The National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 defined workers on strike as employees. Section 2 ( 3 ) reads:
"The term ’employee’ ...shall include any individual whose work has ceased
.••
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or between employers and
employees.
The use of the plural in a law is not
unusual since it is a legal device to cover
every contingency. "What contingency did
Congress wish to cover here? An industry-
wide dispute? A general strike? It is
hard to say. The Supreme Court supplied
an answer: "Congress had in mind particular
industrial controversies, not a general
22
class war,"
or between employees, or
between persons employed
and persons seeking
employment
,
This could apply to a jurisdictional
strike between two groups of employees both
claiming jurisdiction over a particular job,
or between employees and unemployed crafts-
men both claiming jurisdiction over a job to
be performed for the employer in question,
or between two groups of employees each
wanting a different union to represent their
shop. Again the words are amenable to any
construction.
involving or growing out
of, a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of
employment
This does not seem to cover a dispute
to unionize a shop. If that is so, nothing
new has been granted to labor. It is an
empty formula to allow a dispute "concerning
as a consecuence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute. . ."
The Taft-Kartley Act does not change this definition,
^ Duplex Printing Press Company y. Deering, 25U U. S. hh3 (1921).
•' J
-
-
"
,
•
. YU :
,
.
.
'
~
.
.
.
•'V flJ. '
.
59
unless necessary to pre-
vent irreparable injury
to property, or to a
property right, of the
party making the applica-
tion, for which injury
there is no adequate
remedy at law, and such
property or property
right must be described
with particularity in the
application, which must be
in writing and sworn to by
the applicant or by his
agent or attorney.
terms or conditions of employment" without
the prerequisite of being able to organize
in order to bargain collectively. If
first things come first, it would seem
logical that such a prerequisite is under-
stood. Yet, many of the lower federal
courts held that "the statute was . . .
inapplicable when the strike was to
unionize a factory or generally, for a
purpose other than immediate betterment
of working conditions."^
This proviso merely states what has
always been a part of equity juris-
prudence. Injunctions have always been
granted to prevent irreparable injury to
property where there is no adequate remedy
at law. By neglecting to define
irreparable and property
,
Congress has
tacitly approved the interpretations given
to these terms by the courts in prior
labor injunction cases.
Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit.
,
p. 165
. . .
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And no such restraining
order or injunction shall
prohibit any person or
persons, whether singly
or in concert, from termina-
ting any relation of employ-
ment, or from ceasing to
perform any work or labor,
or from recommending,
advising, or persuading
others by peaceful means
so to do
j
or from attending at any
place where any such person
or persons may lawfully be,
for the purpose of peace-
fully obtaining or com-
municating information
or from peacefully
persuading any person to
work or to abstain from
This obviously grants the right to
strike (note the use of the words in
concert), but this right had already been
recognized by a Supreme Court which did not
think that it conflicted with the right to
issue an injunction. In the Debs Case
,
the Court found that the injunction did
not challenge the "right of any laborer,
or any number of laborers, to quit
work ..."
This seems to sanction picketing, but
this word was not used, and the omission
was noticed by the Supreme Court. 4 The
words lawfully and peacefully were to be
held incorapatable with picketing. "It is
idle to talk of peaceful communication. *
* The name ’picket' indicated a
militant purpose, inconsistent with
peaceful persuasion."^ Thus nothing was
^
"The phrase really recognizes as legal that which bears the sini-
ster name of 'picketing' which it is to be observed Congress carefully
refrained from using in section 20." Taft, C. J., American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 13U (1921). Case reprinted
Tn Handler, op. cit., pp. llU-122.
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working; changed. "This introduces no new principle
into . . . equity jurisprudence
. . .
Labor's conduct was to be subject to the
same restraints that applied prior to this
section."^
or from ceasing to
patronize or to employ
any party to such dispute,
or from recommending,
advising, or persuading
A boycott seems to be implied here.
But what kind of a boycott? The words
peaceful and lawful could very well mean
that nothing new was granted than what had
already been allowed by the courts. This
others by peaceful and lawful in fact was the case, as it is noted by
means so to do; the Court in Duplex Printing Press Company
v. Peering : "the section as reported was
carefully prepared 7/ith the settled purpose
of excluding the secondary boycott and
confining boycotting to the parties to the
dispute. . . "
or from paying or giving The payment of strike benefits was
to, or withholding from, never a point of contention in the Supreme
any person engaged in Court,
such dispute, any strike
The Supreme Court in the American Steel Foundries Case described
what this conduct should be. ( Infra p.3f5). It said, however, that:
"Each case must turn on its own circumstances." This would place upon
labor the burden of fitting its conduct to the circumstances, never
certain, however, that its actions would be those approved by the
courts.
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benefits or other moneys
or things of value;
or from peaceably
assembling in a lawful
manner, and for lawful
purposes;
This seems unnecessary since the
Constitution (Article I) already gave "the
right of the people peaceably to assemble."
or from doing any act
or thing which might
lawfully be done in
the absence of such
dispute by any party
thereto;
nor shall any of the acts
specified in this para-
graph be considered or
held to be violations of
any law of the United
States
•
Does this mean that a person engaged
in a labor dispute retains the privileges
and immunities granted to him under the
Constitution? It is difficult to see hovf
it could mean otherwise, for this part of
the Act is concise and unfettered by
ambiguities. In that case, the right to
work or not to work, or to purchase or not
to purchase (a right which is exercised by
one person or another almost daily) is
retained by a worker in a labor dispute.
In the Bedford Case
,
however, the Supreme
Court enjoined simple refusal to work
l
Unfortunately very little was specified
in the paragraph but much was alluded to.
Nor does this concluding remark lend
constitutionality to the section, for the
Supreme Court could have found it
unconstitutional.
.•
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These comments on Section 20 do not pretend to embrace all the
interpretations that could be placed upon the various phrases, nor the
more important ones. The attempt rather is to present a thought-
provoking analysis.
Sections 17 , 18, and 19 of the Act deal with the procedural
aspects of the injunction. Section 17 is intended to limit the use of
ex parte restraining orders.^ No restraining orders may be issued
without notice unless it can be proved under oath that the complainant
will suffer irreparable damage. If such an order is issued, it cannot
remain in effect for more than ten days (unless good cause is shown), at
which time a hearing must be held if a temporary injunction is desired.
Section 18 requires that the applicant for a restraining order or a
temporary injunction must give security which will be forfeited and paid
to the defendant if he suffers injury from an injunction wrongfully
issued. Section 19 seeks to prevent the issuance of blanket injunctions.
These sections were intended to correct certain procedural
abuses, yet fourteen years after the Act was passed, Frankfurter and
Greene were compelled to observe that: "More restraining orders without
notice have been granted by federal courts within that period of time
than in any prior period of like duration. "2 Sections 13 and 19 fared
29
no better at the hands of the courts.
2? Restraining orders issued without notice. See supra p. 19.
28 Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. , pp. 185-186.
^ Ibid., p. 186, "The other statutory safeguards have likewise been
ineffective. * * a stranger to an injunction suit may still be punished
for contempt of the injunction." This last refers to the blanket
injunction.
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Sections 21 and 22 pertain to contempt proceedings. Section 21
stipulates that any person who disobeys the injunction may be proceeded
against for contempt. Section 22 stipulates that a person believed
guilty of contempt is entitled to a trial by jury if he so desires,
unless the contempt was committed in the presence of the court, or unless
the contempt was in violation of an injunction issued on behalf of the
Government
.
Not only did the Clayton Act fall short of granting labor the
desired relief from the injunction, but one section in the Act exposed
labor to more injunction suits than had been possible under the Sherman
Act which provided that only the Government could bring injunction suits
under the anti-trust laws. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, however, allows
private injunction suits to enjoin violations of the anti-trust laws.
This resulted in an increase of private injunction suits.''0
When Peter the Great was first defeated by the Swedes, he was
not discouraged. He was reported to have said that this defeat had
taught him how to beat the Swedes should he encounter them in the future.
In this sense then, the Clayton Act was not a total defeat for labor.
The experience of the Clayton Act in the courts, while disappointing to
labor, revealed the weaknesses of the law, so that in the next piece of
labor legislation the same mistakes were not repeated. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act accomplished what labor expected of the Clayton Act and
even more.
30
” Probably as many as half of the suits that have been brought
against labor under the Sherman Act after the passage of the Clayton Act,
have been private injunction suits.” Mounce, 0£. cit . , p. 116,
..
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CHAPTER XI
LANDMARK CASES PRECEDING THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
DUPLEX PRINTING PRESS CO. v. DEERING1
This was a suit in equity brought by the Duplex Printing Press
Company, a Michigan corporation manufacturing printing presses in that
state, for an injunction to enjoin the actions of the defendants who
maintained a boycott of the complainant's products to further a conspiracy
to injure its property and to destroy its interstate trade. The bill was
2
filed in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York,
in April, 19lU, and an ex parte restraining order was issued by the court.
A temporary injunction was granted on April 30, 19lU, and in May, 1917,
when the hearing for a final decree was held, the bill was dismissed,
and the temporary injunction was vacated. This ruling was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals on May 25, 193?
,
but reversed by the Supreme
Court on January 3, 1921, with three justices dissenting.
^
^ 25U U. S. U;3 (1921); reprinted in Handler, op. cit. , pp. 259-270;
also in Sayre, op. cit., pp. UiO-lj.53« History of tKe case is given in
Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit., pp. 165-171.
2 Federal jurisdiction was invoked because of "diversity of citizen-
ship" and the "Federal" question. The former means that the parties to a
federal suit must reside in different states. In this case the complainant
was a Michigan corporation, and the defendants were located in New York.
The "Federal" question pertains to Federal law. In this case the defendants
were alleged to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
^ The majority opinion was written by Justice Pitney with White, C J.,
McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, and McReynolds, J. J. concurring; Justice
Brandeis wrote the dissenting opinion with Justices Hclmes and Clarke
concurring.

The facts of the case were as folloiTs: The Duplex Printing Press
Company operated its factory in Battle Creek, Michigan on an "open shop"
basis with both union and non-union men employed. The defendants, members
of unions affiliated with the International Association of Machinists,
were accused of combining to compel the unionization of the complainant's
factory, and to achieve a "closed shop," the eight-hour day and the
union scale of wages . To enforce these demands, the defendants were
alleged to have interfered with, and restrained, the interstate commerce
of the complainant. None of the defendants were ever employed by the
complainant, nor did the complainant ever have relations with the union
in question. The complainant sold presses all over the United States with
a great deal of its business concentrated in New York City. The prayer
complained of, and sought to have restrained, the following acts on the
part of the defendants: warning customers not to purchase Duplex presses,
or having purchased them, not to install them, threatening customers with
loss if they should do so; threatening customers with sympathetic strikes
in other trades; threatening a trucking company with trouble if it
continued to haul the presses; inciting the employees of the customers
and of the trucking company to strike in order to interfere with the
hauling and installation of the presses; notifying repair shops not to
service the presses; threatening union men with loss of membership if
they aided in installing the presses and coercing them further with a
"scab" blacklist; threatening an exposition company with a strike if it
displayed the Duplex presses; and interfering in various other ways with
the sale of the presses in New York City and with their movement in
interstate commerce
•
.
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The Clayton Act was passed after the beginning of the suit, but
before the hearing, and for that reason the Act was held to apply to the
case. The question was whether such a boycott as was being conducted by
the defendants had been legalized and rendered immune from the injunction
by the Clayton Act. The District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals held
that it had been. Judge Hough of the District Court felt that the words
employers and employees would "be given a strained and unusual meaning"^
if they did not refer to the litigants in question. The limiting word
his had not been used, and therefore a labor dispute was not confined to
an employer and his employees. The Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that the defendants were conducting a secondary boycott, but it held that
Section 20 legalized such a boycott, and it affirmed the holding of the
District Court. The majority of the Supreme Court reversed these
decisions.
Justice Pitney writing the majority opinion arrived at the
following conclusions:
1. The employer’s right to do business is a property
right and as such it may be protected from irreparable damage by the
injunction.
^
^ From decision cited in Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
., p. 167.
^
"That complainant’s business of manufacturing printing presses apd
disposing of them in commerce is a property right, entitled to protection
against unlawful injury or interference." The defendant’s actions
constituted unlawful injury and interference. "Hence the right to
injunction is clear if the threatened loss is due to a violation of the
Sherman Act as amended by the Clayton. ..." Justice Pitney added that
"there is nothing in /Section 67* to exempt such an organization or its
members from accountability where it or the-'- depart from its normal and
legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it be ta cen
c.
•
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2. The privileges and immunities of Section 20 extend
only to disputes between an employer and his employees.
1"
7
3. Section 20 did not legalize the secondary boycott. 1
U. The instigation of a sympathetic strike in furtherance
0
of a secondary boycott was not "peaceful and lawful" persuasion.
In his dissenting opinion. Justice Brandeis found economic
as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally
lawful organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined by the anti-trust laws."
Handler, op. cit
.
,
pp. 261-63.
^
"It is very clear that the restriction upon the use of the
injunction is in favor only of those concerned as parties to such a
dispute as is described." Handler, op. cit
.
,
p. 263. Judge Hough of
the lower court had not found this "very ’clear" but "strained and
unusual". Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
,
p. 167 . Justice Pitney
adds: "full and fair effect will be given to every word if the
exceptional privilege be confined—as the natural meaning of the
words confines it—to those who are proxiraately and substantially con-
cerned as parties to an actual dispute respecting the terms or conditions
of their own employment, past, present, or prospective." Handler,
op. cit., p. 26u.
^ The Court cited Loewe v. Lawlor and other decisions to show the
illegality of a secondary boycott. "It is settled by these decisions
that such a restraint produced by peaceable persuasion is as much
within the prohibition as one accompanied by force or threats of
force." Ibid
.
,
p. 262. As to the meaning of Section 20, the Court
said "... the section as reported expressed the real purpose so
well that it could not be tortured into a meaning authorizing the
secondary boycott." Ibid
.
,
p. 266.
O
"To instigate a sympathetic strike in aid of a secondary
boycott cannot be deemed 'peaceful and lawful' persuasion."
Ibid
. , p. 265.
..
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justification in the actions of the defendants which he based upon the
following facts: There were four competing manufacturers of such
presses in the United States. The International Association of
Machinists had induced three of them to recognize and bargain collectively
with the union for an eight-hour day, a minimum wage, and other union
requirements. The Duplex Company was the only one of the four* that
refused to recognize the union or to grant any of the other concessions
—
the ten-hour day being the rule in its factory. Under the circumstances
greater competitive burdens were placed upon the unionized manufacturers,
and two of them notified the union that if their competitor, the
Duplex Company, did not enter into an agreement with the union, they
would be obliged to terminate their own agreements.
The minority saw in these facts a threat to the existence of
the union—a threat which the union had to meet in self-defense.
"Defendants’ justification /Tor their acts7 is that of self-interest.
. . .
They have injured the plaintiff, not maliciously, but in self-
defense." The minority displayed a deep insight into the struggle
between capital and labor and the legal area of economic conflict
that should attend such a struggle. Economic realities do not permit
a conglomeration of wage scales within a single industry nor polygot
working conditions. Sooner or later competition forces the higher
standards to the level of the lower if the latter are tolerated, llor
could one group of workmen look with indifference upon what was
happening to another group. This is not a novel principle; Lincoln
had long ago said: "A house divided against itself cannot stand."
Justice Brandeis gave recognition to the realities of economic
..
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self-interest attending labor organizations in a classic passage of his
opinion:
A single employer might, as in this case,
threaten the standing of the whole organization
and the standards of all its members; and when
he did so the union, in order to protect itself,
would naturally refuse to work on his materials
wherever found. TShen such a situation was first
presented to the courts, judges concluded that
the intervention of the purchaser of the
materials established an insulation through
which the direct relationship of the employer
and the workingmen did not penetrate; and the
strike against the material was considered a
strike agains* the purchaser by unaffected
third parties. But other courts, with better
appreciation ol the facts of the industry,
recognized the unity of interest throughout
the union, and that, in refusing to work on
materials which threatened it, the union was
only refusing to aid in destroying itself.'
The remainder of the minority opinion was concerned with
putting a different construction on Section 20 than had been applied by
the majority. Justice Brandeis held, for example, that "Congress did
not restrict the provision to employers and workingmen in their employ."
It’s not so important that the Court split over the interpretation of
the Act, the majority had set a standard which was to be maintained for
the next decade; it is important, however, that the minority recognized
that the existence of an industrial struggle demanded an allowable area
of economic conflict and that the limits of this area should be determined
by the legislative and not the judiciary branch of government."0 This
standard was later used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act which so clearly
' Sayre, op. cit
.
,
p. kSO.
"Because I have come to the conclusion that both the common law of
a state and a statute of the United States declare the right of industrial
J:
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expressed the will of Congress that the primary job of the courts was to
enforce the Act rather than to speculate upon its meaning.
AMERICAN STEEL FOUNDRIES v. TRI-CITY CENTRAL TRADES COUNCIL
11
Less than a year after the Duplex Case had passed upon the
legality of the secondary boycott under the Clayton Act, the meaning of
Section 20 was scrutinized by the Court once more—this time in regards to
picketing; the occasion was the American Steel Foundries Case . The
American Steel Foundries, a New Jersey corporation, operated a plant in
Granite City, Illinois. In May, l?lli, it petitioned the Federal District
Court of the Southern District of Illinois for an injunction against the
12
Tri-City Central Trades Council and others to enjoin them "from carrying
on a conspiracy to prevent complainant from retaining and obtaining
skilled laborers to operate its plant." The complainant alleged that the
conspiracy was perpetrated by means of organized picketing, threats, and
intimidation against its employees and prospective employees.
combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of
self-interest, I do not wish to be understood as attaching any constitu-
tional or moral sanction to that right. All rights are derived from the
purposes of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to
the community. The conditions developed in industry may be such that those
engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the com-
munity. But it is not for judges to determine whether such conditions
exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest
and to declare the duties which the new situation demands. This is the
function of the legislature which, while limiting individual and group
rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for
the more primitive method of trial by combat." Handler, 0£. cit .
,
pp. 269 -'
|
11 257 U. S. (1921), reprinted ibid., pp. llU-122.
12
As the corporation was from New Jersey and as the defendants were
citizens of states other than New Jersey, the American Steel Foundries was
able to invoke federal jurisdiction because of "diversity of citizenship."
0 .
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The Tri-City Trades Council, a labor organization representing
thirty-seven trade unions in Illinois, protested to the complainant when
a wage cut was instituted at the latter's factory. The complainant
notified the Council that it ran its factory on an open shop basis, and,
therefore, it would not deal with the union. As a result, the Council
called a strike at the complainant's plant, but only two of the employees
heeded the strike call—defendants Churchill and Cook. Picketing was then
put into force by the Council, and evidence disclosed that the following
conduct took place: Employees were threatened to keep away from the
plant; a sign was displayed outside the plant calling attention to the
strike and advising employees and other workers to stay away in order
that a wage increase might be secured; one of the employees, master
mechanic Hall, was handed a circular of the Trades Council by one of the
defendants and was told:
We don' t like the way you have treated
our boys down here, and we just came down
to raise a little hell.
Three or four groups of pickets patrolled the plant, and there
were from four to a dozen men to the group. One April 30th, an employee
was assaulted by three of the pickets, and more attacks occurred within
the next few days. On Kay 18, 191U, the District Court issued the
restraining order, and all "disturbances ceased."
The defendants admitted picketing the plant, but alleged that
persuasion was the means by which they sought to induce the people to
stay away from the complainant's factory. The ruling of the Distrist
Court was, however, very drastic. The final decree was a blanket
.ft
r
.
r.
.
injunction^ which "perpetually restrained and enjoined from in any way
or manner whatsoever by use of persuasion
,
threats, or personal injury,
intimidation, suggestion of danger, or threats of violence of any kind,
interfering -with, hindering, obstructing or stopping any person engaged
in the employ of the American Steel Foundries," or who sought to be
employed there. Persuasion was also ruled out as a means of inducing
employees to leave the employ of the American Steel Foundries or of
preventing others from working there. The injunction further enjoined
the defendants "from picketing or maintaining at or near the premises of
the complainant, or on the streets leading to the premises of said
complainant, any picket or pickets . . . .
On December 16, 1916, the Circuit Court of Appeals modified the
injunction by permitting persuasion and by restraining only that picketing
that was carried on "in a threatening or intimidating manner. On
December 5 , 1921, the Supreme Court affirmed the first modification
which allowed persuasion, but reversed the second.
The Court ruled that the Clayton Act applied because the case in
question was argued in the Circuit Court of Appeals after the Act was
passed. Chief Justice Taft writing the majority opinion^ adhered to the
13
The "blanket" clause read as follows: "... the said defendants
. . . and each of them, and all persons combining with, acting in concert
with, or under their direction, control or advice, or under the direction,
control, or advice of any of them, and all persons whomsoever. ..."
Reprinted in Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
.
,
p. 88. This clause was
allowed to stand by the Supreme Court despite Section 19 of the Clayton
Act restricting such catch-all clauses.
^ Final decree reproduced in body of Supreme Court opinion in
American Steel Foundries Case. Handler, op. cit
.
,
pp. llU-115.
15 Ibid
., p. 119.
Justice Brandeds concurred in substanee in the opinion and-the—
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Duplex decision by stating that Section 20 introduced "no new principle
into the equity jurisprudence of /the federal/ courts. It is merely
declaratory of what was the best practice always.” Chief Justice Taft then
sought to show that picketing was not the "best practice always” because
it could not be peaceable^ nor could it be lawful-*^
,
and he cited for
support "many well reasoned authorities.” Furthermore, he called attention
to the fact that "that which bears the sinister name of 'picketing'" was
"carefully" omitted by Congress from Section 20. His point was that the
qualification placed upon the word picketing by the Circuit Court was
inadequate and that picketing per se was illegal. The Court recognized,
however, that in an economic struggle the strikers should be given some
opportunity to induce other employees to join their ranks, and for this
purpose the Court introduced the "missionary doctrine" which would not
conflict "with the right of the employer incident to his property and
business to free access of such employees" as picketing would have done.
The "missionary doctrine” was to be flexible so that it could vary with the
circumstances of each case; and Chief Justice Taft described the doctrine
as follows:
judgment of the Court; Justice Clarke dissented.
17
"It is idle to talk of peaceful communication in such a place and
under such conditions. The numbers of the pickets in the groups
constituted intimidation. The name 'picket' indicated a militant
purpose, inconsistent with oeaceable persuasion.” Handler, op. cit
.
, p.
118 .
'
-* '
"Our conclusion is that picketing thus instituted is unlawful and
can not be peaceable and may be properly enjoined by the specific term
because its meaning is clearly understood in the sphere of the
controversy by those who are parties to it." Ibid., p. 119.
c•
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We think that the strikers and their
sympathizers engaged in the economic
struggle should be limited to one repre-
sentative for each point of ingress and
egress in the plant or place of business
and that all others be enjoined from
congregating or loitering at the plant
or in the neighboring streets by which
access is had to the plant, that such
representatives should have the right
of observation, communication and
persuasion, but with special admonition
that their communication, arguments and
appeals shall not be abusive, libelous
or threatening, and that they shall not Q
approach individuals together but singly, '
and shall not in their single efforts at
communication or persuasion obstruct an
unwilling listener by importunate follow-
ing or dogging his steps. This is not
laid down as a rigid rule, but only as
one which should apply to this case under
the circumstances disclosed by the evidence
and which may be varied in other cases. It
becomes a question for the judgment of the
chancellor who has heard the witnesses,
familiarized himself with the locus in
quo and observed the tendencies to disturb-
ance and conflict. The purpose should be
to prevent the inevitable intimidation of
the presence of groups of pickets, but to
allow missionaries.™
Then, paradoxically as it may seem, the Court decided that the
decision in the Duplex Case could "have no bearing here" and it held that
the right to persuasion could be exercised not only by an ex-employee of
the complainant but also by those defendants who had never been employed,
or contemplated being employed, by the complainant. The Court justified
this on the following grounds:
I
19
The Court indulges in semantic calisthenics by preferring the word
missionary to that of picket but it would require more than semantics to
transform the "in concert" of Section 20 to the "singly" of the Supreme
Court.
20 Handler, op . cit
.
,
pp. 119-120
.'
.
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Is interference of a labor organization by
persuasion and appeal to induce a strike against
low wages, under such circumstances without
lawful excuse and malicious? We think not.
... A single employee was helpless in dealing
with an employer. . . . Union was essential to
give laborers opportunity to deal on equality
with their employer. . . . The strike became a
lawful instrument in a lawful economic struggle
or competition between employer and employees
as to the share or division between them of the
joint product of labor and capital. To render
this combination at all effective, employees
must make their combination extend beyond one
shop. It is helpful to have as many as may be
in the same trade in the same community united,
because in the competition between employers
they are bound to be affected by the standard
of wages of their trade in the neighborhood.
Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda
to enlarge their membership and especially
among those whose labor at lower wage mil
injure their whole guild. 1
This was a suprising conclusion for the Court to reach considering
that Chief Justice Taft did not think that it conflicted with or over-
ruled the Duplex decision. In the Duplex Case where the defendants
resided in New York and the complainant operated its factory in Michigan,
the Court decided that Section 20 of the Clayton Act did not offer
relief because the defendants were not employees of the complainant. In
the American Steel Foundries Case where the defendants resided in Illinois
and vicinity and the complainant operated its plant in Illinois, the Court
decided that the privileges of Section 20 (as interpreted by the Court)
applied even though the parties to the dispute did not stand in the
proximate relationship of an employer and his employees. It may be, as
is suggested by Frankfurter and Greene, that Chief Justice Taft based his
conclusions on the smaller geographical area involved in the American
21 Ibid
.
, pp. 120-121
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Steel Foundries Case .
BEDFORD CUT STONE COMPANY v. JOURNEYMEN STONE CUTTERS' ASSOCIATION23
In the Bedford. Cut Stone Case the Supreme Court ordered an
injunction against the Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association to enjoin
refusal to work upon non-union material. The facts of the case were
simple. The Bedford Cut Stone Company and twenty-three others, mostly all
Indiana Corporations, were engaged in the business of quarrying and cutting
Indiana limestone, a great part of which was sold in interstate commerce.
^
The plaintiffs operated their business under a union agreement with a
local of the General Stone Cutters' Union until 1921, at which time a
dispute over terms caused the plaintiffs to terminate their agreement. A
strike was followed by a lockout; and the plaintiffs organized "a so-called
independent union" 23 with which they entered into agreement "closing their
shops and quarries against the members of the General Union and its
locals." 2,3 The General Union thereupon issued a notice to its members not
22
"The justification of a substantial common concern so clearly
expounded by the Chief Justice was present in the Duplex as well as in the
Tri-City case, unless the Court rested the differences in result between
the two cases upon the fact that in the Tri-City Case the stage of the
controversy was confined to a smaller geographic area." Frankfurter and
Greene, op. cit
.
,
p. 173.
23 27h U. S. 37 (1927) Case reprinted in Raushenbush and Stein, 00 .
cit
.
,
pp. 167-17U; reprinted in part in Handler, op. cit .
, pp. 270-272;
separate opinion of Justice Stone reprinted in part in Frankfurter and
Greene, op. cit.
,
p. 176 .
2
^ The amount sold in interstate commerce was 7%% . Mounce, or. cit .
,
p. 120
2S The words used by Justice Brandeis in his minority opinion; alludingl
of course, to the fact that such a union was a company union.
2d
The fact that there was a lockout was recognized by Justice Suther-
land from whose opinion these words are quoted.
V
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to work on stone "that has been started
—
planned, turned, cut, or semi-
finished—by men working in opposition to our organization. "^7
Although the General Union had been locked out of the plaintiffs 1
shops and quarries in Indiana, the significance of its order lay in the
fact that most of its members were employed outside the state of Indiana,
on buildings where the complainants' stone was used. Upon the issuance
of the order, these stone -.workers, members of the defendant union, refused
to work on the stone of the plaintiffs;^ whereupon the Bedford Cut Stone
29
Company sought to have this refusal enjoined. The injunction was
denied by the District Court on November 13, 192H, and this decree was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on October 28, 1925 • On April 11
1927, the Supreme Court reversed the decree and granted the injunction.
Justice Sutherland in writing the majority opinion called the
union' s action "a course of conduct which directly and substantially
curtailed . . . the natural flow in interstate commerce ... to the
gravely probable disadvantage of producers, purchasers, and the public;
and it must be held to be a combination in undue and unreasonable
restraint of such commerce within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act as
Order reproduced in majority opinion.
^ Some members refused to work on the plaintiffs’ stone while others
who were found working on the stone, were warned that their union cards
would be revoked if they continued.
29 The defendant members refused to work on the stone after it had
been purchased by local builders with whom they had no grievance.
.,
.
. .
r
.
.
-
. * . . . ,
.
109
interpreted by this court. It was the opinion of the Court that this
conspiracy existed solely as a retaliatory measure to force the com-
plainants to recognize the union. Such a purpose was not lawful, and the
Court based its decision largely on the Duplex Case
,
which it reviewed at
great length. But how similar were the facts in these two cases? It will
be recalled that the machinists' union was alleged to have committed a
•31
great many acts, all of which were enjoined. The stone cutters on the
other hand were accused of only one act—refusal to work on non-union
stone. This was the only action enjoined by the Court. The simplicity of
the stone cutters' action can only be appreciated by enumerating the things
that they did not do.
1. They did not engage in a secondary boycott, nor did they
32
33
refuse entirely to work on the plaintiffs' stone.
2. They did not instigate sympathetic strikes
3. They did not resort to picketing, violence nor threat of
violence, nor intimidation of thira parties.3h
30 Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
. ,
p. 170.
33- See supra p.96 for the conduct of the machinists which allegedly
included secondary boycotts, instigation of sympathy strikes, and intimida-
tion of third parties.
32"
"They did not plan a boycott against any of the plaintiffs or
against builders who used the plaintiffs' product. On the contrary, they
expressed entire willingness to cut and finish anywhere any stone
quarried by any of the plaintiffs, except such stone as had been partially
'cut by men working in opposition to' the Association." Justice Brandeis
dissenting. Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
.
,
p. 172.
33
"There was no attempt to seek the aid of members of any other craft,
by a sympathetic strike or otherwise." Justice Brandeis, loc . cit .
3^
"They were innocent alike of trespass and of breach of contract.
They did not picket. They refrained from violence, intimidation, fraud
and threats. They refrained from obstructing otherwise either the
..
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They merely refused to complete work started by non-union labor.
If one stone cutter had refused to work on the slone, the injunction could
never have been issued against him; but because the stone cutters had
acted in concert, the Court had deemed their conduct unlawful.''" The
commentary of Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion was most
appropriate
:
Observance by each member of the provision
of their constitution which forbids such action
was essential to his own self-protection. It
was demanded of each by loyalty to the organiza-
tion and to his fellows. If, on the undisputed
facts of this case, refusal to work can be
enjoined. Congress created by the Sherman Law
and the Clayton Act an instrument for imposing
restraints upon labor which reminds of
involuntary servitude. The Sherman Law was
held in United States v. United States Steel
Corporation
,
251 U. 5. 117, to permit’
capitalists to combine in a single corpora-
tion 50 per cent of the steel industry of the
United States dominating the trade through
its vast resources. The Sherman Law was
held in United States v. United Shoe
Lkchinery Co
., '2h7 IT. S. 32, to permit
capitalists to combine in another corpora-
tion practically the whole shoe machinery
industry of the country, necessarily giving
it a position of dominance over shoe-
manufacturing in America. It would, indeed,
be strange if Congress had by the same Act
willed to deny to members of a small craft
plaintiffs or their customers in attempts to secure other help.” Justice
Brandeis, loc . cit . The majority in searching for signs of intimidation
could find only ’’expressions of apprehension on the part of such
customers of labor troubles if they purchased the stone.” Justice Suther-
land, majority opinion, og. cit
.
,
p. 167.
35
"An act which lawfully might be done by one, may when done by many
acting in concert take on the form of a conspiracy and become a public
wrong
. . .
." Justice Sutherland, og. cit
. ,
p. 170. This doctrine goes
back to the early American conspiracy cases and even beyond to People v.
Wilzig (1562), see supra , p 36 .
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of workingmen the right to co-operate in
simply refraining from work, when that
course was the only means of self-protection
against a combination of militant and power-
ful employers. cannot believe that
Congress did so."®
J Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
.
,
p. 17U; Justice Stone who
concurred with the majority "largely on the authority of the Duplex Case"
nevertheless observed in a separate opinion that "as an original proposition,
I should have doubted whether the Sherman Act prohibited a labor union from
peaceably refusing to work upon material produced by non-union labor or by
a rival union, even though interstate commerce were effected." From
separate opinion of Justice Stone reprinted in part in Frankfurter and
Greene, 0£. cit .
,
p. 176.
•r ,
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CHAPTER XII
THE FOURTEENTH AMENIMENT AND THE LABOR INJUNCTION
TRUAX v. BISBEE LOCAL NO. 3801
Certainly, if a dispute between plaintiffs
and a labor union exists • .
.
plaintiffs have
no legal right to force the union to keep the
facts secret. The extent of the publicity-
given in such dispute is unimportant and
violates no right of plaintiffs, either civil
or criminal. If the publicity given the
existence of the dispute results in a loss
of patronage and business to plaintiffs, such
loss is attributable to the dispute, and not
attributable to the publicity given to the
dispute.
Consequently the mere publication of the
existence of a strike and of its causes in a
thorough manner is no ground for equitable
interference
. . .
.
2
This decision of the trial court in Arizona followed a dispute
between one Truax, operating a restaurant in Bisbee, Arizona, and his
employees after a reduction in wages and an increase in hours. A cook and
the waiters went on strike and began to picket the restaurant. Truax
claimed that the picketing was causing irreparable damage to his business
and applied for equitable relief in the state courts. The defendants
claimed exemption for their conduct under an Arizona statute which
19 Ariz. 379 j 389 (1918), opinion reprinted in part in Handler,
op
. cit .
,
pp. 251-252 .
2 Cunningham, J., in Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380.
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permitted peaceful picketing.^ The trial court refused to issue an
injunction as was seen above, and this decision was sustained by the Supreme
Court of Arizona which based its ruling upon the Arizona statute. Truax
finally appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the case
was heard under the title of Truax v. Corrigan .
TRUAX v. CORRIGAN^ 1
The Supreme Court obtained jurisdiction in the Truax Case on the
ground that the Arizona statute which denied equitable relief to Truax
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. ^ Chief Justice
Taft writing the majority opinion described the conduct of the defendants,
which though not violent, involved the following acts: patrolling in
front of the plaintiffs’ restaurant with a banner; announcing in alta voce
in front of the plaintiffs' restaurant that he was unfair; stigmatizing
plaintiffs' employees as scabs;^ libelously charging that Truax was
tyrannical and chased his employees down the street with a butcher knife;
casting aspersions upon the plaintiffs' restaurant, his food, and his
prices; ridiculing the mentality of patrons and inquiring of prospective
J Ariz. Civ. Code (1913) par. II4.6I4.. This statute was similar to the
Clayton Act which it preceded.
k 257 U. S. 312 (1921). Majority opinion of Chief Justice Taft and
dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis reprinted in Handler, op. cit
.
,
pp. 133-liil; dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes reprinted in Raushenbush
and Stein, op. cit
.
, pp. 73-7U; dissenting opinion of Justice Pitney
reprinted in part in Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. ,
p. 179.
^ Article XIV, Section 1 of the Constitution reads: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
persons of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
. .
'
° This brings up the.. problem of what to call a spade if you can't nail
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customers of thr plaintiffs: "Can you patronize such a place and look the
world in the face ?"
;
and admonishing others with such phrases as "All ye
who enter here leave all hope behind" and "Don’t be a traitor to humanity.
llh
ti
Chief Justice Taft inquired as to whether these means were
illegal and he submitted that they were. "Violence could not have been
more effective. It was moral coercion by illegal annoyance and obstruction,
and it thus was plainly a conspiracy." He concluded, therefore, that the
Arizona statute, which allowed such conduct, deprived a person of his
property"^ without due process of law and could not be constitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The crux of the majority* s decision lay in the fact that the
Arizona statute denied equal protection of the laws as provided in the
Fourteenth Amendment and as such was unconstitutional. That is, while the
Arizona statute denied injunctive relief to the plaintiffs for the actions
of his striking employees, he could have secured an injunction, if say, his
business competitors had acted thus. The Court expressed this as follows:
The necessary effect of these provisions and
of Paragraph ll;6b is that the plaintiffs in error
would have had the right to an injunction against
such a campaign as that conducted by the defendants
in error, if it had been directed against the
plaintiffs' business and property in any kind of
a controversy which was not a dispute between
employer and former employees.
On this reasoning the ruling of the Arizona Supreme Court was
it a spade.
7 By property the Court meant the plaintiffs' right to do business.
"Plaintiffs' business is a property right." Chief Justice Taft, Handler,
op . cit
.
,
p. 137.
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reversed and the injunction granted
Four Justices dissented and three separate dissenting opinions
resulted.^ The majority opinion demonstrated, however, that if labor was
to achieve relief from the injunction and the anti-trust laws, it would
have to depend on federal legislation.
^ Some of the highlights of these dissenting opinions were as follows:
"
. . . it is clear that the refusal of an equitable remedy for a tort is not
necessarily a denial of due process of law. And it seems to be equally
clear that such refusal is not necessarily arbitary and unreasonable when
applied to incidents of the relation of employer and employee." Justice
Brandeis, reprinted in Handler, op. cit
.
,
p. lUO.
.
.By calling a business ' property r you make it seem like land and lead
up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut down the
advantage of ownership existing before the statute was passed. . . . But
you cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing." Justice
Holmes, reprinted in Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
.
, pp. 73-7U.
".
. .
I find no authority for the proposition that the guaranty was intendec
to secure equality of protection ’not only for all but against all similarly
situated,' except as between persons who properly belong to the sane class.'1
Justice Pitney, reprinted in Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit.
,
p. 179.
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CHAPTER XIII
THE ABUSES OF THE LABOR INJUNCTION
Most of the labor injunction cases that have come before the
Supreme Court thus far have been covered. These landmark decisions reveal
that the Court had put narrow limits to the actions of organized labor.
Labor was a consistent loser in the courts, and legislation did not offer
the desired relief because it was loosely drawn. Strikes, picketing, and
boycotts were held illegal or were vastly circumscribed in scope. On the
other hand, the yellow-dog contract was given a sweeping mandate. Above
all these cases portray the intensity of the economic struggle between
capital and labor. It was seen how the employer was aided in the struggle
by an efficacious legal weapon—the labor injunction.
The nature of the labor injunction was such that it worked a
hardship on the activities of organized labor. In this connection many
writers speak of the abuses of the labor injunction.'*' The following
analysis will illustrate what they had in mind.
An employer beset by labor difficulties and desirous of an
injunction could file a bill in equity or a complaint with the court.
These complaints were usually drawn up in sterotyped fashion without
Gregory, op. cit
. ,
Chapter IV j Handler, op. cit . , pp. liuL-lWi;
material for this chapter was also gathered from the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brandeis in Truax v. Corrigan; Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
.
,
Chapters II and III; Commons and Andrews, op. cit
. ,
lil3ff.; Stein et al..
Labor Problems in America (New York: Farrar & Rhinehart. Inc.. 19ho).
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particular regard to the facts of the case. In many instances a formula
that had proved successful in a prior case was employed verbatim . In
order to secure an injunction, the mere recitation of the following
sterotyped complaint was sufficient : the complainant had property and
business goodwill; a conspiracy existed to damage the same; the conspira-
tors were striking or were inducing a strike or were using threats and
intimidation in furtherance of the conspiracy; and irreparable injury for
which there was no adequate remedy at law would ensue. It was not
necessary to mention specific conduct on the part of the defendants.
The complainants also had the choice of tribunals in presenting
their bills, and they could petition a judge who was not actually sitting
on the bench at the time the restraining order was desired. Naturally
the custom developed of petitioning only those judges who could be
depended upon to issue the injunction. Since the federal courts were
more prolific in issuing injunctions, the employer’s attorney used, when-
ever he could, diversity of citizenship and the federal question in order
to present the complaint before a federal judge. Of 2,000 injunctions
issued between 1880 and 1932, one fourth were federal injunctions. The
federal courts refused to grant injunctions in only six per cent of the
cases to come before them; whereas the state courts denied the injunction
2m twelve per cent of the cases.
If the judge was convinced of the allegations as stated in the
complaint (no witnesses were called upon to refute them), he would issue
an parte restraining order without notice to the union or its members.
Stein et al., ojd. cit.
,
p. 62k.
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This was designed to maintain a status quo until a hearing could be held.
This meant that the parties to the dispute must assume the position that
they held prior to the controversy until a hearing could be held to
determine whether the defendants were acting unlawfully. It did not
necessarily follow that the acts restrained were actually being
perpetrated or threatened by the defendants. In a great many instances
the courts enjoined conduct that was probably never contemplated by the
defendants. This anticipated and rendered illegal in advance any
conceivable action on the part of the defendants. To disobey the order
was prima facie evidence that the defendants were in contempt of court
and ipso facto subject to punishment. For the defendants to protest that
they were committing none of the alleged acts, would have elicited the
reply from the court that if this were so, then there was no harm in
issuing the restraining order. The psychological effects of such an
order, however, hampered the activities of the union or the v/orkers in a
dispute, for they were never sure when they would step out of bounds.
Furthermore, it made them feel the weight of the courts tossed into the
scales against them. Workers untutored in the ways of the law were
easily discouraged by this damoclean sword suspended above them, and
would rather return to work than to continue a hopeless struggle.
If the workers decided to continue the struggle, they would have
to persuade the judge on the strength of affidavits to vacate the order.
This opportunity was presented to them at the hearing for a temporary
injunction which was normally held within ten days of the issuance of
the ex parte order, but which was in many cases postponed. This delay
could easily prove fatal to the union, for a strike is usually won in

its early stages. At the hearing the judge had to decide -whether or not
to issue a temporary injunction on the basis of highly colored and
conflicting affidavits without the opportunity of hearing witnesses
cross-examined. Eecause of the nature of these affidavits, the court
had to exercise considerable discretion in granting temporary injunctions.
This deplorable situation vras described by Judge Amidon in Great
Northern R. Co. v. Brosseau:
. . . affidavits are an untrustworthy guide
for judicial action. That is the case in
all legal proceedings, but it is peculiarly
true of litigation growing out of a strike,
where feelings on both sides are necessarily
wrought up, and the desire for victory is
likely to obscure nice moral questions and
poison the minds of men by prejudice.-^
On this flimsy and questionable sort of evidence injunctions
were granted that were very often sweeping in scope or obscure as to the
sort of conduct that was being enjoined. These "drag-net” clauses in
their endeavor to put a quietus on any unlawful activity enjoined
"threats," "intimidation," "coercion," and "unlawful acts" without
bothering to define these terms. Some clauses went all out in their
restraint as in the Tri-City Case in which "any acts or things whatever
in furtherance of any conspiracy" were enjoined. Many injunctions
prohibited the use of language that was "bad," "indecent," "annoying,"
li £
or "abusive." The use of the epithets "scab," "traitor," and "unfair"
^ 286 Fed. I4.II4. (D. N. Dak., 1923), from case reprinted in Handler,
op . cit
.
,
p. 123.
^ Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit
. , p. 9^.
5 Loc. cit.
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was also enjoined. In one dispute in which ninety per cent of the workers
spoke a foreign language, the judge prohibited the use of any but the
) English language.^* In another case even silence was found coercive. Thus
the court enjoined a lone picket who patrolled in silence because
"silence is sometimes more striking and impressive than the loud
mouthings of the mob." The court likened the solitary vigil of this
picket to the terrifying effects of the swinging pendulum in Poe' s tale
n
"The Pit and the Pendulum." The injunction was also used to enjoin
such purely economic weapons as the strike and the conduct so necessary
to carry on a strike—inducing others to strike, the payment of strike
benefits, peaceful persuasion, giving publicity to the facts in the
dispute. Even simple refusal to work was enjoined as was seen in the
Bedford Cut Stone Case
.
It may seem redundant to recite the specific
acts forbidden when it could be said simply that anything "whatsoever"
was forbidden in a great many cases. But this would leave too much to
the reader* s imagination, and no reader would ever imagine that a court
would prohibit the singing of such hymns as "Nearer my God to Thee."
Yet such was the case in a Pennsylvania dispute where the judge enjoined
all meetings and hymns on church property that was over one quarter of
Q
a mile from the coal mine that was being struckl
0 Clarkson Coal Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers (S. D. Ohio, 1927)
unreported., case discussed ibid
.
,
p. 103; concerning this same case, the
judge declared that he would have any man who was not an American citizen
deported if such a person violated the injunction. Ibid
.
,
p. 39.
1 Gevas v. Greek Restaurart Workers' Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770 (1926);
1 excerpt from case cited ibid., p. 132.
q Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,
No. 1909 Equity, 1927 (D. 3. W. D. Pa) unreported; case discussed ibid
.
,
pp. 101-102, footnote 91. The incident took place at Rossiter,
Pennsylvania, and the injunction was issued by Judge Langham of the
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Thus it is seen that the injunction failed to inform the
defendants of the specific acts which they were forbidden to do, or it
enjoined acts which would have been permissible in the absence of a labor
dispute. In addition many injunctions contained the "omnibus" clause
which extended the injunction to all persons "whomsoever." This prevented
anyone from rendering any aid to the defendants, and corralled persons
outside the dispute and forced them to pay heed to the terms of the
injunction. Thus a barber who displayed a sign "No Scabs Wanted in Here"
9
was held in contempt of court.
'
At all hearings the judge determined the facts without the
assistance of a jury. Contempt proceedings were conducted by the judge,
who had granted the injunction, without benefit of a jury, and evidence
was submitted in the form of affidavits. Since it was his order that had
been violated, the judge* s position was not as impartial as might be
hoped, and the form of punishment lay at his discretion.
In cases involving federal jurisdiction, the defendants might
ultimately appeal to the Supreme Court, but the expense involved in such a
procedure made this course of action prohibitive to all but the larger and
more prosperous unions. Furthermore, so much time was consumed in
appellate proceedings, that the final decree, if it had been rendered in
favor of the defendants, would have been nothing more than a moral victory.
Pennsylvania State Court. Lester reports that the judge in this case
later admitted that he had $6,000 invested in the coal company. Lester,
op . cit., p. 808.
° United States v. Taliaferro, 290 Fed. 21i* (W. D. 7a., 1922) Case
discussed in Frankfurter and Greene, on. cit., p. 113; see also Gregory,
op . cit
.
,
p. 101.
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While awaiting appellate jurisdiction the defendants were
compelled to obey the injunction, for an injunction, though wrongfully
issued, must be obeyed. It would be ironical if after years of litigation,
the defendants were to be told that the injunction had been wrongfully
issued and they need not obey it. The Hitchman Case which remained in the
courts for over ten years resulted in an adverse decision for the
defendants. But if the Supreme Court had ruled in 1917 that the injunction
had been wrongfully issued in 1907, this would not have restored the
defendants to the position they occupied in the earlier period1.
Such was the nature of the injunction that led Justice Brandeis
to say “that the real motive in seeking the injunction was not ordinarily
to prevent property from being injured nor to protect the owner in its
use, but to endow property with active, militant power which would make
it dominant over men."^
But it was not, the injunction alone that curbed labor. The
injunction was merely a device which was abused. The thing that led to
this abuse was the state of mind of the judiciary. The industrial
struggle was still an innovation when the first labor injunction cases
began to come before the courts. These early judges could hardly be
blamed if they looked upon strikes, picketing, and boycotts as highly
irregular conduct which somehow seemed unlawful and ought to be enjoined.
Many were property owners who were nutured in an environment where
property was highly respected. They moved in the same social circles as
the employers, and were inadvertently biased in the developing economic
10 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (l92l)
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conflict which they honestly believed to be an attack upon property. Nor
were they aided by the law-making branch of the government which passed
very little labor legislation to guide the courts. The courts had only the
English common-law rule of conspiracy to guide them. The metamorphosis of
the United States into an industrial nation required a new set of rules to
govern the developing economic contest between capital and labor. There
is nothing unhealthy about such a struggle anymore than there is anything
wrong about business competition. This is perfectly clear now, but it
cannot be expected that the courts could take this view at the incention
of such a struggle. They were necessarily confined by their own Zeitgeist
in which any encroachment upon property was abhorred and in which
individualism was the ruling spirit. “While unionism entailed collectivist
action and aggressiveness if the workers 1 conditions were to be improved,
the employers had the enviable position of maintaining that which was
sanctioned by law and order and of protecting established rights from
encroachment. The latter position is always favored by the courts which
resist change until the need for change clearly becomes the expressed will
of the people.^ In those days the courts could not be certain that
strikes, picketing, and boycotts were socially recognized economic weapons,
^ The importance of the judges’ economic and social bias in rendering
their decisions was recognized by Justice Brandeis in the Duplex Case where
he spoke of "judges" determining "according to their own economic and social
views "
5
Gregory quotes Lord Justice Scutton, Cambridge Law Journal
,
1921 as
follows: "It is very difficult sometimes to be sure that you have put
yourself into a thoroughly impartial position between two disputants, one
of your own class and one not of your class." Gregory, op. cit
.
,
p. 15>3.
The expressed will of the people should then become law. "Govern-
ment and the State should be, namely uhe will of the people expressed in
terms of law." Levi, Carlo, Christ Stopped at Bboli (New York: The
Penguin Books, Inc., 19U8), p. l5o.
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and it is little -wonder that the Supreme Court was constantly seeking to
narrow the allowable area of economic conflict to curb the growing power
of labor. A few enlightened justices like Holmes and Brandeis saw the
need for widening the allowable area of economic conflict to meet the
exigency created by modern industry. There was the need to formulate rules
of conduct so that employers and employees could conduct themselves
accordingly, and the courts would know what they could or could not enjoin.
If the labor injunction was being abused, this was so because, up to 1932,
no one knew the limits to the allowable area of economic conflict.
>
..
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CHAPTER XIV
THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT LED TO THE ANTI-INJTJNCTION LAW OF 1932
The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the result of varied
and complex factors. The effect of some of these factors was direct but
their importance should not be overstressed; other factors while exerting
only an indirect influence may have played a more important role in
securing this legislation. In the final analysis, it was the timely
combination of many events and factors that created the suitable climate
for an anti-injunction law in 1932.
The agitation of the American Federation of Labor was certainly
a prime mover. With the same resolute determination that made the Romans
declare, "Delenda est Carthago," the leaders of the Federation cried out,
"
. . • we must abolish and wipe out this iniquitous menace when speaking
of the injunction. The speeches and writings of Samuel Gompers were
replete with attacks upon the injunction and with the demand for legislative
2
relief. After his death, the struggle was continued by President Green
and Vice-President Matthew Woll. This agitation was accelerated in the
From a speech of Vice-President Matthew Woll of the A.F.L.; from the '
New York Times
,
February 8, 1928, p. 27, col. 8, reprinted in Frankfurter
and Greene, op. cit
.
,
p. 52.
^ See Samuel Gompers, Labor and the Employer (New York: E, P. Dutton
and Co., 1920); also Samuel^Gompers
,
Labor and the Common Welfare (New York:
E. P. Dutton and Co., 1919) ; both volumes are compilations of the writings
and addresses of Samuel Gompers extending over a period of thirty-five
years.
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twenties, and during this period John Frey, editor of the International
Molder 1 s Journal
,
wrote a stinging indictment of the injunction in his
book, The Labor Injunction
,
and Andrew Furuseth, leader of the Seamen,
conducted an active lobby against the labor injunction. This redoubled
agitation in the twenties was the result of the treatment of the Clayton
Act in the Supreme Court. In every case which involved an interpretation
of the Clayton Act, and especially in the Bedford Case ," the deficiencies
of that Law in offering injunctive relief were becoming patently clear.
It can be said that the Supreme Court influenced the form of future anti-
injunction legislation by exposing the inadequacies of the Clayton Act in
this regard.
The anti-injunction campaign of the Federation received a real
impetus when Professor Felix Frankfurter of Harvard took up the cudgel
against the labor injunction. This not only lent prestige to the arguments
against the injunction, but it also placed the struggle in more expert
hands. In contrast to Fre;/-' s The Labor Injunction
,
which read like
propaganda. Professor Frankfurter (now a Justice of the Supreme Court)
with the aid of Nathan Greene wrote an effective indictment of the
injunction which was based upon sound legal grounds. It is noteworthy that
this book, also entitled The Labor Injunction
,
was published in 1930, just
two years prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that Professor Frank-
furter is generally recognized as the author of the Act itself. a
^
"The Bedford decision heightened the A.F.L.’s agitation for a
federal ant^Injunction law, which led to the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.
Raushenbush and Stein, op. cit
., p. 17U.
^ The Norris-LaGuardia Bill was "reputedly drafted by Professor
Frankfurter." Gregory, op. cit., p. 135.
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Frankfurter and Greene had predicted that: "Effective recession
in the present trend of prosperity is likely to invigorate the demand for
legislation. "5 The disastrous depression which began in October, 1929, hit
the nation before these prophetic words went to press. By the end of 1930
over six million people were unemployed and this number was doubled by
1932.° Yihether rights or wrongly capitalism lay discredited, and the
Republican Party was held responsible for the depression. Conservatism no
longer appealed to the millions who were unemployed nor to the small
business men who were equally hard hit. The trend away from conservatism
was indicated in the election of 1930 7^hich gave control of Congress to the
Democrats. That Congress was not slow in divining the will of the people
is evident by the close margin by which conservative Charles Evans Hughes
was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1930. Even Republican
senators deplored this as a move to strengthen the conservative majority
on the Supreme Court.''' That same year the Senate rejected Judge Parker's
nomination to the Supreme Court because of his anti-labor decision in the
g
Red Jacket Case . The time seemed propitious for effective anti-injunction
legislation, and on March 23, 1932, the Norris-LaC-uardia Act became law.
THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT9
The Norris-LaGuardia Act presaged a change in the government'
s
attitude towards collective bargaining. When the United States was first
5
6
7
8
Frankfurter and Greene, op .
Hicks, op. cit
. ,
p. 616.
Ibid
.
,
p. 653.
Supra
, p79 » footnote 1|6.
cit
.
,
p. 150.
9 U7 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. 101 et seq. (1932); reprinted infra,
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instituted, combinations of workers to better their working conditions
were frowned upon, and this attitude was reflected in the courts as is
seen by the conspiracy cases. Later the attitude changed to one of
toleration. Labor v/as free to bargain collectively provided that this
did not conflict 7/ith the rights of employers or non-union employees.
Labor failed in the courts under this policy of toleration because it was
easy for an employer to prove that labor was encroaching upon his rights.
In its essence toleration meant that the government gave recognition to
the right of labor to bargain collectively, but the government would back
the employer if the latter refused to grant this same recognition. The
Norris-LaGuardia Act was a transition from the toleration to the encourage-
ment of collective bargaining. The Act did not force the employer to
bargain collectively, but it was a precursor for the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 , which did make it obligatory for employers to
bargain collectively with their employees. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
removed the first obstacle in the path of collective bargaining by with-
drawing support from the employers when they refused to bargain
collectively. From then on employers were on their own as their legal
weapon—the injunction—was restricted, and the economic struggle 7/as
equalized. To guide the courts in interpreting the Act according to this
new philosophy. Section 2 recognizes that the individual employee is
helpless in dealing with the employer and declares that it is the public
policy of the United States that the worker "have full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his
ovm choosing" and that he have the right to bargain collectively concerning
Appendix I.
I.
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terms and conditions of employment; nor should he be interfered with in
this right. If this seems to hit only indirectly at the anti-union or
yellow-dog contract, Section 3 clearly states that such a contract is contr
public policy and hence unenforceable in any court of the United States.
Section U lists acts which the federal courts may not enjoin:
a. Striking.
b. Joining or remaining a member of a union even though
a yellow-dog contract has been signed.
c. Giving financial support to strikers, such as strike
benefits.
d. Lawfully aiding any party to a labor dispute who is a
litigant in the law courts.
e. Publicizing a labor dispute and all the facts in the
dispute by any means short of fraud or violence.
f. Assembling peaceably to organize and promote a labor
dispute.
g. Declaring the intention to do any of the above acts.
h. Agreeing with others to do any of the above acts.
i. Inducing others to do any of the above acts by any
means short of fraud or violence and regardless of
a yellow- dog contract.
This section again strikes at the yellow-dog contract by taking
cognizance of the situations in which it might arise. Section U actually
gives the union and others interested in a labor dispute a clear field in
the economic conflict, provided they do not use fraud and violence. In
analyzing the various acts which may not be enjoined, it will be helpful
*y to
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to recall all of the labor injunction cases discussed thus far, for it is
in this area of experience that the reader will find the raison d' etre for
every paragraph in Section U. Congress was in effect repealing the abuses
of the injunction not by speculating about how the injunction would be
abused but by examining how it had been abused in the past. A single
illustration will suffice. Section U (b) and (i) was a repeal of the
Hitchman decision as the reader will readily recognize. This section is
remarkable for the thoroughness with which it covers every legal facet
that might be exposed in a labor dispute. At first glance, however, the
question of a secondary boycott seems to be omitted, but this is not
actually the case. Congress merely handled the situation sensibly. To
have forbidden an injunction against secondary boycotts would have
exposed the provision to unconstitutionality; Section U (e) would allow
the union to conduct a secondary boycott by permitting it to publicize the
facts in a labor dispute; sympathizers could take their cue from that.
Up to this point the Act is actually ineffective, for a court
could still enjoin the acts covered if it found that a labor dispute did
not exist. A union could be enjoined from striking a plant in which none
of its members were employed. Something was needed, therefore, to widen
the "allowable area of economic conflict" in keeping with the declaration
of public policy in Section 2. This was accomplished in Section 13 (c),
the most important part of the Act, which declared that: "The term
' labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee." No longer could an
injunction be secured by an employer because the members of the union
were not his employees. Thus the Duplex decision was repealed, and the
vr o ' . a i -
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government gave recognition to the unity of interest that existed among
organized labor. The minority opinion of Justice Brandeis had at last
become the prevailing opinion’,
Mindful of all possible ramafications, Congress forbids
in Section 5 the issuance of an injunction based upon an unlawful
combination or conspiracy on the part of those engaged in a labor dispute.
Section 6 absolves the members of a union from all responsibility for the
unauthorized and unlawful acts of individual members and officers.
Section 7 stipulates when an injunction may be issued, but even this
section restricts the use of injunctions and reforms injunctive procedure.
Temporary restraining orders may be issued only after complainant alleges
under oath that irreparable and substantial damage will ensue; in addition,
the complainant shall file a bond with the c^urt sufficient to recompense
those enjoined for any injury they may suffer for an erroneous issuance
of the injunction. Such a restraining order will be effective for no more
than five days at which time a hearing must be held. In all other cases
no injunction may be issued without a hearing with due notice to the
parties and an opportunity for the cross-examination of witnesses. Notice
must be given to all persons sought to be enjoined; this is directed
against the issuance of blanket injunctions. Section 7 also restores the
use of the injunction to the traditional sphere of equity jurisdiction
from which it had strayed since its application in labor cases. The
precepts of equity are reiterated—an injunction can issue only when
substantial and irreparable injury is oresent and there is no adequate
remedy at law nor police protection; an injunction may not issue unless
"as to each item of relief" its denial will injure the complainant more
,-
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than the union. It -will be recalled that the courts had grovm rather lax
in this regard.
The Act further provides for trial by jury and by a new judge
at the option of the accused in contempt cases provided the contempt is
not committed in the presence of the Court. Appellate procedure shall be
speedy. Thus cognizance is taken of the urgency of a rapid settlement in
labor disputes.
The evils of a "drag-net" clause were not overlooked, and
Section 9 provides that injunctions be issued only upon "findings of fact"
and that only specific acts complained of shall be enjoined.
An unusual feature of the Act is the stipulation that the
complainant shall "make every reasonable effort to settle" a dispute
through mediation or voluntary arbitration before he be granted an
injunction. Thus the employer is put on notice that he cannot take the
easy way out in a labor dispute by the simple expediency of applying for
an injunction. This was in keeping with the philosophy of the Act—the
government was withdrawing the judicial weight which it had so long
exercised on the side of the employer and was leaving the disputants
strictly on their own. In the final analysis, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is important because it equalizes the legal strength of the disputants in a
labor dispute. It did this not by entering the dispute on the side of
labor but by removing those obstructions which had so long contained
labor. The area of economic conflict was defined, and the government
stood on the sidelines to ensure fair play. The significance of the
change in the government' s attitude can only be appreciated by taking a
long backward glance at all theretofore labor legislation since the first
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session of Congress . Never had the objectives of labor organizations
been given such keen consideration. % the Norris-LaGuardia Act labor
gained the recognition for which it had been fighting for over one hundred
years’. And yet this Law was only a transition—a brief moment of
government neutrality in labor disputes—for within the next few years
the government came out openly on the side of labor by the passage of
the Wagner Act of 1935.
.. f ' .
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> CHAPTER XV
THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT IN THE COURTS
Despite the fact that Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
clearly indicates that a labor dispute exists regardless of whether or not
the disputants are in the proximate relationship of employer and employees,
some of the lower federal courts held otherwise in the earlier cases. In
the United Electri c Coal Co . Case", the Federal District Judge held that a
controversy between an employer and a union was not a labor dispute within
the meaning of the Act since none of the members of the union were
employees of the United Electric Coal Company. In another case," the
International Ladies* Garment Workers Union picketed the Donnelly Garment
Company to induce it to recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining
agent for its employees. The Donnelly Company's employees belonged to an
"independent” union which was recognized by the company, and there was no
controversy between the company and its employees. The District Court held
that no labor dispute existed since this was not a controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment. Finding the absence of a labor dispute
in each case allowed the issuance of injunctions.
3In the Cinderella Theatre Co
. Case,"' however, the Court refused
to enjoin pickets who carried signs proclaiming that the plaintiff was
1 80 F. (2d) 1 (1935).
O
Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union,
U. S. D. C., W. D., Mo., W. Div., No. 2921;, August 13, 1937.
•3 Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers* Local, 6 F. Supp. 16U (193U).
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unfair to organized labor. Although none of the pickets were employees of
the theatre, the restrict Court held that such action was not enjoinable
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that a labor dispute existed within the
meaning of the Act regardless of the absence of employer-employee relation-
ship between the disputants.
The pitch for the interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was finally set in recent landmark cases which were decided by the Supreme
Court. Among these was the Senn Case, ^ forerunner of the Lauf Case "* which
passed upon the constitutionality of the Act. Senn conducted a tile
contracting business in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He employed several journey-
men and a few helpers, and he also worked with his men performing the same
work as they. None of Senn* s employees belonged to the union. The Tile
Layers Union sought to induce Senn to become a union contractor, and this
he agreed to do; but he refused to sign an agreement which would have
prevented him from working with his hands in his own business because he
was an employer. Senn even offered to join the union himself, but was
refused because he could not meet the apprenticeship requirements. Senn
thereupon refused to unionize his shop. The union began to picket
peacefully and without violence. A request for an injunction by Senn was
refused by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The court based its decision
on a Wisconsin statute^* (similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act) which
^ Senn v. Title Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U. S. I4.68
(1937); case reprinted in Handler, op. cit .
,
pp. llUi-150.
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); reprinted ibid.,
pp. 150-I51i.
'
^ Wisconsin Employment Peace Act of the Wisconsin Labor Code, sections
103.51 to 103.63 (Wis. Laws, 1931, C. 376; Laws, 1935, C. 551, 5).
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permitted peaceful picketing and publicizing of the facts in a labor
dispute. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and before this body Senn argued that since the picketing was conducted
in the absence of a strike, this was not a labor dispute. Furthermore,
the right to work in his business with his own hands was guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment; and the Wisconsin statute, by allowing the union to
picket Senn in order to induce him from exercising that right, contravened
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected Senn* s argument. It
held that picketing and publicity do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
That Senn 1 s business suffered from the publicit}?- did not deprive him of
any right under the Constitution. Justice Brandeis, in writing the
majority opinion, said: "It is true, also, that disclosure of the facts
may prevent Senn from securing jobs which he hoped to get. But a hoped-
for job is not property guaranteed by the Constitution." The Court held
that the means authorized by the Wisconsin statute
—
peaceful picketing and
publicizing the facts in a labor dispute—were not unlawful, and that the
union kept within the bounds of the statue. Nor was the end sought by the
union—inducing Senn to unionize his shop—unconstitutional. Justice
Brandeis said, "The unions acted and had the right to act as they did, to
protect the interests of their members against the harmful effect upon
3them of Senn’ s action."' That they picketed Senn though none of the
union’s members were employed by him was irrelevant. "Because his action
was harmful, the fact that none of Senn' s employees was a union member, or
sought the union’ s aid, is immaterial." Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act
7 Handler, op. cit., p. 1U9.
O
' Loc. cit.
9 Loc. cit.
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was not involved in this case, this interpretation of a labor dispute
foreshadowed the construction the Court was to put upon Section 13 of the
Act.
A year later in 1938, the Court officially passed upon the
constitutionality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in Lauf v. E. G. Shinner &
Co.
,
and the principles laid down in the Senn Case were reaffirmed. In
the lauf Case
,
the employer operated a chain of meat markets in Milwaukee.
None of his employees belonged to the union. The union made a demand upon
the employer that he require his employees to join the union. The
employer was perfectly willing to permit his employees to join the
union, but his employees declined to do so. The union, thereupon,
picketed the meat markets in order to induce the employer to force his
employees to join the union. The employer applied for, and received, a
temporary injunction from the Federal District Court. The decree
restrained the picketing and the publication by the union that the employe!
was unfair to organized labor. The court held that since this was not a
controversy between an employer and his employees, it was not a labor
dispute as defined by the Wisconsin statute or the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
This decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The union
took the case to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court reversed the
decision. The Court held that the controversy in the case was a labor
dispute as defined by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that the lower courts
exceeded their authority by restraining picketing which was unaccompanied
by fraud and violence.
The same year the Supreme Court rendered a similar decision in
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co."^ The New Negro Alliance
-N-Nf&Xl Q 938 );-reprinted ibid. , pp^ - 155-1t&v
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requested the Sanitary Grocery Company to employ Negroes in some of its
stores that were located in the Negro section of Washington, D. C. The
company ignored this request, and the Alliance placed in front of one of
the stores a picket carrying the following sign:
Do Your Part*.
Buy Where You Can Work1.
No Negroes Employed Here’.
The picket patrolled in a peaceful manner neither coercing nor
intimidating any of the customers. The Sanitary Grocery Company was able
to get an injunction from the District Court of the District of Columbia,
which restrained the Alliance from picketing or boycotting the com-
plainant’ s business and from doing any act which was injurious to the
complainant’s business. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this
decree, holding that this was not a labor dispute within the meaning of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act because it did not concern terms or conditions
of employment. The Supreme Court overruled this decision, and Justice
Roberts, writing the majority opinion, displayed an acute insight into the
actions of the New Negro Alliance and the intrinsic catenation between
such conduct and terms or conditions of employment. His words bear
repeating:
^The/ definitions /of the term
"labor dispute^ plainly embrace the
controversy which gave rise to the
instant suit and classify it as one
arising out of a dispute defined as a
labor dispute. They leave no doubt
that the New Negro Alliance and the
Reproduced in Supreme Court opinion; ibid
.
,
p. 1^5.
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individual petitioners are in contemplation
of the act, persons interested in the dis-
pute. * * The desire for fair and
equitable conditions of employment on the
part of persons of any race, color, or
persuasion, and the removal of discrimina-
tions against them by reason of their race
or religious beliefs is quite as important
to those concerned as fairness and equity
in terms and conditions of employment can
be to trade or craft unions or any form of
labor organisation or association. Bace
discrimination by an employer may reasonably
be deemed more unfair and less excusable
than discrimination against workers on the
ground of union affiliation.
The Court held that peaceful picketing and publicizing the facts
in a labor dispute without fraud or violence were within the meaning of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that the lower court erred in not complying with
the provisions of the Act.
In 1939 in Wilson & Co. v. Birl
,
J the Circuit Court of Appeals
declined to enjoin secondary picketing-^ and secondary boycotting-1-^ because
the union’s conduct was unaccompanied by fraud and violence. Circuit Judge
Biddle made direct reference to the secondary boycott in his opinion: ”As
found by the trial judge, the appellees’ acts did not involve fraud or
violence. Such pressure on others often loosely termed a ’secondary boycott’,
falls within the section /of the Norris-LaGuardia Act/ and cannot be
enjoined."-^ The case was not appealed to the Supreme Court.
12 Ibid
., p. Ip6.
H 105 F. (2d) 9I48 (C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 1939); reprinted
ibid
.
, pp . 163-166
.
A general definition of a secondary boycott is the refusal of A to
deal with B if B deals with C.
15 Secondary picketing occurs when A, having a dispute with C, pickets
B to induce him from dealing with C.
16 '5Bicr»T p. 166.
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The Hutcheson Case1? of 19Ul, which involved criminal prosecu-
tion of the union by government under the Sherman Act, did not directly
concern the Norris-LaGuardia Act. nevertheless, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
pointed out in his opinion that a secondary boycott unaccompanied by fraud
or violence could not be enjoined under the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The case involved a jurisdictional dispute ' between the carpenters
union and the machinists' union over work to be done for Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., at its plant in St. Louis, Missouri. In addition to ruling that the
!? United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (l9Ul)j reprinted ibi d.
,
pp. 167-176.
“l O
The circuitous route by which Mr. Justice Frankfurter arrived at
this conclusion is aptly described by Gregory: "He observed that an
indictment may be validly drawn under one statute and at the sane time
another statute, not referred to therein, 'may draw the sting of criminality
from the allegations.' Thus, if an offense under the Sherman Act alone
were found to have been absolved by the terms of Section 20 of the Clayton
Act—the statute which was in some ways intended to amend and to modify
the Sherman Act—then an indictment charging that offense could not stand
up. He pointed out that a portion of Section 20 described certain conduct
customarily engaged in by union people for the purposes of extending
organization and of collective bargaining and made it specifically non-
enjoinable. He also reasoned that this paragraph 'relieved such practices
of all illegal taint by the catch-all provision, /nor shall any of the
acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations
of any law of the United States._7' In short, if the actions of the four
indicted union leaders in pursuing this secondary boycott amounted to
conduct fairly described by this portion of the Clayton Act, then such
conduct was not only not enjoinable but was not even illegal in any sense
whatsoever. That is to say, it did not amount to a violation of any law
of the United States, including the Sherman Act, under this concluding
catch-all clause." Gregory, op . cit
.
,
pp. 269-270. The Supreme Court,
however, had not so interpreted Section 20 of the Clayton Act in the
Duplex decision in 1921. Gregory points out that Justice Frankfurter
surmounted this obstacle "by deciding that Congress itself had in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act redefined the conduct set forth in the second para-
graph of Section 20 of the Clayton Act, with reference to employees and
nonemployees alike. In this way. he declared. Congress had given this
catch-all clause a new vitality." Ibid
. ,
p. 272.
*1 O
xo A jurisdictional dispute may be generally defined as ". . .a
disagreement between unions over the right of one or the other to represent
a particular -wroup of employees, or over which union is to control certain
work."
_
G. T. Gilliamson and Herbert Harris, Trends in Collective Bargain-
ing. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,
-
l9li!?)', p. 17.
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secondary boycott conducted by the carpenters’ union was permissible under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Supreme Court held that Section 13 of the
Act permitted a jurisdictional dispute.
Thus in a series of landmark decisions, labor was emancipated
from the grip of the labor injunction. Unlike the Clayton Act, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was interpreted by the Supreme Court as granting labor every- 1
thing that labor had expected to receive when the Act was passed. To
recapitulate briefly, the gains of organized labor under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act were: the right to picket and publicize the facts in a
labor dispute without fraud or violence, and in the absence of a strike
regardless of whether or not the disputants were in direct relationship
of employer and employees; the right to conduct secondary picketing and
secondary boycotting unaccompanied by fraud or violence; the right to strik ;
for a closed shop; and the right to engage in a jurisdictional dispute.
In short, organized labor was able to employ its economic weapons
unhampered by the injunction provided that it did not resort to fraud
or violence.
4

CHAPTER XVI r
THE STATUS OF THE INJUNCTION TODAY
The labor injunction was used less frequently after the passage of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the interpretation of the Act by the Supreme
Court. It is true that the employer could still apply for an injunction when
fraud and violence were involved, but the employer’s attorney would have to
present strong evidence to that effect. No longer would the courts accept
vague and general affidavits. Furthermore it was incumbent upon the employe]
to prove that he had made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute
through mediation or voluntary abitration before he be granted an injunction,
This opens the door to government interference, but the Act so restricted
the injunction that this provision never recived a major test in the courts.
For all practical purposes the labor injunction had ceased to be an effica-
cious employer's weapon.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was only the first of a series of laws
favorable to labor. With the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the
presidency and with the inception of the "New Deal" a period of govern-
mental encouragement to labor organizations was ushered in, and the Democrat^.
Administration adopted a sympathetic policy towards the aims and aspirations
of labor organizations. In 1933, Congress oassed the National Industrial
Recovery Act. Section 7 (a) of this Act provided that employees should have
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing and that no employee be required to join a company union
as a condition of employment. The purpose of the Act was to set codes of
fair competition for certain industries, and Section 7 (a) was one of the
conditions to the codes;-" The -Act was declared uncongt-it-jonal' on bay-H? j=
—
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1935, by the Supreme Court in Schecter Poultry Co. v. IT. S.~ Although
Section 7 (a) was not directly involved in the Schecter Case, it fell
along with the rest of the Act since it was a part of the codes. A few
months later, however, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act
which not only incorporated Section 7 (a) within its provisions, but it
also prohibited certain actions of the employers which were deemed "Unfair
2
Labor Practices"" Under the National Labor Relations Act, popularly known
as the Wagner Act, a union no longer had to apply economic pressure on the
employer to obtain recognition for collective bargaining purposes. The
employer was required by law to do this, and the union's main task was to
induce employees to become members of the union.
Under the benevolent approval of the New Deal, labor organizations
expanded and grew powerful. Unfortunately, a few labor leaders became
arrogant and abused their newly-won privileges. Neanvhile it was becoming
obvious that the Wagner Act did not mitigate industrial strife as was
expected in Section 1. The yearly number of strikes and lockouts, ’while
fluctuating, was large and kept going up. In 19U6, there were 116,000 man-
days lost as the result of strikes as compared with 19,592 in 193U, the yeai
before the Wagner Act.^ Furthermore, employers complained that the Act did
more than restore equality of bargaining power between employers and employ-
ees as was stated in Section 1— rather it gave more power to the employees.
A reaction began to spread against the growing power of labor and the
abuses of labor under existing legislation. Y/here labor had once cried
1 295 U. s. U95 (1935).
2 See Appendix II for list of unfair labor practices.
^ Bureau of Labor Statistics. For an opposite view, cf . Leon H,
Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act? Louis G. Silverberg, The Vagner Act:
19E5V
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for reform, it -was now the employer who demanded relief. A threatened
railroad strike in 19U6 and the perennial walkouts of the bituminous miners
under John L. Lewis did not help the cause of labor. It was becoming clear
that the country was in the mood for reform, and in 19U6 when the control
of Congress passed to the Republicans, they interpreted their victory,
among other things, as a mandate from the people to inaugurate drastic reforijn
of the labor legislation passed by the New Deal. Going through the same
process of experiencial realization that had given birth to the Wagner
Act, the Taft-Hartley Act of 19U7 became law. The Republicans were able to
pass the Act over President Truman’s veto with the aid of their Democratic
colleagues.
Ihh
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into a detailed
discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Act is mentioned merely to
complete the overall picture of the ebb and flow of labor legislation
which has alternately favored capital and labor in the economic struggle.
That part of the Act which deals with the labor injunction bears discussion.
Just as the Wagner Act prescribed certain conduct on the part of
the employer as unfair, the Taft-Hartley Act enumerates certain actions by
the union which would also be deemed unfair. “ To prevent these unfair
labor practices by the union, the National Labor Relations Board is
empowered to issue "cease and desist orders." To enforce these orders, the
Board may petition any circuit court for a temporary restraining order.
h See Appendix III.
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In granting this temporary relief, the courts are not "limited by the Act
entitled ' An Act to amend the Judicial Code and to define and limit the
jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes,' approved
March 23, 1932."^ In other words, restraining orders can be issued, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act notwithstanding 1 The adverse implications of this on
labor may be far reaching. It is difficult to understand why Congress, in
correcting the abuses of 'the Wagner Act, should have found it necessary to
disturb the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This can only be another indication of
the change that has taken place.
The Taft-Hartley Act further permits the Board to get a five-day
temporary restraining order without notice in cases vrhere substantial and
irreparable damage to the employer may result.
Sections 206 to 210 of the Taft-Hartley Act deal with labor
disputes which are defined as national emergencies. Whenever the .President
of the United States deems that a strike^’ "affecting an entire industry or
a substantial part thereof" engaged in interstate commerce will "imperil
the national health or safety," he may appoint a board of inquiry to
investigate the issues. This board of inquiry shall submit a report to the
President, and, at that time, he may direct the Attorney General to
petition a federal district court to enjoin such a strike for a period of
eighty days. In issuing the injunction, the court will not be limited in
any way by the Norris-LaGuardia Act l After the Court order has been issued
the parties to the dispute are obligated to make every endeavor to settle
^ Section 10 (h)
° The same procedure is followed in case of a lockout.
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their differences with the aid of a "Federal 1'ediation and Conciliation
lli6
Service” created under the Act. Neither side is obliged, however, to
accept any of the proposals made by the Service. If no settlement is
reached at the end of sixty days, the board of inquiry shall again report
to the President. The current position of the parties and the employer’s
last offer will be made public. Within the succeeding fifteen days, the
National Labor Relations Board shall take a secret poll of the employees
to decide whether they wish to accept the employer’s last offer. The
results will be certified vrithin five days thereafter. The eighty-day
period having expired, the Attorney General shall petition the Court to
discharge the injunction. This action may be taken sooner, of course, if
settlement takes place at an earlier date. After the injunction has been
discharged (artiassuming that the dispute has not yet been settled), the
President shall submit a full report to Congress "together with such
recommendations as he may see fit to make for consideration and appropriate
action."
This procedure is not actually as equitable as it seems, nor is
it pregnant with the solution for settling a national emergency; for, in
the final analysis, the President may have to settle a dispute by asking
Congress to take "appropriate action." This means government interference,
and both capital and labor should realize that government interference
means political interference which can work to the detriment of both
capital and labor. It is unfortunate that each side welcomes government
interference when it is to its advantage, little caring that the advantage
may be a temporary one, dependent upon the vicissitudes of politics.
The declaration of a national emergency by the President in the
case of a strike places the burden upon labor of having created that
..
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emergency. Sensational headlines and an uninformed public create an
atmosphere which may not be conducive to a clear understanding of the
issues. The fairness or unfairness of the demands may be overlooked. The
apparent facts -will stand out. It is labor who is striking or threatening
to strike thus endangering the "national health or safety;" it is against
labor that the injunction has been issued; it is up to labor to accept or
reject the final offer of the employer. This places the pressure
undeniably on labor. The public in its anxiety to prevent a fuel or food
shortage may consider any last offer of the employer as a fair one which
labor should accept. The psychological effect of the injunction and the
hostile attitude of the public may lead the employees to accept the employ
last offer although it may not be a satisfactory one.
All this, of course, is only one of the possible outcomes in the
event a national emergency is declared. There are labor leaders who have
a penchant for creating national. emergencies and for making unreasonable
demands. This evil must be overcome, and a cooling off period is
necessary to allow a proper sifting of the issues before a disastrous
strike occurs. The question is whether such a cooling off period in a
national emergency is to be secured by an injunction, especially when the
injunction may be procured regardless of any provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Yet the Taft-Hartley Act stipulates several times that
injunctions are not to be limited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act is subject to abrogation not only in
case of a national emergency but also where the union is guilty of unfair
labor practices under the Act, and the Board decides to act against the
union by asking for an injunction. To negate the Norris-LaGuardia Act in
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this manner may place labor in the position that it occupied prior to
March 23, 1932. This thesis has endeavored to show the demoralizing
stigma that was attached to the injunction, and the ease with which it was
abused before the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Taft-Hartley Act may make it
possible for some of these abuses to reoccur, especially if the Act is
administered by a Board and under an Administration which is not friendly
to labor. In securing cooling off periods and in restraining unfair
labor practices on the part of labor, the type of injunction defined by the
Taft-Hartley Law could conceivably contain drag-net clauses and blanket
clauses and be subject to the type of abuses discussed in Chapter XIII.
CONCLUSION
Although the Taft-Hartley Act, by providing for the abrogation
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in certain instances, appears to resuscitate
the use of the injunction in labor disputes, actually the revival of the
labor injunction on a large scale is merely hypothetical. It is unlikely
at the moment that the labor injunction ’.Till assume its former importance
in the American labor scene. For one thing, the raison d* etre for the
indiscriminate issuance of labor injunctions no longer exists. Many of
the actions that were enjoined prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act no longer
can be restrained because they have become the guaranteed rights of labor
under the law. Even the Taft-Hartley Act continues to guarantee certain
basic rights of labor. These include the right to organize for collective
bargaining purposes, the right to strike, and the right to picket. The
0
yellow-dog contract can no longer be enforced by the courts. The former
wide area of injunctive action does not exist today. It will be recalled
that most of the landmark cases discussed in this thesis involved the
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restraining of what are now the recognized rights of labor. It is true that)
certain actions by labor are now forbidden by the Taft-Hartley Act as unfair)
labor practices. These include sympathetic strikes, secondary boycotts,
7
and jurisdictional disputes. But even these restrictions may not be as
drastic as they appear on the surface. While unions may not actively
initiate a secondary boycott, the right to publicize the facts in a labor
dispute still remains, and there is no law which prevents union sympathizers
from voluntarily boycotting the products of the employer involved. The
fact that labor may have to forego jurisdictional disputes may prove a
boon to labor unions. The right to engage in such a dispute is of
doubtful value, and may be detrimental to the unity of the labor movement.
Despite its apprehensions over the Taft-Hartley Act, labor may
still enjoy its basic rights and remain free from injunctive action by
vrorking within the framework of the Act. This is not to say that the Act
is perfect or to prognosticate how the Act will work out in practice. It
is too early as yet to predict how the Taft-Hartley Law will affect
employer-employee relations; there are many unforeseen factors which may
play a role in the interpretation and application of the Act. Just as the
purport of other labor legislation was extracted from the area of judicial
experience, so too must the Taft-Hartley Act await interpretation until the
Supreme Court rules upon it. One thing is evident as this time: Unless
the Taft-Hartley Act completely breaks down or labor refuses to work within
its framework, the labor injunction will play only a minor role in the
American labor scene.
7 See Appendix III for complete list of unfair labor practices.
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Certainly the Taft-Hartley Act is not the last step in the
search for a solution to the labor problem. Amendments to the Act are
already being considered, and there Trill be other labor legislation passed.
It has been seen that in the ebb and flow of federal labor legislation,
the conduct of both capital and labor has been an important factor in
instituting changes in the law. Whatever course future legislation may
take depends in part upon labor leaders and employers. If the road leads
to complete government control, they must share the responsibility. Both
capital and labor have a vast accumulation of experience from which to
derive a valuable lesson: Extreme measures and abuse of power and
privilege will in the long run unleash violent reaction.
.> .
AN ABSTRACT

AN ABSTRACT
The labor injunction was catapulted from the comparative obscurity
of the state courts into national prominence in the Pullman Strike of I89I1
,
which marked the beginning of the issuance of labor injunctions by federal
courts. For the next thirty-eight years the activities of organized labor
were greatly restricted by the labor injunction. Daring this period the
labor injunction was the center of a bitter controversy which finally
culminated in the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, restricting
the injunction to labor disputes involving fraud and violence.
It is the purpose of this study to seek out the raison d 1 etre for
the Norris-LaGuardia Act by examining the area of experience from which the
Act emerged and to ascertain the status of the labor injunction today. The
study proceeds along four major lines: First, a brief examination of equity!
jurisprudence
;
second, an examination of the doctrines of conspiracy and of
restraint of trade and their connection with the labor injunction; third,
an analysis of federal legislation which has influenced the course of
injunctive action; fourth, a study of the landmark decisions of the Supreme
Court dealing with the labor injunction.
Equity jurisprudence is based upon remedial justice which began toi
develop in England as early as the time of William the Conqueror. In time
certain precepts became the basis of equity jurisdiction. The more
important of these principles are that suits in equity may be instituted
where there is no adequate remedy at law and irreparable injury to property
nay ensue or is threatened. In such a situation a court of equity may
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issue an injunction which forbids acts which it considers contrary to equity
and good conscience. The concept of property within this framework included
not only tangible property but also the right to do business.
It was not the injunction, however, that was originally used to
protect '’property" from the encroachments of labor but the doctrine of
conspiracy which was applied as early as 151$ in England against combina-
tions of workmen. In brief, the doctrine of conspiracy as it applied to
labor condemned as criminal any combination of laborers to better their
working conditions. This concept achieved its greatest prominence in
American labor disputes during the early part of the nineteenth century.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of conspiracy
was replaced by a more efficacious legal device—the injunction. In
reality the doctrine of conspiracy was not discarded, for it formed the
basis of the federal legislation under which injunctions could be issued
against labor.
The injunction was first used against labor in England in 1868 in
j
Springhead Spinning Co . v. Riley where the court restrained picketing and
the display of signs by the defendants because it found such actions
injurious to the property of the plaintiff. Property in this case was
interpreted as the right to do business. The labor injunction, however,
did not take root in England; it was in the United States that it attained
its fullest development. After this early English case, the labor injunc-
tion began to be issued with increasing frequency by the state courts in
America. In Sherry v. Perkins
,
a Massachusetts court restrained picketing
by union workers in 1888 . Two years later the passage of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act laid the basis for the issuance of injunctions in federal cases.
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The Sherman Act of 1890 was at first intended to render illegal
15U
business combinations in restraint of interstate commerce. In time the
Supreme Court interpreted the Act as applying to combinations of labor as
well as business, and one method of enforcing the Act was injunction pro-
ceedings instituted by the Government.
In 18 9U the federal labor injunction was used with telling effect
in the Pullman Strike when the principle was established that conduct by
labor which endangered interstate commerce could be enjoined by a federal
court. Eugene bebs and other labor leaders who refused to obey the
injunction were found in contempt of court and sentenced to prison. In
addition the injunction was issued not only against the parties to the
dispute but also against "a^one whomsoever". This was the famous
"omnibus" injunction which rendered anyone who disobyed its provisions
liable to contempt proceedings.
V/ithin the next two decades such economic weapons as strikes,
picketing, and boycotts were enjoined when the courts found that they
interfered with interstate commerce or that they caused irreparable damage
to property (including the right to do business). Attempts to organize
workers who had signed yellow-dog contracts promising not to join a union
were also restrained. Unions found it difficult to organize interstate
industries or to get employers to bargain collectively with them when the
slightest economic pressure on their part could be countered with an
injunction. Thus the agitation began for legislation excluding Labor from
the provisions of the anti-trust laws and offering Labor relief from the
injunction. The Clayton Act of 191U contained some labor provisions which
many thought to restrict the use of the labor injunction. The language
of the Act proved to be ambimious, however, for the Supreme Court ruled
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that the Act had not changed anything that had theretofore been considered
law, and more injunctions were issued under the Clayton Act than ever
S
} before. The court’s opinion and the Act in reality broadened the scope
for injunctive action, for it permitted private parties to seek injunc-
tions whereas this right had been reserved to the Government under the
Sherman Act.
The 1920’s witnessed the issuance of a series of labor in junct.ior 5
which reaffirmed the employer’s right to injunctive action. The Duplex
Case established the principle that an injunction was not limited by
Section 20 of the Clayton Act except in those labor disputes between an
employer and his employees. An emnloyer’ s business was deemed a property
right which could be protected by the injunction under Section 20 of the
Clayton Act. In the Bedford Cut Stone Case in 1927, the Supreme Court
upheld an injunction restraining union labor from simole refusal to
work on stone cut by non-union labor. In Truax v. Corrigan
,
the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional an Arizona statute which permitted peace-
ful picketing on the grounds that such a law denied equal protection of
the laws as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
These decisions demonstrated that the Clayton Act had failed to
provide adequate injunctive relief. Meanwhile it had become evident that
the labor injunction was amenable to certain abuses, the more important
of which were:
(a) The issuance of ex parte restraining orders without
notice to the union or its members.
(b) An injunction thought wrongfully issued had to be
obeyed.
(c) Injunctions were often obtained on the basis of
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stereotyped complaints which bore no relations to the actual facts in the
case, but were used merely because the wording had proved to be a success-
ful formula in previous cases.
(d) Temporary and permanent injunctions were often issued
solely on the basis of highly colored and conflicting affidavits without
the opportunity to cross-examine vdtnesses in open court.
(e) Drag-net clauses in some injunctions prohibited any
act whatsoever
.
Consequently, at times certain basic freedoms were
enjoined.
(f) The issuance of omnibus or blanket injunctions which
restrained all persons whomsoever. This prevented anyone fron rendering
any sort of aid to the persons enjoined, and forced persons who vrere not
actual parties to the dispute to pay heed to the terms of the injunction.
(g) Contempt proceedings were held without a jury, and the
same judge presided who had issued the injunction.
These abuses, in addition to the adverse decisions in the Supreme
Court during the 1920's, intensified labor's efforts to secure injunctive
reform. The American Federation of Labor was particularly active in this
anti-injunction campaign, and it was aided by many legal experts who
wished to see the inequities of the injunction abolished. The latter,
foremost among whom was Professor Felix Frankfurter, presented sound legal
arguments as to why a reform was needed in injunction procedure. In the
early 1930' s, the political and economic situation helped to create a
suitable climate for anti-injunction legislation, and on March 23, 1932,
Congress passed the Norris-LaC-uardia Law.
Briefly, the Norris-LaGuardia Act corrected all of the abuses
mentioned above, and it allowed labor to employ its economic weapons
*.
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unhampered by the injunction, provided it did not resort to fraud or
violence. Within the next decade the Supreme Court gave substance to the
wording of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and labor was at last emancipated from
abusive injunctive action.
Meanwhile the Wagner Act of 1935 gave labor the right to organize
for collective bargaining purposes, and many methods used theretofore by
employers in combatting unions were declared unfair labor practices. This
pro-labor legislation in the 1930’ s fostered the growth of labor unions
both in size and power. The abuses of a few labor leaders, however, helped
to kindle the reaction that was beginning to form against the growing power
of labor. This plus the fact that the Wagner Act failed, either to cut down
industrial strife or to eoualize bargaining power between employers and
employees finally led to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 19^7.
Under the Labor-Managment Relations Act of 19U7 certain actions by
the unions are prescribed as unfair labor practices. Should the union
commit these practices, the National Labor Relations Board may issue cease
and desist orders. If this fails to have any effect on the conduct of the
union, the Board may then apply to a federal court for an injunction against
the union. Injunctive action may also be taken against a union in the case
of a strike affecting an entire industry or a substantial part thereof. If
the President deems that such a strike may imperil the national, health or
safety, he may direct the Attorney General to procure an eighty-day injunc-
tion. during this eighty-day period a board of inquiry will investigate
the issues, the parties must make an attempt at conciliation, and the
employees must be given an opportunity to vote upon the employer’s last
offer. Whatever the outcome, the Injunction must be vacated at the
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expiration of the eighty-day period, and if the dispute is not settled at
that tine, the President nay make recommendations to Congress to take
appropriate action.
Theoretically, these provisions of the Taft-Kartley Act abrogate
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to some extent, but actually it is inconceivable
that the labor injunction will assume its former importance on the American
labor scene. While certain defined unfair labor practices such as
secondary boycotts and sympathetic and jurisdictional strikes are forbidden
to unions, the basic rights of Labor are now protected by law and no longer
come within the purview of injunctive action. These basic rights of Labor
are protected from the encroachments of employers who are also restrained
from committing certain defined unfair labor practices. By working within
the framework of the Taft-IIartley Act, Labor may still employ its basic
economic weapons and organize for collective bargaining purposes. Labor’s
adherence to the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act will in part determine
the course of future labor legislation in regard to the labor injunction.
i [|


APPENDIX I
THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90, hi Stat. 70 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.
Sec. 1. That no court of the United States, as herein defined, shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in
a strict conformity with the provisions of this Act; nor shall any such
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to
the public policy declared in this Act.
See* 2. In the interpretation of this Act and in determining the juris-
diction and authority of the courts of the United States, as such juris-
diction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of
the United States is hereby declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate
and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions
of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate
frith his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing,
to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such reoresentatives or in self-
organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
... , ....
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bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following
definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the
courts of the United States are hereby enacted.
Sec. 3. Any undertaking of promise, such as is described in this section,
or any other undertaking or promise in conflict with the public policy
declared in section 2 of this Act, is hereby declared to be contrary to the
public policy of the United States, shall not be enforceable in any court
of the United States and shall not afford any basis for the granting of
legal or equitable relief by any such court, including specifically the
following:
Every undertaking or promise hereafter made, whether written or oral,
express or implied, constituting or contained in any contract or agreement
of hiring or employment between any individual, firm, company, association,
or corporation, and any employee or prospective employee of the same, whereby
(a) Either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises
not to join, become, or remain a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization; or
(b) Either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises
that he will withdraw from an employment relation in the event that he joins,
becomes, or remains a member of any labor or organization or of any employer
organization.
Sec. U. No count of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are
herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
.'
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following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described in section 3 of this Act;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating
or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or
insurance, or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested
in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting,
any action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State:
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any
other method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of
their interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the
acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud
or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such under-
taking or promise as is described in section 3 of this Act.
Sec. 5* No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
a restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground
that any of the persons participating or interested in a labor disoute
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constitute or are engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because
of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated in section U of this Act.
Sec. 6. No officer or member of any association or organization, and
no association or organization participating or interested in a labor
dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United
States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents,
except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization
of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge
thereof.
Sec. 7* No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of
witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support
of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in
opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the
court, to the effect
—
(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless
restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be
issued on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person
or persons, association, or organization making the threat or committing
the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property
will follow;
(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be
t.
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inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than -will be inflicted
upon defendants by the granting of relief;
(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant' |5
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has
been given, in such manner as the court shall direct, to all known persons
against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public
officials of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant’s
property: Provided, however
,
That if a complainant shall also allege that,
unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a
substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will be
unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony
under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a
temporary injunction upon a hearing after notice. Such a temporary
restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and shall
become void at the expiration of said five days. Ho temporary restraining
order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that
complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an
amount to be fixed by the court sufficient to recompense those enjoined
for any loss, expense, or damage cuased by the improvident or erroneous
issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs
(together with a reasonable attorney's fee) and expense of defense against
the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the
same proceeding and subsequently denied by the court.
The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to signify an
:
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agreement entered into by the complainant and surety upon which a decree
may be rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said complainant
and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages of which hearing complainant
and surety shall have reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court for that purpose.
But nothing herein contained shall deprive any party having a claim or
cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his
ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity.
Sec. 8. No restraining order or injunctive relief such be granted to
any complainant who has failed to comply with .any obligations imposed by
law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed
to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by
negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of
mediation or voluntary arbitration.
Sec. 9. No restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction shall
be granted in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except
on the basis of findings of fact made and filed by the court in the record
of the case prior to the issuance of such restraining order or injunction;
and every restraining order or injunction granted in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition of such
specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of in the bill of
complaint or petition filed in such case and as shall be expressly included
in said findings of fact made and filed by the court as provided herein.
Sec. 10. Whenever any court of the United States shall issue or deny
any temporary injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute, the court shall, upon the request of any parly to the proceedings
and on his filing the usual bond for costs, forthwith certify as in
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ordinary cases the record of the case to the circuit court of appeals for
its review. Upon the filing of such record in the circuit court of appeals,
the appeal shall be heard and the temporary injunctive order affirmed,
modified, or set aside with the greatest possible expedition, giving the
proceedings precedence over all other matters except older matters of the
same character.
Sec. 11. In all cases arising under this Act in which a person shall
be charged with contempt in a court of the United States (as herein defined),
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt shall have
been committed: Provided
,
That this right shall not apply to contempts
committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere
directly with the administration of justice or to apply to the misbehavior,
misconduct, or disobedience of any officer of the court in respect to the
writs, orders, or process of the court.
Sec. 12. The defendant in any proceeding for contempt of court may file
with the court a demand for the retirement of the judge sitting in the
proceeding, if the contempt arises from an attack upon the character or
conduct of such judge and if the attack occurred elsewhere than in the
presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere directly with the
administration of justice. Upon the filing of any such demand the judge
shall thereupon proceed no further, but another judge shall be designated
in the same manner as is provided by law. The demand shall be filed prior
to the hearing in the contempt proceeding.
Sec. 13. Vi/hen used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act
—
(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute
.r
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when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade,
craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who
are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an
affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is
(l) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or
more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers
or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of
employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees
and one or more employees or associations of employees; or 'Then the case
involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute" (as
hereinafter defined) of "persons participating or interested" therein
(as hereinafter defined).
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating
or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and
if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in
which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or
is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in whole or in
part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or
occupation.
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
(d) The term "court of the United States" means any court of the United
State whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or defined or limited
by Act of Congress, including the courts of the District of Columbia.
'.
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Sec. ill* If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid,
the remaining provisions of the Act and the application of such provisions
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. If). All Acts and parts of Acts in conflict Kith the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed.
, C .o:
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APPENDIX II
Sections 7 and 8 of the
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
Sec. 7» Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.
Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
—
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization, or contribute financial or other support to it:
Provided
,
That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 6 (a), an employer shall not be prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with him curing working hours without loss
of time or pay.
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization: Provided
,
That nothing in this Act, or in the
National Industrial Recovery Act (U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-
712), as amended from time to time, or in any code or agreement approved or
prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization
(not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act
By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
’,
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as an unfair labor practice) to reauire as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of
the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective
bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.
(U) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subiect to the orovisions of Section 9 (a).
.. OA
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APPENDIX III
Section 8 (b) of the
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 19h7
(The Taft-Hartley Act)
Sec. 8 (b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents
—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 : Provided
,
That this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer
in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership;
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is
the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section
9 (a);
(h) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of
their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring
;v X AO; :
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any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person; (B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or
bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9; (C) forcing or requiring
any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization
as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions
of section 9; (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular
work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular
trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organiza-
tion or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing
to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the
bargaining representative for employees performing such work: Provided
,
That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to make
unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer
(other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are
engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such
employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act;
(5) to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under
subsection (a) (3) the payment, as a condition precedent to becoming a
member of such organization, of a fee in an amount which the Board finds
excessive or discriminatory uncer all the circumstances. In making such a
finding, the Board shall consider, among other relevant factors, the
-•
‘
practices and customs of labor organizations in the particular industry,
and the vrages currently paid to the employees affected; and
(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree
to pay or deliver any money or other tiling of value, in the nature of an
exaction, for services -which are not performed or not to be performed.
(<'
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